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AUGUST 2017 – AUGUST 2018 
CASE LAW ON AMERICAN INDIANS 
 
Thomas P. Schlosser* 
 
I. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
1. Patchak v. Zinke 
No. 16-498, 138 S. Ct. 897 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2018). Neighboring 
landowner brought action challenging decision of the Secretary of 
the Interior to take a parcel of land into trust on behalf of the Match–
E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians for casino use 
pursuant to Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). The District Court, 
646 F. Supp. 2d 72, dismissed action on the basis of standing and 
the Quiet Title Act. Landowner appealed. The appellate court, 632 
F.3d 702, reversed. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, 567 
U.S. 209, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 183 L. Ed. 2d 211, affirmed. On remand, 
the District Court, 109 F. Supp. 3d 152, entered summary judgment 
against landowner, based on Congress’s enactment of the Gun Lake 
Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, which reaffirmed the Department’s 
decision to take the land into trust and stripped federal courts of 
jurisdiction over actions “relating to” the land. Appeal was taken. 
The appellate court, 828 F.3d 995, affirmed. Certiorari was granted. 
The Supreme Court held that Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation 
Act did not violate separation of powers.  
 
 
                                               
*Mr. Schlosser represents Tribes in fisheries, timber, water, energy, cultural 
resources, contracting, tax and federal breach of trust. He is a director of Morisset, 
Schlosser, Jozwiak & Somerville, where he specializes in federal litigation, 
natural resources, and Indian tribal property issues. He is also frequently involved 
in tribal economic development and environmental regulation. In 1970s, Tom 
represented tribes in the Stevens’ Treaty Puget Sound fishing rights proceedings. 
Tom has a B.A. from the University of Washington and a J.D. from the University 
of Virginia Law School. Tom is a founding member of the Indian Law Section of 
the Washington State Bar Association and also served on the WSBA Bar 
Examiners Committee. Tom is a frequent CLE speaker and moderates an 
American Indian Law discussion group for lawyers at 
http://forums.delphiforums.com/IndianLaw/messages. He is a part-time lecturer 
at the University of Washington School of Law and Seattle University School of 
Law.  
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2. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren 
No. 17–387, 138 S. Ct. 1649 (U.S. May. 21, 2018). Property owners 
brought action against Indian tribe, which owned land adjacent to 
owners’ property, seeking to quiet title to property that owners 
claimed to have acquired through adverse possession before original 
owner sold adjacent property to the tribe. Tribe moved to dismiss 
based on tribe’s sovereign immunity. The Superior Court, Skagit 
County, Dave Needy, J., denied motion, and Susan K. Cook, J., 
granted summary judgment to property owners. Tribe moved for 
direct discretionary review. After accepting review, the Supreme 
Court of Washington, 187 Wash. 2d 857, 389 P.3d 569, affirmed. 
Certiorari was granted. U.S. 138 S. Ct. 543. The Supreme Court, 
Justice Gorsuch, held that: (1) in rem nature of property owners’ 
action did not, by itself, establish that suit was outside scope of 
tribe’s sovereign immunity, and (2) Court would not affirm on 
alternative common-law ground that tribe could not assert sovereign 
immunity because suit related to immovable property located in 
Washington state that was purchased by the tribe in same manner as 
a private individual. Vacated and remanded.  
 
3. Washington v. U.S. 
No. 17-269, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (Mem), 86 USLW 361,  
186 USLW 4400 (U.S. Jun. 11, 2018). The judgment is affirmed by 
an equally divided Court. Justice Kennedy took no part in the 
decision of this case.  
II. OTHER COURTS 
A. Administrative Law 
4. Nakai v. Zinke 
No. 16–cv–1500, 279 F. Supp. 3d 38 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2017). 
Applicant for Indian preference brought pro se action against 
Department of Interior (DOI) and various DOI employees, 
challenging the denial of her application by the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA). Applicant moved to complete the administrative 
record, defendants moved to dismiss, and applicant moved to strike 
some of defendants’ arguments from their reply brief in support of 
their motion to dismiss. The District Court held that: (1) action was 
rendered moot by Solicitor of the Interior’s remand of application 
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back to the Regional Director of the BIA for reconsideration of 
applicant’s application based on her Indian heritage pursuant to 
regulation governing Indian preference for BIA positions; (2) DOI’s 
interpretation of the Lumbee Act, to preclude applicant for Indian 
preference from receiving benefit, based on her Lumbee heritage, 
was substantially justified, and thus, applicant would not be entitled 
to attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, even if she 
would prevail and be granted Indian preference on remand; and 
(3) district court would decline to strike arguments in DOI’s reply 
brief supporting its motion to dismiss. Motion to dismiss granted; 
motions to complete the record and to strike denied. 
5. Cherokee Nation v. Nash 
No. 13–01313, 267 F. Supp. 3d 86 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2017). 
Cherokee tribe brought action seeking declaration that descendants 
of freed non-Indian slaves no longer had rights to citizenship in 
tribe. Department of Interior (DOI) and putative class of freed slaves 
intervened as defendants. DOI filed counterclaim for declaration 
that freed slaves retained tribal citizenship under Article 9 of the 
Treaty with the Cherokee, 14 Stat. 799 (July 19, 1866). Parties filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court held that: 
(1) term “all,” as used in treaty that guaranteed “all the rights of 
native Cherokees” to freed slaves of the tribe, was unambiguous in 
its scope and covered the entirety of rights with no limitation 
whatsoever; (2) treaty gave qualified free slaves the right to 
citizenship in Cherokee Nation to same extent that native Cherokees 
had; and (3) extant descendants of freed slaves, whose ancestors had 
resided in Cherokee Territory within six months of ratification, were 
entitled to rights of Cherokee citizens, including citizenship. 
Ordered accordingly. 
6. Mdewakanton Sioux Indians of Minnesota v. Zinke 
No.16–2323, 264 F. Supp. 3d 116 (D.D.C. Sep. 1, 2017). Putative 
Indian tribe and three individuals who allegedly belonged to tribe 
brought action against Secretary of Department of the Interior and 
United States, alleging that Department’s failure to consult 
regarding proposed amendments to constitution of Indian 
community and changes to federal land assignment system violated 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and seeking declaratory 
and injunctive relief. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies and on statute of limitations 
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grounds. The District Court held that: (1) plaintiffs failed to show 
that waiver was warranted for their failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies; (2) district court would convert government’s motion to 
dismiss into motion for summary judgment; and (3) claim accrued, 
and six-year limitations period for suits against the United States 
began to run, when plaintiffs contacted Department requesting 
consultation regarding constitutional amendments and land 
assignments. Motion granted. 
7. Forest County Potawatomi Community v. United States 
No. 15–105, 270 F. Supp. 3d 174 (D.D.C. Sep. 12, 2017). Indian 
tribe brought action under Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
against the United States, challenging Department of Interior’s 
(DOI) decision not to approve an amendment to a gaming compact 
between the tribe and State of Wisconsin under Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act (IGRA). After a second tribe and its gaming 
authority were granted leave to intervene as defendants, 317 F.R.D. 
6, plaintiff moved to supplement the administrative record, and 
intervenors moved both to supplement the administrative record and 
to exclude documents from the administrative record. The District 
Court held that: (1) administrative record would not be 
supplemented with records of meetings and calls among DOI 
official, Wisconsin, and another tribe; (2) administrative record 
would not be supplemented with news reports and other public 
documents relating to the proposed amendment; (3) administrative 
record would not be supplemented with four gaming compacts and 
compact-related agreements between other tribes and other states; 
(4) administrative record would not be supplemented with 
documents referred to in legal memoranda submitted by another 
tribe that opposed the amendment; (5) administrative record would 
not be supplemented with documents related to a settlement 
agreement in a separate suit involving another Indian tribe; and 
(6) administrative record would not be supplemented with financial 
reports that were not considered by DOI. Plaintiff’s motion denied, 
and intervenor defendants’ motion granted in part and denied in part. 
8. Forest County Potawatomi Community v. Zinke 
No. 14–2201, 278 F. Supp. 3d 181 (D.D.C. Sep. 30, 2017). 
Requester, an Indian tribe, brought action against Department of the 
Interior and its component agencies under Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA), seeking response to FOIA requests it had filed 
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regarding documents pertaining to another tribe that sought to open 
a competing gaming facility. Parties filed cross motions for 
summary judgment. The District Court held that: (1) internal records 
of environmental contractor that worked on competing facility were 
“created or obtained” by agencies; but (2) agencies did not control 
contractor’s internal records at time of FOIA request, which thus 
were not agency records under FOIA; (3) documents withheld were 
“commercial” within meaning of FOIA exemption applicable to 
privileged or confidential commercial documents; (4) disclosure of 
commercial documents did not pose serious risk to government’s 
ability to receive such information in future, but (5) disclosure of 
documents created a substantial likelihood of competitive harm to 
applicant tribe, so documents were exempt from disclosure under 
FOIA; and (6) agencies did not engage in policy or practice of FOIA 
noncompliance. Department and officers’ motion granted in part 
and denied in part; requester’s motion denied. 
9. County of Amador, California v. United States 
Department of the Interior, et al.  
No. 15-17253, 872 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 2017). County 
brought action against Department of Interior (DOI), challenging 
record of decision announcing its intention to take land into trust for 
benefit of Indian Tribe and allowing Tribe to build a casino on land. 
Tribe intervened as defendant. The District Court, 136 F. Supp. 3d 
1193, granted summary judgment to DOI and Tribe. County 
appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) as matter of first 
impression, phrase “recognized Indian tribe now under Federal 
jurisdiction,” in IRA includes all tribes that are “recognized” at the 
time of the relevant decision and that were “under Federal 
jurisdiction” at the time the IRA was passed; (2) DOI’s 
interpretation of phrase “under Federal Jurisdiction” in provision of 
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) defining an “Indian” entitled to 
IRA’s benefits was best interpretation; (3) DOI’s determination that 
tribe was “under Federal jurisdiction” when IRA was passed was 
not arbitrary and capricious; and (4) grandfathering provision in 
DOI regulation implementing Indian Gaming Regulatory Act’s  
(IGRA) “restored tribe” exception was in accordance with IGRA. 
Defendants’ motions granted, plaintiff’s denied. 
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10. Moody v. United States, 
No. 16–107C, 135 Fed. Cl. 39 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 13, 2017). Lessees, 
who had entered into five agricultural leases with Indian tribe, 
brought action against United States, alleging that government 
breached leases by terminating them and ordering lessees to vacate 
land, and that government’s actions constituted taking without just 
compensation under Fifth Amendment. Government moved to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state 
claim. The Court of Federal Claims held that: (1) there was no 
privity of contract between United States and lessees; 
(2) conversation between lessees and government official could not 
have created implied in fact contract; (3) government lacked 
authority to enter into implied in fact contract to allow lessees to 
continue farming after their leases were cancelled; and (4) because 
lessees alleged that government violated regulations in 25 C.F.R. §§ 
162.247–162.256, rather than acted lawfully pursuant to the 
regulations, in terminating leases, lessees could not state Fifth 
Amendment takings claim. Motion to dismiss granted.  
11. Nooksack Indian Tribe v. Zinke 
No. C17-0219, 2017 WL 5455519 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 14, 2017). 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for 
reconsideration of the Court’s Order denying Plaintiff’s motion for 
preliminary injunction and granting Defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment (Dkt. No. 43). This lawsuit was initiated by 
members of the Nooksack Tribal Council, including “holdover” 
members who continued to occupy their seats on the Council 
after their terms expired in March 2016. Defendants consist of the 
Department of the Interior (“DOI”), Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(“BIA”) and members of the agencies’ leadership.  On May 11, 
2017, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, 
holding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the 
holdover Council lacked authority to bring its claims on behalf of 
the Tribe during the period where DOI had refused to recognize 
tribal leadership. The Court subsequently denied Plaintiff’s motion 
for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff filed a motion for 
reconsideration and Defendants responded. Before the Court 
addressed the motion, the parties filed a joint motion for a 120-day 
stay of proceedings. The Court granted the stay and the parties filed 
a joint status report at the end of the 120-day period. During the stay, 
the parties conducted negotiations that resulted in the execution of a 
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Memorandum of Agreement (“MOA”) between Robert Kelly, the 
Chairman of the Tribal Council, and Michael Black, the Acting-
Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs. The MOA outlines a process 
through which the federal government will once again recognize the 
Nooksack Tribal Council as the governing body of the Nooksack 
Tribe. Under the MOA, the Tribe must hold a special election and 
the results must be endorsed by the BIA. In addition, the MOA 
reiterated that DOI only recognizes actions taken by the Nooksack 
Tribal Council prior to March 24, 2016 when a quorum existed. The 
special election is scheduled for December 2, 2017 to replace the 
“held-over” council members. In the parties’ joint status report, 
Plaintiff asked the Court to immediately renote its motion for 
reconsideration. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was denied.  
12. Allen v. United States of America 
No. C16-04403, 2017 WL 5665664 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2017). In 
this Indian tribal rights action, plaintiffs move for summary 
judgment. Federal defendants oppose and cross-move for summary 
judgment. For the reasons herein, federal defendants’ motion is 
granted and plaintiffs’ motion is denied. Plaintiffs are a group of 
Indians seeking to organize as the Ukiah Valley Pomo Indian Tribe 
on the Pinoleville Rancheria where they reside. The Rancheria is 
already home to the Pinoleville Pomo Nation (previously known as 
the Pinoleville Indian Community and the Pinoleville Band of Pomo 
Indians), a federally recognized tribe, members of which also reside 
on the Rancheria. Though the two groups were previously a single, 
unified tribe, our plaintiffs have since relinquished their 
membership in the Pomo Nation. Based on the foregoing, the 
Regional Director acted within her discretion to determine that a 
tribe cannot be comprised of only a subset of the Indians residing on 
a reservation. Because plaintiffs comprise only a part of the group 
for whom the Pinoleville Reservation was established and are only 
some of the Indians living on the Reservation, the Regional Director 
was within her discretion when she denied them the right to seek 
organization. Her determination follows from the language of the 
statute and implementing regulation and is not “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law.”  
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13. Bahe v. Office of Navajo 
No. CV-17-08016, 2017 WL 6618872 (D. Ariz. Dec. 28, 2017). 
Plaintiff Hedy Bahe, on behalf of her deceased husband, Jerry Bahe, 
seeks judicial review of the administrative decision by Defendant 
Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation (ONHIR) denying 
Plaintiff relocation benefits under the Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act. 
Before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary 
judgment. The motions are fully briefed and neither side requested 
oral argument. In 1882, a reservation was established in northeastern 
Arizona for the Hopi Nation and “such other Indians as the Secretary 
of Interior may see fit to settle thereon.” Bedoni v. Navajo-Hopi 
Indian Relocation Comm’n, 878 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1989). 
Members of the Navajo Nation subsequently settled on the 
reservation alongside the Hopi. “The Hopi and Navajo [Nations] 
coexisted on the 1882 reservation for seventy-five years, but became 
entangled in a struggle as to which [nation] had a clear right to the 
reservation lands.” In 1962, this district court found that the two 
tribes held joint, undivided interests in most of the reservation, 
which was called the “joint use area” (JUA). Twelve years later, 
after establishment of the JUA failed to solve inter-tribal conflicts 
over the land, Congress passed the Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act in 
1974. The Act authorized the district court to make a final partition 
of the reservation after mediation efforts between the nations had 
failed. See Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 626 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 
1980.) The Act also directed creation of the ONHIR’s predecessor, 
the Navajo-Hopi Relocation Commission, to provide services and 
benefits to help relocate residents who were located on lands 
allocated to the other nation as a result of the court-ordered partition. 
See Bedoni, 878 F.2d at 1121-22; 25 U.S.C. § 640d-11. To be 
eligible for relocation benefits, a Navajo applicant bears the burden 
of demonstrating that he or she was (1) a legal resident on the Hopi 
Partitioned Lands (HPL) on December 22, 1974, and (2) a head of 
household on or before July 7, 1986. 25 C.F.R. § 700.147. In May 
2005, Jerry Bahe, a member of the Navajo Nation, applied for 
relocation benefits. In October 2005, ONHIR denied Bahe’s 
application, finding that he “did not reside on [HPL] on December 
22, 1974.” In November 2005, Bahe timely appealed ONHIR’s 
decision. Bahe died in 2006, after which Plaintiff continued to 
pursue the claim pursuant to ONHIR’s surviving spouse policy. An 
independent hearing officer (IHO) held an appeal hearing. In 2011, 
the IHO issued a written opinion upholding the ONHIR’s denial, 
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finding that “[t]he greater weight of evidence shows that, on 
December 22, 1974, [Jerry Bahe] was a legal resident of Jeddito 
Island, an area which was later partitioned for the use of the Navajo 
[Nation].” The IHO’s ruling became Defendant’s final decision 
when it affirmed the ruling on July 18, 2011. Plaintiff then 
commenced this action for judicial review pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 
§ 640d-14(g) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 
U.S.C. § 701 et. seq. On appeal, Plaintiff makes four arguments: 
(1) the IHO applied an incorrect legal standard when assessing 
whether Plaintiff was a resident of HPL at the time of the statutory 
cut-off date; (2) even if the IHO applied the correct legal standard, 
his decision is not supported by substantial evidence; (3) the IHO’s 
credibility findings are arbitrary and capricious; and (4) the ONHIR 
breached its fiduciary duty to Plaintiff. The court found that 
Defendant’s decision denying Plaintiff relocation benefits is 
reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, it is 
ordered that Defendant’s administrative decision denying Plaintiff’s 
application for relocation benefits is affirmed. The Clerk entered 
judgment accordingly and terminated this case. 
14. Stand Up for California! v. United States Department of 
Interior 
No. 16-5327, consolidated with 16-5328, 879 F.3d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 
Jan. 12, 2018). Community groups and Indian tribe with competing 
casino brought action challenging Department of Interior’s decision 
to take a tract of land into trust for the North Fork Rancheria of 
Mono Indians and authorize it to operate a casino there. The District 
Court, 204 F.Supp. 3d 212, granted partial summary judgment to 
Department and dismissed remaining claims. Plaintiffs appealed. 
The appellate court held that: (1) Indian tribe constituted a 
“recognized Indian tribe” at time that Indian Reorganization Act 
(IRA) was passed; (2) substantial evidence supported Department’s 
conclusion that Indian tribe, as it currently existed, could trace its 
roots to Indians who lived on tribe’s reservation at time that IRA 
was passed; (3) court would defer to Department’s reasonable 
interpretation of provision of Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
(IGRA) that required an Indian casino to not be a detriment to the 
surrounding community; (4) substantial evidence supported 
Department’s determination that permitting Indian tribe to operate a 
casino on its newly acquired lands would not be detrimental to the 
surrounding community; and (5) relevant date for Department’s 
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analysis of whether proposed casino would comply with Clean Air 
Act (CAA) requirements was when the Department initially made 
its determination, rather than when it reissued its determination on 
remand. Affirmed.  
15. Chissoe v. Zinke 
No. 16-5172, 725 Fed. Appx. 614 (10th Cir. Feb. 16, 2018). 
Personal representative of estate of owner of restricted Indian land 
appealed decision of the Interior Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA) 
upholding denial of application to complete transfer of land to 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). The United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Oklahoma, No. 4:15-CV-00166, Claire V. 
Eagan, 2016 WL 5390890, affirmed. Personal representative 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Circuit 
Judge, held that: (1) BIA had not made final decision to acquire 
property; (2) Secretary of the Interior acted reasonably in 
interpreting applicable statute and regulation to require that 
applicant be living at time of agency’s decision regarding whether 
to take restricted Indian land into trust; and (3) remand was 
warranted for district court to determine whether personal 
representative was entitled to exception to exhaustion requirement. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
16. Burt Lake Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. 
Zinke 
No. 17–0038, 304 F. Supp. 3d 70 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2018). Plaintiff 
Burt Lake Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians (formerly known 
as the Cheboygan Band) describes itself as “the last ‘landless’ tribe 
in Michigan.” This case arises out of the fact that plaintiff has been 
seeking formal federal recognition, which would give the Burt Lake 
Band (or “the Band”) a number of rights and benefits, since at least 
1935. In 1935, a group of the Band’s ancestors petitioned the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) within the Department of Interior to be 
recognized under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. Am. The 
agency has never issued a final decision on the 1935 Petition. In 
1985, the Band filed another petition. The 1985 petition went 
unanswered for more than 20 years, until it was denied in 2006. 
Plaintiff did not seek review of the 2006 decision. In 2014, the BIA 
initiated a rulemaking to reform the federal recognition process, and 
it solicited comments on a proposed rule that would revise the 
existing regulations. Fed. Acknowledgment of Am. Indian Tribes, 
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79 Fed. Reg. 30766 (proposed May 29, 2014) (to be codified at 25 
C.F.R. pt. 83) (“Proposed Rule”). One of the provisions in the 
proposal sent out for notice and comment, would have allowed 
Tribes to re-petition the agency for recognition under certain 
circumstances. Ultimately, the agency chose not to adopt that 
provision, stating that “allowing for re-petitioning by denied 
petitioners would be unfair to petitioners who have not yet had a 
review,” and identifying other efficiency concerns. Fed. 
Acknowledgment of Am. Indian Tribes, 80 Fed. Reg. 37862, 37875 
(July 1, 2015) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 83) (“2015 
Regulations”). Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on January 9, 2017 and 
filed an amended complaint on June 1, 2017. The amended 
complaint includes seven constitutional and statutory claims. 
Counts I, II, and III challenge the agency’s failure to issue a final 
decision on the 1935 Petition under the APA, the Due Process 
Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause of the 5th Amendment. 
Counts IV, V, and VI challenge the agency’s 2015 Regulations 
under the APA, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection 
Clause. Counts IV, V, and VI will proceed because the Court finds 
that plaintiff has standing to challenge the 2015 Regulations.  
17. Nipmuc Nation v. Zinke 
No. 14–40013, 305 F. Supp. 3d 257 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2018). The 
Nipmuc Nation (“Plaintiff”, “Nipmuc Nation” or “Petitioner 69A”), 
has filed a Petition for Review of a final administrative 
determination by Secretary Ryan Zinke, the United States 
Department of the Interior (“DOI”), Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(“BIA”), Office of Federal Acknowledgment, and the United States 
of America (collectively, the “Defendants”). Plaintiff seeks a ruling 
that the Defendants’ Final Determination against federal 
acknowledgment was arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, 
against the substantial evidence and not in accordance with the law 
(Count One); that the BIA failed to follow the applicable regulations 
set forth in 25 C.F.R. § 83 et seq. and therefore, the Defendants’ 
Final Determination against federal acknowledgment violated 
Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights (Count Two); and that the 
BIA’s refusal to consider evidence in support of Plaintiff’s Petition, 
despite its consideration of such evidence in the applications of other 
similarly situated tribes seeking federal acknowledgment, deprived 
Plaintiff of its right to equal protection under the law (Count Three). 
Essentially, Plaintiffs seeks a declaration that it has satisfied the 
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legal criteria for federal acknowledgment as an Indian tribe under 
the laws of the United States of America. Accordingly, Plaintiff 
asked the Court to vacate Defendants’ Final Determination against 
federal acknowledgment and reverse it, or, alternatively, to vacate 
the Final Determination and remand Plaintiff’s Petition to 
Defendants with instructions to reconsider the Petition consistent 
with the findings of this Court. The Court found that Defendants’ 
determination that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the requisite criterion for 
federal acknowledgment was not arbitrary or capricious. 
Additionally, the Court did not find that either the procedure utilized 
by the Defendants, or their decision denying Plaintiff federal 
acknowledgment deprived the Plaintiff of its Fifth Amendment right 
to due process. Defendant’s motion granted.   
18. Butte County, California v. Chaudhuri 
No. 16-5240, 887 F.3d 501 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 13, 2018). County in 
which parcel of land was located that Indian tribe sought to have 
taken into trust to operate a casino on brought action against 
National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) challenging Secretary 
of Interior’s decision to take land into trust. The District Court, 197 
F. Supp. 3d 82, granted summary judgment to NIGC. County 
appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) Secretary did not abuse 
her discretion in reopening administrative record on remand; 
(2) Secretary’s grant of 15-day extension to tribe to submit its 
response to county’s submission of new evidence was not improper; 
(3) Secretary acted within her authority in setting a 20-day deadline 
for county to respond to tribe’s expert’s rebuttal report; and 
(4) Secretary’s determination that members of modern-day tribe 
were biological descendants of members of pre-1850 tribe was not 
arbitrary and capricious. Affirmed.  
19. Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of Colusa Indian 
Community v. Zinke 
No. 17-15245, No. 17-15533, 889 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. May 2, 2018). 
Indian tribe with a casino, citizens’ groups, and individuals brought 
action to enjoin the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) from taking 
parcel of land into trust for another Indian tribe so that it could build 
a casino and hotel complex. The District Court, No. 2:12-cv-03021-
TLN-AC, 2015 WL 5648925, granted summary judgment to 
defendants and, 2017 WL 345220, denied reconsideration. Plaintiffs 
appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) BIA had authority 
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under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) to take parcel of land 
into trust for the tribe seeking to build a casino; (2) BIA’s decision 
under IRA, that the Indian tribe seeking to build a casino needed 
BIA to take parcel of land into trust for it for economic development, 
was not arbitrary and capricious; (3) BIA’s misdescription of parcel 
of land in notice of final agency determination did not render its 
decision arbitrary and capricious; (4) BIA satisfied Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act’s (IGRA) requirement for consultation with the tribe 
that owned a casino; (5) regulatory definition of “nearby” Indian 
tribe, with which BIA was required to consult under IGRA, was not 
arbitrary and capricious; (6) district court did not abuse its discretion 
when it struck, as outside administrative record, expert declaration; 
(7) BIA’s decision under IGRA, that mitigation measures would 
prevent detrimental harm to surrounding community from new 
Indian casino, was not arbitrary and capricious; and (8) BIA’s final 
environmental impact statement (FEIS) satisfied National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirements. Affirmed.  
20. Stand Up for California! v. United States Department of 
Interior 
No. 1:17-00058, 315 F. Supp. 3d 289 (D.D.C. May 30, 2018). A 
Gambling advocacy group brought action against the Department of 
Interior, challenging adequacy of the administrative record for 
judicial review of the Department’s decision to approve acquiring 
land in trust for Wilton Rancheria tribe of American Indians, 
seeking to supplement the administrative record and seeking 
discovery in form of privilege log from Department. The case arose 
from the Department’s finalization of acquisition of land for the 
tribe’s proposed casino, which was within an entirely different plot 
of land than tribe had proposed in its application to Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA). The District Court held that: (1) plaintiff failed to 
show any unusual circumstances warranting supplementation of 
administrative record; (2) plaintiff made prima facie showing of bad 
faith warranting production of privilege log; and (3) defendant did 
not wholesale waive its deliberative process privilege for documents 
with consultant. Motion to supplement administrative record denied 
and motion for discovery granted. 
21. Chinook Indian Nation v. Zinke 
No. C17-5668 RBL, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1128 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 20, 
2018). This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to 
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Dismiss. Plaintiffs are descendants of the historic Chinook Indian 
tribe and bring suit against the Department of the Interior (DOI) and 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in an effort to compel those 
agencies to add the Chinook Indian Nation (CIN) to the list of 
federally acknowledged tribes. Plaintiffs also challenge regulations 
promulgated by Defendants which prohibit the CIN from re-
petitioning the federal government for tribal acknowledgment. 
Finally, Plaintiffs seek access to funds from a 1970 Indian Claims 
Commission judgment currently held in trust by the DOI for the 
Lower Band of Chinook and Clatsop Indians. Defendants move to 
dismiss all claims, arguing that the Court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction to confer federal acknowledgment on the CIN. 
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the 
re-petition ban, and that the CIN’s claims regarding the funds held 
in trust is not a final agency action which can be challenged under 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). For the reasons that 
follow, the Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. 
This Court reaches the same conclusion as the Burt Lake court and 
determines that Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the re-petition 
ban contained in the 2015 federal acknowledgment regulations. 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claims 2–5 seeks to have the Court 
prematurely address the merits of a re-petition under the 2015 
regulations. At this juncture, however, the Court must construe the 
Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party and accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of material fact. 
Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims 
challenging the re-petition ban at this stage of the litigation. 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss claims 2–5 is denied. 
 
B. Child Welfare Law and ICWA 
 
22. State in Interest of P.F. 
 
No. 20160247, 405 P.3d 755 (Utah Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2017). The 
State petitioned to terminate mother’s parental rights to child. The 
Juvenile Court, No. 1032776, terminated parental rights. Mother 
appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) the placement of child 
with a non-Native American foster family did not violate the Indian 
Child Welfare Act (ICWA), and thus the trial court could consider 
the bond child had with foster family as grounds for good cause to 
depart from the ICWA placement preferences, and (2) the trial court 
was not required to provide special weight to the testimony of 
mother’s expert. Affirmed. 
 
23. Matter of Adoption of B.B. 
No. 20150434, 417 P. 3d 1 (Utah Aug. 31, 2017). Birth father, a 
member of a Native American tribe, moved to intervene in adoption 
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matter after birth mother, a member of the same tribe, had executed 
a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, in which she listed her 
brother-in-law as child’s father, and adoption agency had received 
custody of the child. Following its initial granting of birth father’s 
motion to intervene, the Third District Court denied on 
reconsideration birth father’s motion to intervene and denied birth 
mother’s motion to withdraw her consent to the termination of her 
parental rights. Birth father appealed. The Supreme Court held that: 
(1) birth father was a parent under the Indian Child Welfare Act 
(ICWA) and had right to notice and to intervene in the adoption 
proceedings; (2) birth father had custody of child under the ICWA; 
(3) adoption proceedings were involuntary, not voluntary, as to birth 
father (4) trial court’s order accepting birth mother’s consent to 
child’s adoption under the ICWA and terminating her parental rights 
was not properly presented to the Supreme Court for review; and 
(5) any defect in the timing of birth mother’s consent to adoption of 
child did not deprive trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
Reversed and remanded. 
24. In Interest of S.E. 
No. ED 105382, 527 S.W. 3d 894 (Mo. Ct. App. Sep. 12, 2017). 
Child protection proceedings were initiated after mother’s Indian 
children were alleged to have been abused and neglected. Children’s 
tribe intervened in the proceedings. State then filed a motion to 
terminate mother’s parental rights. Following a hearing, the Circuit 
Court terminated mother’s parental rights. Tribe appealed. The 
appellate court held that: (1) Indian tribe had standing to appeal the 
judgment independently of mother; (2) alleged invalidity of 
mother’s consent to termination of parental rights and trial court’s 
alleged error in certifying child protection worker as an expert 
witness under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not result 
in manifest injustice, and thus plain error review was not 
appropriate; and (3) no manifest injustice resulted from alleged 
insufficiency under ICWA of the trial court’s findings in support of 
the termination of parental rights, and thus plain error was not 
appropriate. Affirmed. 
25. In re A.F. 
No. D072226, 18 Cal. App. 5th 833 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2017). 
After health and human services agency filed dependency petition 
on behalf of Indian minor child and recommended that child remain 
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in her maternal aunt’s care, child’s paternal grandmother filed 
de facto parent request, request for review of agency’s placement 
decision, and request to change a court order. After jurisdictional 
and dispositional issues were bifurcated at contested jurisdiction and 
disposition hearing, the Superior Court made jurisdiction finding of 
dependency, and subsequently entered dispositional order placing 
child in the care of grandmother. Mother appealed. The appellate 
court held that: (1) Indian tribe’s letter indicating its placement 
preference did not modify statutory placement preferences for 
Indian children, and (2) order placing child with her grandmother 
complied with statutory placement preferences. Affirmed. 
26. Interest of K.S.D. 
No. 20170272, No. 20170273, 904 N.W. 2d 479 (N.D. Dec. 7, 
2017). County Social Services filed petition to terminate mother’s 
and father’s parental rights to Native American children. The 
Juvenile Court terminated father’s parental rights, and father 
appealed. The Supreme Court held that: (1) evidence supported 
findings that children were deprived, that deprivation would 
continue, and that father’s continued custody would likely result in 
serious emotional or physical damage to children; (2) active efforts 
were made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs 
designed to prevent breakup of family, as prerequisite to termination 
of parental rights, under Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA); 
(3) under ICWA, qualified expert testimony was required on 
whether father’s continued custody of children was likely to result 
in serious emotional or physical damage to children. Remanded. 
27. In Interest of J.J.T. 
No. 08-17-00162, 544 S.W. 3d 874 (Tex. App. Dec. 20, 2017). 
Department of Family and Protective Services filed petition to 
terminate parental rights to child, who was member of Navajo 
Nation. After denying the Navajo Nation the right to intervene in the 
proceedings, the District Court terminated parental rights of both 
parents and ordered child to remain in foster home. The Navajo 
Nation formally intervened pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act 
(ICWA) and filed a motion requesting a placement hearing. Navajo 
Nation then filed notice of appeal. The appellate court held that: 
(1) Navajo Nation had standing to appeal under ICWA; (2) ICWA 
section allowing tribe to intervene in child custody proceedings for 
an Indian child preempted state rule requiring a written intervention 
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pleading; and (3) evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that mother’s continued custody of child was 
likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child, 
and was not in the child’s best interest. Reversed and remanded. 
28. Matter of IW 
No. 115997, 419 P.3d 362 (Okla. Civ. App. Dec. 29, 2017). State 
petitioned to terminate parental rights of father of minor children of 
Native American descent, alleging father, who resided in Kansas, 
failed to correct conditions which led to minor children’s deprived 
status after he pled no contest to domestic battery for spanking one 
child who suffered significant bruising. The District Court 
terminated father’s parental rights. Father appealed, raising issues 
under state and federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The 
appellate court held that: (1) expert was qualified to testify regarding 
placement of minor children, and (2) expert testimony was 
insufficient to support required finding under ICWA that continued 
custody of children with father was likely to result in serious 
emotional or physical damage to children. Reversed. 
29. State in Interest of A.J.B. 
No. 20160954, 414 P.3d 552 (Utah Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2017). 
Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) moved to terminate 
mother’s parental rights to her minor child. The Eighth District 
Juvenile Court terminated mother’s parental rights. Mother 
appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) child’s relocation, after 
initial custody determination, to community within exterior 
boundaries of Indian tribe’s reservation did not divest Juvenile 
Court of jurisdiction, and (2) Juvenile Court did not abuse its 
discretion by declining to contact tribal court before terminating 
parental rights. Affirmed. 
30. Kiva O. v. State Department of Health & Social Services 
 
No.S-16605, 408 P.3d 1181 (Alaska Jan. 5, 2018). Office of 
Children’s Services (OCS) sought authority of court to consent to 
medicating, over mother’s objection, Indian child in OCS’s custody 
with both an antidepressant and mood stabilizer, as recommended 
by child’s psychiatrist. The Superior Court granted OCS’s request. 
Mother appealed following denial of her request for a stay and 
motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court held that: 
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(1) mother had fundamental constitutional liberty and privacy right 
that was substantially burdened by OCS’s request for authority to 
medicate child over her objection; (2) OCS had compelling interest 
in child’s medical care, as factor in determining whether trial court 
could override mother’s fundamental constitutional liberty and 
privacy right by granting OCS’s request to medicate child over 
mother’s objection; (3) evidence supported finding that treating 
child with antidepressant was in child’s best interests; (4) evidence 
supported finding that there were no available treatments less 
intrusive than treating child with antidepressant; and (5) evidence 
was insufficient to support finding that mood stabilizer was least 
intrusive available treatment to address child’s medical needs. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
 
31. Diego K. v. Department of Health & Social Services, 
Office of Children’s Services 
No. S-16374, 411 P.3d 622 (Alaska Feb. 23, 2018). Office of 
Children’s Services (OCS) petitioned for removal of Indian child 
from parents’ custody. The Superior Court ordered child removed 
from her parents’ home. Parents appealed. The Supreme Court 
remanded for additional findings. Following remand, the Superior 
Court issued order clarifying its removal findings. Parents appealed. 
The Supreme Court held that information from status hearings, 
including unsworn statements made by OCS workers, could not be 
used by trial court to support its order authorizing removal of Indian 
child from parents’ custody. Vacated and remanded.  
 
32. Nguyen v. Gustafson 
 
No. 18-522, 2018 WL 1413463 (D. Minn. Mar. 21, 2018). This 
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction. The underlying facts of this action concern divorce 
proceedings between Plaintiff James V. Nguyen and Defendant 
Amanda G. Gustafson. Gustafson is an enrolled member of the 
Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community, while Nguyen is not a 
member. Nguyen and Gustafson were married in Las Vegas, Nevada 
in 2014, and are the parents of a minor child. Both parties now reside 
in Minnesota. In June 2017, Nguyen filed for dissolution of marriage 
in California state court, as he resided in California at that time. In 
July 2017, Gustafson filed for dissolution of marriage in the 
Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community Tribal Court (“Tribal 
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Court”), a defendant in the current action. Defendant Henry M. 
Buffalo, Jr., Judge of the Tribal Court, was assigned the case. The 
California state court held a two-day evidentiary hearing to discuss 
custody and visitation. Upon receipt of a Tribal Court order dated 
August 10, 2017, in which that court confirmed its intent to proceed 
with the case, the California state court dismissed the proceedings 
before it. Shortly thereafter, Nguyen moved to Minnesota and filed 
for dissolution of marriage in Hennepin County. In his filings, 
Nguyen disclosed that he was not currently employed and did not 
receive any earned income, with the exception of some rental 
income from a leased property. He also alleged that although 
Gustafson was not currently employed, she received per capita 
payments as a member of the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux 
Community. On January 8, 2018, the Hennepin County court stayed 
Nguyen’s action as a matter of judicial expedience and comity, 
pending the proceedings in Tribal Court. In October 2017, Nguyen 
moved to dismiss the proceedings in Tribal Court, asserting that the 
court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Judge Buffalo 
issued a written ruling on November 10, 2017, in which he found 
that the Tribal Court had both subject matter and personal 
jurisdiction and had a substantial interest in continuing to exercise 
its jurisdiction. Nguyen then sought an appeal with the Court of 
Appeals for the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community (the 
“Tribal Court of Appeals”). He requested permission to appeal 
under the collateral order doctrine, and in the alternative, asked the 
Tribal Court to certify the November 10, 2017 decision for 
interlocutory appeal. On December 11, 2017, the Tribal Court 
denied Nguyen’s request for certification, and also found that his 
motion to dismiss did not fall within the collateral order doctrine. 
On January 30, 2018, the Tribal Court of Appeals denied Nguyen’s 
request for an appeal under the collateral order doctrine, and because 
it was not certified for interlocutory appeal. On March 7, 2018, 
Nguyen filed this action for injunctive and declaratory relief 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, under which non-Indians may bring a 
federal common law cause of action challenging tribal court 
jurisdiction. He seeks a declaration that the Tribal Court lacks 
jurisdiction over the dissolution proceedings and that proper 
jurisdiction rests in state court. In addition, he seeks a preliminary 
injunction to halt all current proceedings in Tribal Court and to 
prohibit any defendant from prosecuting Gustafson’s position in that 
court. Nguyen contends that he will suffer irreparable harm if forced 
to complete discovery and participate in proceedings in a court 
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system that lacks jurisdiction, and that he is likely to succeed on the 
merits of his contention that the Tribal Court lacks jurisdiction. The 
Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 
 
33. Matter of L.D. 
No. 17-0419, 414 P.3d 768 (Mont. Mar. 27, 2018). In child 
protection proceeding, the District Court terminated mother’s 
parental rights. Mother appealed. The Supreme Court held that: 
(1) Department of Health and Human Services could not passively 
rely on inaction of Indian tribe to satisfy burden under Indian Child 
Welfare Act (ICWA) to actively investigate and ultimately make 
formal inquiry with tribe for conclusive determination of child’s 
tribal membership eligibility, and (2) trial court could not rely on 
mother’s stipulation or acquiescence that the Indian Child Welfare 
Act (ICWA) did not apply to child to satisfy its threshold duty to 
obtain conclusive determination from Indian tribe of child’s tribal 
eligibility. Reversed and remanded. 
34. In re Williams 
No. 155994, 915 N.W. 2d 328 (Mich. May 18, 2018). Foster parents 
petitioned to adopt children, whose biological father was member of 
Indian tribe, after father signed consent to termination of his parental 
rights. Father intervened and moved to withdraw his consent to 
termination of his parental rights. The Macomb Circuit Court, No. 
2012-000291-NA, denied father’s motion, and the Oakland Circuit 
Court, No. 2015-837756-AM, denied foster parents’ adoption 
petitions. Foster parents and father appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
320 Mich. App. 88, 902 N.W. 2d 901, affirmed in part, reversed in 
part, vacated in part, and remanded. Father applied for leave to 
appeal, which application was granted, 501 Mich. 870, 901 N.W. 2d 
856. The Supreme Court held that: (1) specific adoptive placement 
was not required for father’s consent to termination of his parental 
rights to be valid; (2) father was not required to have executed any 
additional consent in order to be statutorily-entitled, under the 
Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA), to withdraw his 
consent to termination of his parental rights; and (3) father’s status 
as participant in child protection proceeding did not preclude father 
from benefiting from consent-withdrawal provision of the Michigan 
Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA). Reversed and remanded.  
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35. In re C.A. 
No. D073229, 24 Cal. App. 5th 511 (Cal. Ct. App. May 23, 2018). 
Dependency proceeding was initiated regarding child born with 
amphetamine and methamphetamine in her system at birth. 
Following determination that Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did 
not apply to child’s presumed father or biological father, the 
Superior Court, No. J519280, terminated mother’s parental rights to 
child. Mother and presumed father appealed. The Court of Appeal 
held that:(1) record demonstrated ICWA did not apply based on 
biological father’s initial claim of Native American heritage; (2) as 
an issue of apparent first impression, presumed father’s claim of 
Native American heritage was insufficient to trigger ICWA notice 
requirements; and (3) record supported finding that mother was not 
entitled to parent-child relationship exception to adoption to 
preclude termination of parental rights. Affirmed.  
36. Jane Doe 1 v. The Corporation of The President of The 
Church Of Jesus Christ Of Latter Day Saints, et al. 
No. 2:17-CV-0300, 2018 WL 3603087 (E.D. Wash. Jul. 6, 2018). 
Before the court is Defendants the Corporation of the President of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints and LDS Family 
Services’ Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court has reviewed 
the record and files herein and is fully informed. For the reasons 
discussed below, the Motion is granted. Plaintiff was born in 1961. 
When she was approximately eight years old her mother entered her 
in the “Indian Student Placement Program” (ISPP), a program 
implemented by Defendant LDS Family Services on behalf of 
Defendant the Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints. The program placed Native American 
children with “foster” parents during the school year with the aim of 
providing better educational opportunities, and the children returned 
home in the summer. Pursuant to the ISPP, Plaintiff was taken in by 
LDS church members Donald Wayne Lewis and Mary Lewis. 
Defendants have presented concrete evidence that Plaintiff was 
diagnosed with PTSD and Plaintiff knew the PTSD was a result of 
the childhood abuse. Plaintiff fails to show that Plaintiff now suffers 
from a qualitatively different harm or symptom than that attending 
PTSD. Ultimately, as Plaintiff essentially admits in explaining she 
has been trying to bring this suit for over twenty years, Plaintiff has 
been aware of the harm upon which she brings this suit, and its 
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connection to the underling abuse, for far too long to avoid the 
statute of limitations. 
37. In re D.F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court 
Law, Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family 
Services v. Carla M. 
No. B285396, 2018 WL 3599379 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 27, 2018). 
Appellant Carla M. (mother) appeals from the jurisdictional findings 
and dispositional order as to her daughter, D.F. She argues the court 
erred when it did not order reunification services, and that notice 
was inadequate under the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 
§ 1901 et seq. (ICWA)). Respondent, Los Angeles County 
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), conceded that 
ICWA notice was inadequate, but argues the court appropriately 
denied mother reunification services. We conclude that notice was 
improper and remand with directions to comply with ICWA. In all 
other respects the juvenile court’s order is affirmed. At the time of 
the dispositional hearing, two of the Indian tribes who had been sent 
ICWA notices had not responded. At that hearing the court set a 
progress hearing to address ICWA. This timely appealed followed. 
Appellant argues that it was reversible error for the juvenile court to 
proceed with the dispositional hearing without first ensuring ICWA 
compliance. (Compare Nicole K. v. Superior Court (2007), 146 Cal. 
App. 4th 779, 781 [finding lack of ICWA notice should be remedied 
by vacating juvenile court orders] with In re Brooke C. (2005), 
127 Cal. App. 4th 377, 383 [finding that when notice requirements 
of ICWA are not met, case may be remanded prior to termination of 
parental rights]. We decline to follow those courts which have 
reversed based on lack of ICWA compliance, finding remand to be 
the appropriate remedy. Upon remand, if the court finds that D.F. is 
an Indian child after providing proper notice, it shall conduct a new 
dispositional hearing in compliance with ICWA and related 
California law.  
38. Carter v. Tahsuda 
No. 17-15839, 2018 WL 3720025 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2018). 
Plaintiffs-Appellants include Indian children, their adoptive parents 
and next friends. They filed this action in the United States District 
Court in Arizona against the Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs 
for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the United States Secretary of the 
Interior, and the Director of the Arizona Department of Child Safety, 
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seeking to challenge the constitutionality of various provisions of 
the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”), 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. 
The Gila River Indian Community and the Navajo Nation 
intervened to defend the constitutionality of the Act. The district 
court concluded Plaintiffs lack Article III standing. Plaintiffs appeal 
from this dismissal. This Court holds this action is now moot. 
Adoption proceedings were pending at all times during the litigation 
in the district court. Defendants moved to dismiss the action, 
contending that Plaintiffs lacked standing and could not state a 
constitutional claim upon which relief could be granted. The district 
court examined the complaint with respect to each of the challenged 
provisions and ruled that Plaintiffs lacked standing because none 
had been harmed by any conduct traceable to ICWA. This Court 
does not reach the standing inquiry, however, because a subsequent 
development has rendered this action moot. Plaintiffs have never 
suggested they suffered any economic damages. Their original 
complaint sought only declaratory and injunctive relief relating to 
ICWA’s application to their adoption proceedings. While Plaintiffs’ 
appeal from the district court’s dismissal was going forward, 
however, Plaintiffs’ adoptions all became final. The relief Plaintiffs 
sought to redress their alleged injuries is no longer available to them. 
Vacated and remanded.  
C. Contracting 
39. Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation 
No. 16-4175, 868 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. Aug. 25, 2017). Nonmember 
former contractor brought action against Indian tribe to enjoin tribal 
court proceedings seeking declaratory judgment that its contract 
with him was invalid. Tribe filed counterclaims against contractor 
and third party complaint against judge presiding over contractor’s 
state court action seeking injunction against state court proceedings. 
The District Court granted contractor’s motion for preliminary 
injunction and dismissed tribe’s counterclaims and third-party 
claims. Tribe appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) contractor 
failed to establish substantial likelihood of success on merits of his 
claim that tribal-exhaustion rule did not bar his state court action, 
and (2) tribe was not acting as “person” within meaning of § 1983 
when it sought to enjoin contractor’s state court action. Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
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40. Guidiville Rancheria of California v. United States 
No. 15-15221, No. 15-17069, 704 Fed. Appx. 655 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 
2017). Developer and Indian tribe sued city for breach of land 
disposition agreement and for breach of implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. The United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California, No. 4:12-cv-01326, Yvonne 
Gonzalez Rogers, J., 5 F. Supp. 3d 1142, dismissed claims and 
awarded legal fees to city. Tribe and developer appealed. The Court 
of Appeals held that: (1) tribe and developer stated actionable claim 
against city for violation of implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and (2) complaint plausibly alleged that city did not 
negotiate in good faith and thus breached agreement. Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and remanded.  
41. Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation, Washington v. 
United States 
No. 2016-2196, 870 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 12, 2017). Indian 
tribe and three tribal housing entities that qualified for and received 
Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act 
of 1996 (NAHASDA) block grants brought suit under the Tucker 
Act and Indian Tucker Act, alleging that Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) improperly deprived them of grant 
funds to which they were entitled. The Court of Federal Claims, 99 
Fed. Cl. 584, dismissed Tribe’s procedural claims. The Court of 
Federal Claims, 106 Fed. Cl. 623, subsequently vacated its decision 
and subsequently, 112 Fed. Cl. 353, entered partial summary 
judgment in Government’s favor. The Court of Federal Claims, No. 
1:08-00848, subsequently reaffirmed its prior ruling that 
NAHASDA was money mandating, giving Claims Court 
jurisdiction over claims. Government filed interlocutory appeal. The 
appellate court held that: (1) NAHASDA was not money-mandating 
statute, and (2) HUD’s decision not to grant block grants to Tribe 
did not constitute illegal exaction. Vacated and dismissed. 
42. Redding Rancheria v. Hargan 
No. 14–2035, 296 F. Supp. 3d 256 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2017). Indian 
tribe sought review of, inter alia, decision by Indian Health Service 
(IHS) rejecting tribe’s application for reimbursement under federal 
catastrophic health emergency fund (CHEF) for health services 
benefits that were provisionally paid by tribally-funded self-
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insurance plan, but ultimately determined by tribe through 
coordination of benefits system to be eligible for coverage under 
contract health services (CHS) program operated by tribe under 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA) 
compact. Tribe and IHS moved for summary judgment. The district 
court held that: (1) de novo standard of review, rather than 
Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) arbitrary and capricious 
standard, applied; (2) tribe’s self-insured health services plan was 
not excluded from qualifying as payor of last resort under Indian 
Health Care Improvement Act (IHCIA); (3) plan’s exclusionary 
clause did not prevent plan from qualifying as payor of last resort 
under IHS’ policy exception to its regulation listing IHS as payor of 
last resort; (4) IHS’ interpretation of its payor-of-last-resort 
regulation went beyond purpose of regulation; (5) IHCIA provision 
prohibiting contract remedies with respect to CHEF benefits did not 
preclude tribe’s action; and (6) remand to IHS was warranted. 
Tribe’s motion granted in part and denied in part; IHS’ motion 
denied; remanded to IHS. 
43. Ute Indian Tribe v. Lawrence 
No. 16-4154, 875 F.3d 539 (10th Cir. Nov. 7, 2017). Indian tribe 
brought action seeking declaratory judgment that state court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear non-Indian’s breach of contract 
case against it, and injunction to halt state court proceedings. The 
District Court, No. 2:16-CV-00579-RJS, dismissed complaint, and 
tribe appealed. The appellate court held that district court had 
subject matter jurisdiction over action. The Tribe's claim—that 
federal law precludes state-court jurisdiction over a claim against 
Indians arising on the reservation—presents a federal question that 
sustains federal jurisdiction. Reversed and remanded.  
44. Williams & Cochrane, LLP v. Quechan Tribe of the Fort 
Yuma Indian Reservation 
No. 3:17-01436, 2017 WL 7362744 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2017). 
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s ex parte motion to seal select portions 
of its complaint and certain exhibits attached to the complaint. 
Plaintiff first filed this action on July 16, 2017. The case arises out 
of an attorney-client fee agreement that Plaintiff entered into with 
Defendant Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation 
(“the Tribe”). Plaintiff’s claims arise from the Tribe allegedly 
terminating Plaintiff as the Tribe’s counsel three days prior to the 
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date on which the Tribe was set to sign a compact with the State of 
California. Plaintiff moved to file the case and the complaint under 
seal. The court denied the motion on August 17, 2017, explaining 
that sealing the case and or the entire complaint was unwarranted. 
The Court explained that “Plaintiff has offered no compelling reason 
why every paragraph in its 91-page complaint and why each of its 
thirty-nine exhibits must be filed under seal.” The Court explained, 
however, that “to the extent that Plaintiff wishes to protect the 
confidential and privileged information contained within the 
complaint, it must redact those portions of the complaint (and those 
portions of the exhibits).” On September 19, 2017, Plaintiff refiled 
its complaint with several redactions. Along with the complaint, 
Plaintiff has filed a motion to seal in which it asks the Court to 
approve the redacted complaint as filed and lodged with the Court 
an unredacted version of the complaint. The Court finds that the 
redactions are appropriate to prevent the disclosure of confidential 
attorney-client communications, attorney work-product, and 
confidential negotiations between the Tribe and the State of 
California. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has offered sufficient 
reason to warrant its proposed redactions to its complaint and 
attached exhibits. As a result, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to 
seal and accepts Plaintiff’s redacted amended complaint. The Clerk 
of Court is respectfully requested to file, under seal, the lodged 
unredacted copy of Plaintiff’s amended complaint. 
45. Modoc Lassen Indian Housing Authority, et al. v. United 
States Department of Housing and Urban Development, et al. 
No. 14-1313, No. 14-1331, No. 14-1338, No. 14-1340, No. 14-1343, 
No. 14-1407, No. 14-1484, No. 15-1060, 881 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 
Dec. 22, 2017). Several Indian tribes separately brought action 
against Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 
challenging HUD’s attempt to recapture alleged overpayments 
made to tribes under an affordable housing program created by the 
Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act 
(NAHASDA) without providing the tribes with administrative 
hearings. The district court entered judgment for tribes. HUD 
appealed and appeals were consolidated. On rehearing, the Court of 
Appeals, Moritz, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) HUD was not required 
under NAHASDA to conduct administrative hearings prior to 
attempting to recapture alleged overpayments; (2) HUD finding that 
tribes incorrectly received NAHASDA payments did not trigger 
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provision requiring hearings before finding improper expenditures; 
(3) HUD lacked the authority to recapture alleged overpayments via 
administrative offset; and (4) sovereign immunity precluded an 
award of money damages payable from NAHASDA grant funds 
carried over from prior years and funds that would be appropriated 
in future years. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.  
46. Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah 
No. 2:16–cv–00958, 311 F. Supp. 3d 1284 (D. Utah Apr. 30, 2018). 
Non-Indian brought action against Indian tribe seeking declaratory 
judgment regarding tribal court’s subject matter jurisdiction over 
breach of contract claims. Non-Indian moved for preliminary 
injunction to enjoin Indian tribe from proceeding in tribal court, and 
tribe moved for preliminary injunction to enjoin parties from 
proceeding in non-Indian’s state court breach of contract action. The 
District Court held that: (1) it was substantially likely that Utah state 
court had subject matter jurisdiction over breach of contract claims, 
and thus non-Indian had likelihood of success on merits of position 
that tribal court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over claims, 
such that grant of a preliminary injunction in favor of non-Indian 
was warranted; (2) tribal parties did not have likelihood of success 
on merits of position that tribal court had subject matter jurisdiction 
over claims, and thus grant of a preliminary injunction in favor of 
tribe was unwarranted; and (3) tribal court’s determination that 
tribal court had subject matter jurisdiction over breach of contract 
action was not entitled to preclusive effect or comity. Non-Indian’s 
motion granted, and tribe’s motion denied.  
47. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah v. Lawrence 
No. 2:16–cv–00579, 312 F. Supp. 3d 1219 (D. Utah Apr. 30, 2018). 
Indian tribe and tribal businesses brought action against state judge 
and non-Indian independent contractor seeking declaratory 
judgment that state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear 
non-Indian’s breach of contract case against it, and injunction to halt 
state court proceedings. Tribe moved for preliminary injunction. 
The District Court held that: (1) tribal court’s ruling that it had 
jurisdiction over contractor was not entitled to preclusive effect; 
(2) money representing contractor’s beneficial interest in portion of 
net revenue distributed to tribal holding company from tribe’s oil 
and gas company did not constitute tribal trust property; 
(3) plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on merits of their claim that 
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state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear contractor’s 
case. Motion denied.  
48. FSS Development Co., LLC v. Apache Tribe of Oklahoma 
No. 17-661, 2018 WL 2248457 (W.D. Okla. May 16, 2018). Before 
the Court are Defendants’ Motion to Stay Pending Exhaustion of 
Tribal Court Remedies and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff 
FSS alleges that on December 20, 2010, it (1) entered into an 
agreement with Defendant Apache Tribe of Oklahoma (“the Tribe”) 
to develop a casino called the Red River Project on Apache land, 
and (2) loaned the Tribe $2.2 million to cover development 
expenses in exchange for a promissory note. In the summer of 2017, 
Plaintiff sued the Tribe, the Apache Business Committee (“ABC”) 
that allegedly negotiated the contracts for the Tribe, four individual 
ABC members, and a Tribe consultant for tortious interference with 
contract, breach of contract, and declaratory judgment. The Tribe 
then sued FSS in Apache tribal court for declaratory judgment that 
the agreements are void under federal and tribal law and, 
alternatively, for breach of contract. The Court, concerned about 
subject matter jurisdiction, ordered a hearing to determine whether 
to dismiss or stay the case. The main issue is complete preemption 
initiated by Defendants’ Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) 
defenses – the parties agree that the Tribe defeats diversity 
jurisdiction, but dispute whether the IGRA’s completely preemptive 
scope provides the Court with federal question jurisdiction. The 
Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against the Tribe and ABC and 
stayed Plaintiff’s tortious interference claim against the individual 
Defendants pending exhaustion of tribal remedies.  
49. Williams & Cochrane, LLP v. Quechan Tribe of Fort 
Yuma Indian Reservation 
No. 3:17-01436, 2018 WL 2734946 (S.C. Cal. Jun. 7, 2018). Before 
the Court are several motions. Defendants Quechan Tribe of the Fort 
Yuma Indian Reservation (“Quechan,” or the “Tribe”), Escalanti, 
and White (collectively, the “Quechan Defendants”) have filed a 
motion to dismiss the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) 
and a motion to disqualify Williams & Cochrane as counsel for 
Plaintiffs other than itself. Defendants Armstrong, Rosette, Rosette 
& Associates, and Rosette, LLP (collectively, the “Rosette 
Defendants”) have filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike one of the 
claims in the FAC and a motion to dismiss the FAC. For the reasons 
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stated below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the 
Quechan Defendants’ motion to dismiss, DENIES the motion to 
disqualify, DENIES as moot the motion to strike, and GRANTS the 
Rosette Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs’ First Amended 
Complaint alleges the following relevant facts. Plaintiff Williams & 
Cochrane, LLP (“W&C”), is a California legal services partnership 
formed in 2010 by Cheryl Williams and Kevin Cochrane after they 
left their positions at the law firm of Rosette & Associates, PC. All 
other Plaintiffs in this case (the “Member Plaintiffs”) are enrolled 
members of Quechan, which is a federally-recognized Indian tribe. 
Defendant Robert Rosette serves as the President and Director of 
Defendant Rosette & Associates, which is a general partner of 
Defendant Rosette, LLP. According to Plaintiffs, Rosette is an 
Indian law attorney who “has a history of representing individual 
persons or factions within tribes while purporting to represent the 
tribe itself.” Defendant Richard Armstrong serves as senior of 
counsel at Rosette, LLP. Defendant Keeny Escalanti is a member of 
the Quechan Tribe who became Tribal Chairman in 2017. Defendant 
Mark William White II is a member of the Quechan Tribe who has 
served as a member of the Tribe’s council. The Court dismisses 
Counts Three, Five, Six, Seven, and Eight. Because this is the first 
time the Court has addressed these deficiencies in Plaintiffs’ 
pleadings, and for the additional reasons listed above, the Court 
dismisses these claims without prejudice. However, because the fee 
agreement between W&C and Quechan makes clear that W&C is 
not entitled to a “contingency fee” under Section 5, any amendment 
in an effort to save that aspect of the breach of contract claim would 
be futile. The Court therefore dismisses with prejudice Count One 
to the extent that it alleges a breach of Section 5 of the fee 
agreement.  
50. Gila River Indian Community v. United States 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
No. 17-15629, 899 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2018). The Gila 
River Indian Community and Gila River Health Care Corporation 
(collectively, “the Community”) sued the Department of Veterans 
Affairs (“the VA”) for failing to reimburse the Community for the 
care it provides to veterans at tribal facilities. The Community 
argues that two provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act require the VA to reimburse it even absent an agreement 
defining the terms of reimbursement. The district court dismissed 
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the Community's lawsuit after determining that the Veterans' 
Judicial Review Act, 38 U.S.C. § 511(a), deprived it of jurisdiction 
over the Community's claims. The Gila River Health Care 
Corporation (GRHC) is a wholly owned tribal organization that 
provides health care services to eligible persons. The GRHC was 
formed pursuant to the Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act, which authorizes Indian tribes to contract with the 
federal government to provide services that were previously 
provided by the federal government. The health care that the GRHC 
provides is financed through funding agreements between the tribe 
and the Indian Health Service (IHS). Relevant to this case, the 
Community provides health care services to Indian and non-Indian 
veterans who are entitled to receive services from the VA. The 
Community alleges that many veterans have opted to receive care 
through the GRHC, rather than through the VA, due to ongoing 
issues with the care provided at VA facilities. Instead of providing 
reimbursements directly under the ACA, the VA developed 
template reimbursement agreements with the IHS, and it required 
recipients to enter into an agreement as a condition of receiving 
reimbursement. The Community argues that these template 
agreements improperly limit the scope of what it contends is a 
mandatory and self-executing right to reimbursement directly under 
the ACA. In the Community's view, the agreements, among other 
things, improperly require express consent by the VA to each 
reimbursement request, limit reimbursements to direct care services, 
and deny reimbursement to the Community for services provided to 
non-Indian veterans who receive treatment from the GRHC. In 
March 2016, the Community filed suit against the VA and the 
Secretary. The Community alleged that the VA had violated § 
1623(b) by “forcing GRHC into a primary payer position on all 
services for which VA has refused to provide reimbursements.” The 
Community further alleged that the VA violated 25 U.S.C.§1645(c) 
by refusing to process reimbursement requests and by conditioning 
reimbursement on entering into an agreement with the VA. The 
Community requested declaratory and injunctive relief, requiring 
reimbursement for services it had already provided to veterans as 
well as reimbursement for future services. The VA moved to dismiss 
the Community's complaint, arguing that the district court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction under the Veterans' Judicial Review Act 
(“VJRA”), and that the complaint failed to state a claim. The VJRA 
provides that the Secretary of the VA “shall decide all questions of 
law and fact necessary to a decision by the Secretary under a law 
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that affects the provision of benefits by the Secretary to veterans.” 
38 U.S.C. § 511(a). A decision by the Secretary is “final and 
conclusive and may not be reviewed by any other official or by any 
court.” The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court did not 
reach the VA's alternative argument that the complaint failed to state 
a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6). The Community appeals. The 
Community argues that the district court has jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1362, which provides the district court with original 
jurisdiction over civil actions brought by Indian tribes that present a 
federal question. The Community did not make this argument in the 
district court, and it has therefore been waived. But even if it were 
properly before us, we would be obliged to hold that the general 
grant of subject matter jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1362, like other 
general grants of subject matter jurisdiction such as 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, does not control over the specific limitation of subject matter 
jurisdiction contained in 38 U.S.C. § 511(a). Affirmed.  
51. LaBatte v. United States 
No. 2017-2396, 899 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 16, 2018). Timothy 
LaBatte appeals from a judgment of the Court of Federal Claims 
(“Claims Court”), dismissing his complaint for breach of contract 
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. LaBatte v. United States, No. 
16-798C, slip op. at 15 (Fed. Cl. July 28, 2017). Mr. LaBatte’s 
complaint alleges the following. In 1999, a group of Native 
American farmers filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of 
Agriculture, alleging that the United States Department of 
Agriculture (“USDA”) had discriminated against them in the 
administration of farm loan and other benefit programs, thereby 
violating the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691. The 
district court certified a class, which included Mr. LaBatte, a farmer 
and member of the Sisseton Wahpeton Tribe of South Dakota. See 
Keepseagle v. Veneman, No. 99-3119, 2001 WL 34676944, at *15 
(D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2001). Ultimately, the government reached a class-
wide settlement, known as the Keepseagle Settlement Agreement 
(the “Agreement”). According to the Agreement, the United States 
would provide a compensation fund totaling $680 million. The 
Agreement established a two track process, “A” or “B,” for 
processing claims. Track A was limited to claimants seeking a 
standard set of payments of $50,000 and other limited relief. The 
Track A process used documentary evidence and was conducted 
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with a paper only record. Claimants had to demonstrate by 
substantial evidence that they “applied, or attempted to apply, for a 
specific farm [loan] at a USDA office” and that the loan was 
“denied, provided late, approved for a lesser amount than requested, 
encumbered by a restrictive condition(s), or USDA failed to provide 
an appropriate loan service(s).” J.A. 114–15. Track A did not require 
proof of discrimination. Under Track B, a claimant could seek 
damages up to $250,000, but the claimant had to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the “treatment of the Claimant’s 
loan or loan servicing application(s) by USDA was less favorable 
than that accorded a specifically identified, similarly situated white 
farmer(s).” J.A. 117. Track B provided that the “identity of a similar 
situated white farmer” could be established “by a credible sworn 
statement based on personal knowledge by an individual who is not 
a member of the Claimant’s family.” Mr. LaBatte filed his claim 
under the Track B process, seeking $202,700.52 in damages. It 
appears to be undisputed that Mr. LaBatte satisfies the relevant 
criteria for membership in the class. Mr. LaBatte identified two non-
family persons who had personal knowledge of the USDA’s 
treatment of similarly situated white farmers. Mr. LaBatte’s 
witnesses were Russell Hawkins (“Hawkins”) and Tim Lake 
(“Lake”). Hawkins and Lake belonged to the same tribe as Mr. 
LaBatte—the Sisseton Wahpeton Sioux Tribe of South Dakota. 
When Mr. LaBatte prepared to submit a claim under the Settlement 
Agreement’s Track B process, both Hawkins and Lake worked for 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”), a government agency within 
the Department of the Interior. Both men agreed to provide Mr. 
LaBatte with a sworn declaration, detailing the USDA’s 
discriminatory acts to meet the criteria of the Agreement. After the 
initial declarations were prepared, but before Mr. LaBatte could 
finalize and revise the documents and obtain signatures, the United 
States directed Hawkins and Lake not to sign the declarations or to 
assist in revising the declarations. Hawkins and Lake were “directed 
or instructed by federal governmental officials not to sign 
declarations of facts that supported LaBatte’s claim,” and were 
instructed not to provide any additional information to Mr. LaBatte, 
preventing Mr. LaBatte from revising or elaborating on the 
information in the declaration. Mr. LaBatte alleges that “[b]oth 
witnesses, former Tribal Chair Hawkins and Lake had agreed to 
provide complete testimony and sign declarations on LaBatte’s 
behalf for his Track B process claim,” and that, because of the 
government’s interference, the declarations of Hawkins and Lake 
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were unable to be “review[ed], revis[ed], and ultimately execut[ed] 
prior to the LaBatte Track B process filing.” Mr. LaBatte alleges 
that these actions by the government breached the Agreement. 
Because Mr. LaBatte was unable to submit finalized, signed 
declarations, he instead submitted to the Neutral a declaration from 
his lawyer that detailed his attempts to obtain the information 
necessary. However, the Track B Neutral issued a final 
determination denying Mr. LaBatte’s claim for having “failed to 
satisfy the requirement of the Settlement Agreement, through a 
sworn statement, that named white farmers who are similarly 
situated to you received USDA loans or loan servicing that was 
denied to you.” Mr. LaBatte filed a motion to intervene in the 
proceedings underlying the Settlement Agreement in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia. Mr. LaBatte 
asserted, among other things, that government officials had 
breached the Settlement Agreement and its implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, by preventing witnesses from signing 
declarations and providing information. The court denied Mr. 
LaBatte’s motion to intervene on the ground that it did not possess 
jurisdiction over his claims. Mr. LaBatte appealed the district 
court’s decision to the District of Columbia, which affirmed, 
explaining that the Settlement Agreement’s enforcement clause 
provided the district court with jurisdiction only to enforce the 
distribution of the funds. On July 5, 2016, Mr. LaBatte filed a 
complaint in the Claims Court. Mr. LaBatte alleged that the 
government “breached the Settlement Agreement and breached the 
government’s duty of good faith and fair dealing resulting in the loss 
of monetary damages,” by ordering Messrs. Hawkins and Lake not 
to sign and to refrain “from testifying and providing evidence on 
behalf of LaBatte’s claim.” As damages, Mr. LaBatte sought an 
award of his full Track B claim amount of $202,700.52. The 
government moved to dismiss Mr. LaBatte’s complaint for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The 
Claims Court granted the government’s motion and dismissed the 
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Although the court recognized 
that it had jurisdiction over breach of settlement claims, the court 
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Mr. LaBatte’s case. The 
court decided that Mr. LaBatte had, in the Track B process of the 
Settlement Agreement, waived his right to judicial review to 
challenge the breach of the Agreement by the United States, because 
the Agreement contained a finality clause. Mr. LaBatte appealed, 
and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). We 
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review decisions of the Court of Federal Claims de novo with 
respect to questions of law, including a dismissal for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. We are confident that if, after further 
proceedings, the Claims Court finds that there was a breach, the 
court will be able to decide on an appropriate remedy to provide Mr. 
LaBatte what he would have received in the Track B process absent 
the breach. The Claims Court may consider whether reconstituting 
the Track B process for Mr. LaBatte is an appropriate or necessary 
step in arriving at such a remedy. We conclude that Mr. LaBatte has 
stated a claim for relief that falls within the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the Claims Court. Reversed and remanded 
D. Employment 
52. Mendoza v. Isleta Resort 
No. A-1-CA-35520, 419 P.3d 1256 (N.M. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2018). 
Employee of Indian tribe’s casino filed a workers’ compensation 
complaint against casino and its workers’ compensation insurer. 
Following dismissal by a workers’ compensation judge on the 
grounds of sovereign immunity, employee appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Vigil, J., held that: (1) Indian Gaming Compact set forth 
an express and unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity; (2) even 
if Indian Gaming Compact did not contain an express waiver of 
sovereign immunity, employee had a right to pursue her workers’ 
compensation claim against insurer and its third-party administrator; 
(3) even if casino was determined to enjoy tribal sovereign 
immunity in the context of a workers’ compensation claim, casino 
was not an indispensable party without which casino employee’s 
claim could not go forward; and (4) employee was a third-party 
beneficiary to casino’s workers’ compensation insurance policy. 
Reversed and remanded.  
53. Delebreau v. Danforth 
No. 17-C-1221, 2018 WL 2694527 (E.D. Wisconsin Jun. 5, 2018). 
Plaintiff Dawn Delebreau, who is representing herself, filed this 
action in September 2017 against Defendants Cristina Danforth, 
Melinda Danforth, Geraldine Danforth, Larry Barton, and Jay Fuss, 
all employees of the Oneida Nation, a federally recognized Indian 
tribe. Essentially, Delebreau alleges that she was terminated from 
her position as an administrative assistant at the Oneida Housing 
Authority because she identified and reported the misuse of housing 
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authority funds. This matter comes before the court on a motion to 
dismiss the complaint filed by four of the defendants, Cristina 
Danforth, Larry Barton, Melinda Danforth, and Geraldine Danforth. 
They argue that the complaint should be dismissed for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). For the 
reasons set forth below, the defendants’ motion to dismiss will be 
granted and the complaint will be dismissed sua sponte as to Jay 
Fuss. Delebreau alleges she was wrongfully terminated from 
employment with the Oneida Nation due to the unspecified activities 
of several officers or employees of the Nation. Federal law 
recognizes and promotes the authority of sovereign Indian tribes to 
control their own economic enterprises. Duke v. Absentee Shawnee 
Tribe of Okla. Housing Auth., 199 F.3d 1123, 1125 (10th Cir. 1999). 
Indeed, it has been long established that Indian tribes are “distinct, 
independent political communities, retaining their original natural 
rights” in matters of local self-government. Worcester v. Georgia, 
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). Tribal sovereign immunity protects 
Indian tribes from suit in their governmental activities, as well as 
their commercial activities, absent express authorization by 
Congress or clear waiver by the tribe. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. 
Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998). Further, tribal sovereign 
immunity “extends to tribal officials when acting in their official 
capacity and within the scope of their authority.” Linneen v. Gila 
River Indian Cmty., 276 F.3d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 2002); Cook v. AVI 
Casino Enters., Inc., 548 F.3d 718, 726–27 (9th Cir. 2008). 
Delebreau cites no federal statute or constitutional provision that 
overcomes the immunity of the Oneida Nation and its officers and 
employees to hire and fire tribal employees without outside 
interference. Consequently, Delebreau’s complaint will be 
dismissed in its entirety.  
E. Environmental Regulations 
54. Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Environment v. 
Bureau of Indian Affairs 
No. 16-08077, 2017 WL 4277133 (D. Ariz. Sep. 11, 2017). Before 
the Court is Intervenor-Defendant Navajo Transitional Energy 
Company’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs Diné Citizens Against 
Ruining Our Environment (“Diné CARE”), San Juan Citizens 
Alliance, Sierra Club, the Center for Biological Diversity, and 
Amigos Bravos (collectively, “Citizens”) have filed suit against the 
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Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”), United States Department of the 
Interior (“DOI”), the Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation and 
Enforcement (“OSMRE”), Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”), 
R.K. Zinke, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States 
Department of the Interior, and the United States Fish and Wildlife 
Service (“FWS”) (collectively, “Federal Defendants”). Plaintiffs 
allege that Federal Defendants violated the Endangered Species Act 
(“ESA”), the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), and the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) in the approval of: (1) a 
twenty-five year lease extension for operation of the Four Corners 
Power Plant (“FCPP”) by Intervenor-Defendant Arizona Public 
Service Company, (2) the renewal of certain right-of-ways for 
existing transmission lines, and (3) a 5,568-acre expansion of strip 
mining in the Navajo Mine’s Pinabete area. Federal Defendants’ 
actions were predicated on a Biological Opinion issued by FWS in 
April 2015, which Plaintiffs characterize as a mistaken 
determination that the “proposed authorizations for continued 
operations of the FCPP and the Navajo Mine ... will neither 
jeopardize the survival and recovery of, nor adversely modify 
designated critical habitat of the Colorado pikeminnow and 
razorback sucker, two endangered fish that are native to the San Juan 
River, in violation of the ESA.” Plaintiffs contend that remaining 
Federal Defendants’ reliance on FWS’ Biological Opinion violated 
the ESA and that Federal Defendants’ subsequent Record of 
Decision and Final Environmental Impact Statement were issued in 
violation of NEPA. This litigation followed. The Arizona Public 
Service Company (“APS”)—on its own behalf and as operating 
agent for the FCPP—was allowed to intervene as of riht as a party 
defendant. Navajo Transitional Energy Company (“NTEC”) filed a 
Limited Motion to Intervene, which this Court granted on October 
28, 2016. Intervenor-Defendant NTEC subsequently filed a Motion 
to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(7) and 19 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. All parties, with the exception of Intervenor-
Defendant APS, oppose Intervenor-Defendant NTEC’s Motion to 
Dismiss. Intervenor-Defendant NTEC contends that it is a required 
party under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that 
cannot be joined by virtue of its sovereign immunity, and that the 
present action should therefore be dismissed in equity and good 
conscience. The Court found that Intervenor-Defendant is a required 
party under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because 
it has a protected interest in the subject of the present litigation that 
only it can adequately protect. As an arm of the Navajo Nation, 
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however, Intervenor-Defendant NTEC enjoys sovereign immunity 
and since it has neither explicitly waived that immunity, nor has 
such immunity been abrogated or waived by Congress, it follows 
that Intervenor-Defendant NTEC cannot be joined. In equity and 
good conscience, the present case cannot continue without 
Intervenor-Defendant NTEC. Accordingly, it is ordered: (1) That 
Intervenor-Defendant NTEC’s Motion to Dismiss is granted; 
(2) That this action is dismissed with prejudice in its entirety; 
(3) That the Clerk of Court shall terminate this action; and (4) That 
the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly. 
55. Pawnee Nation of Oklahoma v. Zinke 
No. 16–CV–697, 2017 WL 4079400 (N.D. Okla. Sep. 14, 2017). 
Now before the Court is the motion to dismiss of Ryan Zinke, in his 
official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the 
Interior (“Interior”); the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(“BIA”); and the United States Bureau of Land Management 
(“BLM”). Federal Respondents ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 
Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”) under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim 
for which relief may be granted. Plaintiffs, the Pawnee Nation of 
Oklahoma and a group of individual members of the Pawnee Nation, 
own partial interests in allotted tracts of land within the boundaries 
of the former Pawnee reservation. Plaintiffs allege that BIA has 
approved seventeen leases (the “Pawnee leases”) that permit oil and 
gas development on tracts of land in which Plaintiffs allege an 
ownership interest. Owners of allotted lands may lease the mineral 
interests on their lands, subject to approval by the Secretary of the 
Interior. 25 U.S.C. § 396. Leases entered into under 25 U.S.C. § 396 
are governed by the regulations at 25 C.F.R. Part 212. Those 
regulations provide that appeals of BIA decisions are governed by 
25 C.F.R. Part 2. 25 C.F.R. § 212.58 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 211.58). 
The seventeen Pawnee leases were approved by the BIA 
Superintendent between July 2013 and November 2013. Appeals 
from the Superintendent’s decision are to the appropriate Regional 
Director (referred to as an “Area Director” in the regulations). 
Plaintiffs do not allege that they have appealed any of the decisions 
they challenge here, but claim that they did not receive the requisite 
notice under the regulations. Federal Respondents have moved to 
dismiss a subset of claims in the Amended Complaint. Federal 
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Respondents have challenged Plaintiffs’ First, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Sixth Causes of Action that challenge the BIA’s approvals of the 
Pawnee leases as violations of the Administrative Procedures Act 
(“APA”) under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 
the American Indian Agricultural Resource Management Act 
(“AIARMA”), the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”), 
and Executive Order 11988. In addition, Federal Respondents move 
to dismiss Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action, which challenges 
BIA’s approval of the Pawnee leases as well as BLM’s approvals of 
Applications for Permits to Drill (“APDs”) and sundry notices on 
the tracts of land covered by the seventeen leases, claiming that the 
approvals violate the American Indian Agricultural Resource 
Management Act. Finally, although their Sixth Cause of Action is 
plead as arising under the APA, Plaintiffs have argued that the 
violations of NEPA, AIARMA, NHPA, and Executive Order 11988 
also amount to a breach of the United States’ fiduciary trust duties. 
Having considered the arguments set forth in the parties’ briefing 
relating to Federal Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court finds 
that the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ First Cause of 
Action is dismissed in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ 
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action are also dismissed for lack 
of jurisdiction to the extent that they raise challenges to the 
approvals of the seventeen Pawnee leases identified in Plaintiffs’ 
Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs’ Fourth Cause of Action is also 
dismissed in its entirety for failure to state claim under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). To the extent Plaintiffs’ Sixth Cause of 
Action alleges a claim for breach of a fiduciary trust duty, it is also 
dismissed for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).  
56. United States v. Osage Wind, LLC 
No. 15-5121, No. 16-5022, 871 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. Sep. 18, 2017). 
Federal government brought action against wind company that was 
building wind farm on Indian land, alleging that its excavation of 
soil, sand, and rock to place cement foundations to support wind 
turbines constituted “mining” that required a federally-approved 
mineral lease. The District Court, 2015 WL 5775378, granted 
summary judgment to wind company. Indian tribe sought to 
intervene and appeal. The appellate court held that: (1) Indian tribe 
was entitled to appeal district court’s grant of summary judgment to 
wind company without having intervened in district court; 
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(2) tribe’s claim was not precluded under doctrine of res judicata; 
(3) de minimis exception in regulation requiring mineral leases on 
indian land did not apply to wind company’s excavation; 
(4) definition of “mining” in regulation requiring mineral leases on 
Indian land is not limited to commercial extraction of minerals, but 
also includes acting upon the minerals to exploit the minerals 
themselves; and (5) wind company’s excavation constituted mineral 
development. Reversed and remanded. 
57. Wyoming v. Zinke 
No. 16-8068, No. 16-8069, 871 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. Sep. 21, 2017). 
Industry organization petitioned for Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) review of Bureau of Land Management (BLM) regulation 
governing hydraulic fracturing on lands owned or held in trust by 
the United States, seeking preliminary injunction. States of 
Wyoming and Colorado filed separate petitions for review. 
Following consolidation of the cases, North Dakota, Utah, and Ute 
Indian Tribe intervened, opposing the regulation, and multiple 
citizen groups intervened, defending the regulation. The District 
Court, No. 2:15-CV-00043-SWS, 2016 WL 3509415, entered order 
invalidating the regulation. BLM and citizen group intervenors 
appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) appeal from district 
court’s order was unfit for review; (2) withholding review of district 
court’s order would not impose hardship on BLM or citizen group 
intervenors; (3) dismissal, rather than abatement, of appeal was 
warranted; and (4) vacatur of district court’s order invalidating 
regulation was warranted. Appeals dismissed as prudentially unripe; 
vacated and remanded with instructions. 
58. Havasupai Tribe v. Provencio 
No. 15-15857, 876 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2017). 
Environmental groups and Havasupai Indian Tribe brought action 
under Administrative Procedure Act (APA) challenging Forest 
Service’s conclusion that uranium mining company had valid 
existing rights to operate a uranium mine on land within a 
withdrawal area of public lands around Grand Canyon National Park 
that the Secretary of the Interior withdrew from new mining, seeking 
declaration that Forest Service was acting in violation of National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Mining companies intervened. 
The District Court, 98 F. Supp. 3d 1044, entered summary judgment 
in favor of Forest Service. Groups and Tribe appealed. The appellate 
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court held that: (1) Tribe had standing to bring action challenging 
Forest Service’s action; (2) environmental group had standing to 
bring action challenging Forest Service’s action; (3) Forest 
Service’s conclusion that uranium mining company had valid 
existing rights to operate uranium mine constituted final agency 
action; (4) Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was not required; 
(5) Forest Service’s determination did not constitute undertaking 
under National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA), and thus 
consultation was not required; and (6) environmental group lacked 
prudential standing to challenge merits of Forest Service’s action 
under Mineral Act or FLPMA. Affirmed. 
59. National Mining Association v. Zinke 
No. 14-17350, No. 14-17351, No. 14-17352, No. 14-17374, 877 
F.3d 845 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2017). Miner and trade associations 
brought actions challenging Department of Interior’s withdrawal of 
more than one million acres of National Forest System lands from 
mining location and entry. The District Court, 2014 WL 4904423 
and 933 F. Supp. 2d 1215, granted summary judgment for 
government. Miner and associations appealed. The appellate court 
held that: (1) provision of Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA) permitting Congress to block withdrawals of land from 
mining location and entry by concurrent resolution, rather than in 
conformity with express procedures of Constitution’s prescription 
for legislative action, was unconstitutional; (2) issue of whether 
unconstitutional legislative veto embedded in FLPMA was 
severable from large-tract withdrawal authority delegated to 
Secretary of Department of Interior in that same subsection was 
properly before court even though statutory legislative veto was not 
exercised by Congress; (3) miner and trade associations had 
standing to raise issue of whether unconstitutional legislative veto 
embedded in FLPMA was severable; (4) unconstitutional legislative 
veto embedded FLPMA was severable from large-tract withdrawal 
authority delegated to Secretary in that same subsection, and 
therefore invalidating legislative veto provision did not affect 
Secretary’s withdrawal authority; (5) Secretary’s decision to 
withdraw large tract of land to protect water resources in Grand 
Canyon watershed and Colorado River from possible water 
contamination was not arbitrary, capricious, or not in accordance 
with the law; (6) Secretary could withdraw large tracts of land under 
FLPMA in interest of preserving cultural and tribal resources; 
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(7) withdrawal to protect “other resources,” including visual 
resources and wildlife was not arbitrary, capricious; and 
(8) agency’s findings regarding quantity of uranium in area to weigh 
economic impact of withdrawal were not arbitrary, capricious. 
Affirmed 
60. Caddo Nation of Oklahoma v. Wichita and Affiliated 
Tribes 
No. 16-6161, 2018 WL 3354882 (10th Cir. Dec. 18, 2017). In 
neighboring tribe’s action alleging that tribe seeking to build history 
center violated procedures required by National Historic 
Preservation Act (NHPA) and National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) throughout planning process, neighboring tribe moved for 
emergency temporary restraining order preventing tribe from 
continuing construction until it complied with those procedures. 
After initially granting temporary restraining order, the District 
Court, 2016 WL 3080971, vacated order. Neighboring tribe 
appealed, and tribe moved to dismiss appeal. The appellate court 
held that neighboring tribe’s appeal of denial of temporary 
restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining tribe’s 
construction of history center was moot. Appeal dismissed; 
remanded. 
61. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers 
No. 16–1534 (and Consolidated Case Nos. 16–1769 and 16–267), 
301 F. Supp. 3d 50 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2018). The Yankton Sioux 
Tribe challenges the construction and operation of the Dakota 
Access Pipeline (DAPL) under the National Historic Preservation 
Act, the National Environmental Protection Act, and the 1851 
Treaty of Laramie. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants—
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, and an assortment of federal employees of both agencies—
violated the NHPA by failing to adequately consult with the Tribe 
regarding historical and cultural sites, violated NEPA by unlawfully 
segmenting their analyses of the pipeline’s environmental impacts, 
and violated the 1851 Treaty by granting approvals for DAPL 
without first obtaining the Tribe’s consent. Both sides have now 
filed Cross–Motions for Summary Judgment on the Tribe’s NEPA 
and Treaty-based claims. Defendants additionally urge the Court to 
dismiss as moot Plaintiffs’ NHPA counts, asserting that they are no 
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longer viable in light of DAPL’s completed construction. Agreeing 
that it can provide no effective remedy on this last score, the Court 
will dismiss the NHPA claims. It will also grant summary judgment 
for Defendants with respect to Plaintiffs’ Treaty-based count, which 
the Tribe essentially withdrew during briefing. Finally, the Court 
concludes that Plaintiffs have not shown that the Corps and FWS 
improperly “segmented” their analysis of the pipeline’s 
environmental consequences, thus yielding summary judgment for 
Defendants on the NEPA claims as well. United States’ motion 
granted. 
62. Battle Mountain Band of Te-Moak Tribe of Western 
Shoshone Indians v. United States Bureau of Land Management 
No. 3:16–cv–0268, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1226 (D. Nev. Mar. 23, 2018). 
Indian band brought action alleging that Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) and its district manager violated the National 
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) by failing to reconsider their 
decision to allow mining project to proceed on land identified by 
band as traditional cultural property (TCP) and deemed eligible for 
inclusion on National Register of Historic Places by BLM. Project’s 
operator intervened and filed cross-claims alleging that BLM’s 
determination that land was eligible for inclusion on National 
Register violated National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). BLM and manager moved to 
dismiss operator’s cross-claims. The District Court, Larry R. Hicks, 
J., held that: (1) programmatic agreement gave operator ongoing 
consultation right with respect to National Register eligibility 
determinations for project land; (2) operator adequately alleged an 
injury in fact; and (3) operator had prudential standing to bring 
NHPA claims. Motion denied. 
63. Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians of California v. 
United States Department of Transportation 
No. 15-04987, 2018 WL 1569714 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2018). Before 
the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiffs 
Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians of California (“Coyote 
Valley”) and The Round Valley Indian Tribes of California (“Round 
Valley”). Also before the Court is the cross-motion for summary 
judgment filed by the United States Department of Transportation 
(“USDOT”). This litigation arises out of the construction of 5.9-
mile-long segment of U.S. Highway 101, which bypasses the City 
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of Willits, California (the “Willits Bypass Project”), and post-
construction mitigation projects in the area. The FHWA and 
Caltrans issued a final Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for 
the Willits Bypass Project in October 2006. In December 2006, the 
agencies issued a Record of Decision, which approved a variation 
of a four-lane freeway (“Modified Alternative J1T”). The Final EIS 
stated there would be no adverse effect on historic properties, if an 
environmentally sensitive area was established. The State Historic 
Property Officer (“SHPO”) concurred in that finding.  This litigation 
focuses on the first phase. Construction on the first phase of the 
Willits Bypass Project is complete, and it was opened to traffic in 
November 2016. The second phase of the Willits Bypass Project 
remains unfunded. According to Plaintiffs, at the time the final EIS 
was issued, “Caltrans had only identified one archaeological site 
eligible for registry on the National Register of Historic Places” 
(“NHRP”), and they claim that “[s]ince 2013, Caltrans has identified 
at least thirty additional archaeological sites eligible for registry on 
the” NRHP. Coyote Valley’s Tribal Chairman, Michael Hunter, 
wrote to Charles Felder, a director at Caltrans, and requested 
“government-to-government” consultation. (Federal Highway 
Administration Administrative Record (“FHWA AR”) Caltrans 
Chairman Hunter stated that “[t]he primary and ongoing request we 
articulated at this meeting was the need for a Supplemental EIS to 
contend with the many ancestral archaeological sites that have been 
discovered subsequent to the approval” of the Final EIS “both in the 
Project Area and Mitigation parcels” of the Willits Bypass Project. 
As a result of the Court’s rulings on the Federal Defendants’ 
motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs’ claims against the Federal Defendants 
have been limited as follows: (1) the Federal Defendants violated 
Section 106 of the NHPA by failing to engage in government-to-
government consultation with Plaintiffs (“the NHPA consultation 
claim”); and (2) after February 18, 2015, the date on which the 
Plaintiffs demanded that the Federal Defendants reassume 
responsibility for the Willits Bypass Project, the Federal Defendants 
directly violated the NHPA, NEPA, and the Federal Highway 
Statutes by failing to act in accordance with the requirements of 
those statutes. The Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment, and it grants, in part, and denies, in part, the Federal 
Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment.  
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64. Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Environment v. 
Jewell 
No. CIV 15-0209, 312 F. Supp. 3d 1031 (D.N.M. Apr. 23, 2018). 
Organization of Navajo community activists and environmental 
organizations brought action against United States Department of 
the Interior (DOI), Secretary of the Interior, Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM), and its director, challenging BLM’s approval 
of applications for permit to drill (APD) in the Mancos Shale 
formation of the San Juan Basin of northern New Mexico, alleging 
that BLM violated National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by 
failing to analyze direct, indirect, and cumulative effects of Mancos 
Shale fracking, by not preparing an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) on fracking the Mancos Shale, and by taking action 
during the NEPA process, and that BLM violated the National 
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) because it did not consider the 
indirect and cumulative effects on Chaco Park and its satellites and 
did not consult with the New Mexico State Historic Preservation 
Officer (SHPO), Indian tribes, or the public. Trade association of the 
oil-and-gas industry intervened as defendant. The District Court, 
2015 WL 4997207, denied organizations’ motion for preliminary 
injunction nullifying BLM’s approval of APDs. The Court of 
Appeals, 839 F.3d 1276, affirmed. Organizations petitioned for 
review on the merits and moved for permanent injunction. The 
District Court held that organizations had standing to assert claims 
alleging that BLM violated NEPA; Appellate Court’s affirmance of 
District Court’s order denying organizations’ motion for 
preliminary injunction did not bar, under law of the case doctrine, 
organizations’ claims alleging NEPA violations; BLM’s approval of 
applications for drilling permits did not violate NEPA; BLM 
satisfied NEPA’s minimal public notice requirements; BLM’s 
failure to consult SHPO was not arbitrary and capricious in violation 
of NHPA; and BLM’s failure to consider effects of gas and oil wells 
in Chaco Park and its satellites did not violate NHPA. Petition 
dismissed; motion for permanent injunction denied.  
65. Sisseton–Wahpeton Oyate of Lake Traverse Reservation 
v. United States Corps of Engineers 
No. 16-4283, 888 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. Apr. 25, 2018). Indian tribe and 
its chairman brought action alleging that Corps of Engineers 
violated Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Clean Water Act 
(CWA), and National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) in issuing 
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permit and exemption determinations allowing adjacent 
landowner’s construction of farm road across wetland adjacent to 
lake. The District Court ruled that Corps’s determination letters 
constituted final agency actions, 918 F. Supp. 2d 962, dismissed 
some claims as untimely, 2014 WL 4678052, denied tribe’s request 
for equitable tolling, 124 F. Supp. 3d 958, and denied plaintiffs’ 
request for injunctive relief and remanded NHPA claims to Corps, 
2016 WL 5478428. Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals held 
that: (1) Corps’ letter to tribe indicating that roadways met 
requirements for CWA’s farm-road exemption and each constituted 
single and complete project did not constitute “final agency action”; 
(2) tribe’s claim that Corps’ determination that roadway had not 
been recaptured was nonjusticiable challenge to enforcement 
decision; (3) tribe was not entitled to equitably toll statute of 
limitations; (4) Corps did not unlawfully stack permit and 
exemption verifications; and (5) district court’s determination that 
Corps did not unlawfully stack permit and exemption verifications 
was final appealable decision. Affirmed.  
66. Puyallup Tribe of Indians v. Washington State Shorelines 
Hearings Board, City of Tacoma 
No. 77748-3-1, 3 Wash. App. 2d 1057 (Wash. Ct. App. May 14, 
2018). The Puyallup Tribe of Indians appeals the Shorelines 
Hearings Board’s decision to affirm a shoreline substantial 
development permit. But, because the Board’s decision is supported 
by substantial evidence, we affirm. We review decisions of the 
Shorelines Hearings Board to determine if the Board’s factual 
findings are supported by substantial evidence and if these findings, 
in turn, support the Board’s conclusions of law. The Board heard 
evidence concerning the risk of disturbing contaminated sediment, 
indications of contamination at the project site, the effectiveness of 
BMPs, and the adequacy of mitigation. The Board summarized and 
weighed the conflicting evidence in its decision. The Board found 
persuasive the respondents’ evidence that there is a low risk of 
contamination at the project site, the identified BMPs adequately 
protect against that risk, any adverse impact will be short term, the 
proposed mitigation offsets adverse impacts, and, in the long term, 
the project will benefit the waterway’s ecological function. 
Affirmed.  
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67. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission 
No. 17-1059, 896 F.3d 520 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 20, 2018). Powertech 
(USA), Inc. applied to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for a 
license to construct a uranium mining project in the Black Hills of 
South Dakota. The Oglala Sioux Tribe, which has historical ties to 
the proposed project area, intervened in opposition because it feared 
the destruction of its cultural, historical, and religious sites. The staff 
of the Commission granted the license. On administrative appeal, 
the Commission decided to leave the license in effect – 
notwithstanding its own determination that there was a significant 
deficiency in its compliance with the National Environmental Policy 
Act – pending further agency proceedings to remedy the deficiency. 
The Commission grounded this decision on the Tribe’s inability to 
show that noncompliance with the Act would cause irreparable 
harm. In so doing, the Commission was following what appears to 
be the agency’s settled practice to require such a showing. The 
National Environmental Policy Act, however, obligates every 
federal agency to prepare an adequate environmental impact 
statement before taking any major action, which includes issuing a 
uranium mining license. The statute does not permit an agency to 
act first and comply later. Nor does it permit an agency to condition 
performance of its obligation on a showing of irreparable harm. 
There is no such exception in the statute. In fact, such a policy puts 
the Tribe in a classic Catch-22. In order to require the agency to 
complete an adequate survey of the project site before granting a 
license, the Tribe must show that construction at the site would 
cause irreparable harm to cultural or historical resources. But 
without an adequate survey of the cultural and historical resources 
at the site, such a showing may well be impossible. Of course, if the 
project does go forward and such resources are damaged, the Tribe 
will then be able to show irreparable harm. By then, however, it will 
be too late. The Commission’s decision to let the mining project 
proceed violates the National Environmental Policy Act. Indeed, it 
vitiates the requirements of the Act. We therefore find the decision 
contrary to law and grant the petition for review in part. Under the 
collateral order doctrine, we have jurisdiction to review the 
Commission’s decision to leave Powertech’s license in place – 
notwithstanding the NRC’s acknowledgment that it has not yet 
complied with the National Environmental Policy Act – on the 
ground that the Tribe failed to show irreparable harm. Because that 
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decision is contrary to law, we grant the petition for review in part 
and remand the case to the Commission for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
F. Fisheries, Water, FERC, BOR 
68. United States v. Washington 
No. C70-9213, Sub-proceeding No. 17-sp-01, 2017 WL 3726774 
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 30, 2017). This matter comes before the Court 
on the Jamestown S’Klallam and Port Gamble S’Klallam Tribes’ 
(collectively “S’Klallam”) and Squaxin Island Tribe’s (“Squaxin”) 
motions to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment, and 
Skokomish Indian Tribe’s (“Skokomish”) cross-motion for 
summary judgment. In addition, the Court resolves what remains of 
Skokomish’s motion to stay the proceedings. S’Klallam requests 
that the Court grant it summary judgment on three bases: (1) the 
Skokomish request for determination is procedurally improper 
because the Skokomish fail to allege which jurisdictional provision 
they invoke; (2) the Skokomish request is legally invalid because it 
violates a settlement agreement: The Hood Canal Agreement; and 
(3) the Court has previously determined, unambiguously, that the 
Skokomish U&A is the Hood Canal and its drainage basin, and 
therefore it is not entitled to any ruling that it has primary fishing 
rights outside of that established U&A. The Squaxin move for 
summary judgment on essentially the same bases, albeit with 
slightly different legal arguments, and include an additional 
argument for dismissal on the basis that Skokomish failed to follow 
the pre-filing requirements established by this Court. Skokomish 
have opposed the S’Klallam and Squaxin motions and also move for 
summary judgment in their favor. Skokomish assert that they have 
complied with all pre-filing requirements and have appropriately 
asserted jurisdiction over this matter, and argue that both this Court 
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have already determined that 
their U&A and primary fishing right extend beyond the Hood Canal 
and its drainage basin. Accordingly, they assert that summary 
judgment in their favor is appropriate. The matter having been fully 
briefed, and having determined that oral argument is not necessary 
in this matter, the Court now grants S’Klallam’s and Squaxin’s 
motions for summary judgment, and denies Skokomish’s cross-
motion for summary judgment. 
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69. United States v. Board of Directors of Truckee-Carson 
Irrigation District 
No. 16–15507, 708 Fed. Appx. 898 (9th Cir. Sep. 13, 2017). United 
States sued Truckee–Carson Irrigation District (TCID), which 
managed project controlling diversions from Truckee and Carson 
rivers, TCID’s board members, and all water users in project as 
class, seeking to recoup more than one million acre-feet of water 
unlawfully diverted in excess of applicable operating criteria and 
procedures (OCAPs) and to detriment of Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe. 
After intervention by tribe as plaintiff, the District Court awarded 
government approximately 200,000 acre-feet of water and 
post-judgment interest, and denied TCID attorney fees under Equal 
Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Appeals were taken. The appellate 
court, 602 F.3d 1074, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded. On remand, the District Court recalculated amount of 
excess diversions for four years. Appeals were taken. The appellate 
court, 723 F.3d 1029, ruled that extraordinary remedy of correcting 
its prior mandate was warranted. On remand, the District Court, 
2015 WL 2185551, determined amount of water subject to 
recoupment for two years, and subsequently, 2016 WL 304309, 
denied government’s and tribe’s recoupment claims for those two 
years. Appeal was taken. The appellate court held that: (1) tribe’s 
claims were not barred by doctrine of res judicata; (2) tribe’s 
appellate arguments were not foreclosed by law of the case; (3) tribe 
did not waive appellate arguments supporting claims; 
(4) recoupment was available for excess diversions during portions 
of two years; and (5) tribe was entitled to equitable remedy of 
recouping 8,300 acre-feet of water for two years. Vacated and 
remanded. 
70. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Suquamish Indian Tribe 
No. 15-35540, 871 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. Sep. 22, 2017). Upper Skagit 
Indian Tribe filed Request for Determination as to the geographic 
scope of the Suquamish Indian Tribe’s usual and accustomed fishing 
grounds and stations as determined by the District Court, 384 F. 
Supp. 312, and 459 F. Supp. 1020, seeking determination that 
determination did not include Chuckanut Bay, Samish Bay, and a 
portion of Padilla Bay where the Upper Skagit has its own court-
approved fishing grounds and stations determination. The District 
Court, Nos. 2:14-sp-00001-RSM 2:70-cv-09213-RSM, entered 
summary judgment finding that the District Court did not intend to 
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include the contested waters in its determination and entered 
summary judgment in Upper Skagit Tribe’s favor. Suquamish Tribe 
appealed. The appellate court held that Upper Skagit Indian Tribe 
sufficiently met its burden to establish that there was no evidence 
before district court judge that Suquamish Indian tribe fished or 
traveled through contested areas, and thus Upper Skagit Tribe’s 
usual and accustomed fishing grounds and station determination did 
not include those areas. Affirmed. 
71. Sturgeon v. Frost 
No. 13-36165, 872 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 2017). Hunter who 
sought to use hovercraft to reach moose hunting grounds brought 
action against National Park Service (NPS), challenging its 
application of 36 C.F.R. § 1.2(a)(3), a regulation that prohibited use 
of hovercraft to National Preserve in Alaska. The United States 
District Court for the District of Alaska, H. Russel Holland, J., 2013 
WL 5888230, granted summary judgment for NPS. Hunter 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Nguyen, Circuit Judge, 768 F.3d 
1066, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The Supreme 
Court, Roberts, Chief Justice, 136 S. Ct. 1061, granted certiorari and 
vacated and remanded Court of Appeals’ decision. On remand, the 
Court of Appeals, Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judge, held that 
regulation preventing use of hovercraft in federally managed 
conservation areas applied to river in National Preserve. Affirmed.  
72. Makah Indian Tribe, et al. v. Quileute Indian Tribe, et al. 
No. 15-35824, No. 15-35827, 873 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 
2017). In litigation over fishing rights in Western Washington, 
Indian tribe commenced subproceeding to determine usual and 
accustomed fishing grounds of two other tribes pursuant to Treaty 
of Olympia. Following bench trial, the district court, Nos. 2:09–sp–
00001–RSM, 2:70–cv–09213–RSM, Ricardo S. Martinez, Chief 
Judge, determined tribes’ rights and fishing boundaries, 129 F. 
Supp. 3d 1069, and corrected scrivener’s error, 2015 WL 10853926. 
Plaintiff and state appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) district 
court did not clearly err in determining that word “fish,” as used in 
Treaty, encompassed sea mammals; (2) tribes were not required to 
provide evidence of specific locations that they regularly and 
customarily hunted whales or seals; and (3) district court incorrectly 
drew longitudinal boundaries of tribes’ U & A fishing grounds. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
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73. Flathead Joint Board of Control v. State 
No. DA 16-0516, 389 Mont. 270 (Mont. Nov. 8, 2017). Board 
responsible for overseeing irrigation districts challenged the 
constitutionality of a water compact entered into between tribes, 
State, and the United States. The 20th Judicial District Court found 
that a section of the compact’s administrative provisions provided 
“new immunity to the State and its agents” and therefore was 
unconstitutional, but that it was severable from the remainder of the 
compact. Board appealed. The Supreme Court held that: 
(1) challenge to the constitutionality of a water compact was 
justiciable, and (2) compact did not provide any new immunity to 
the State and thus Constitutional provision restraining legislature 
from asserting sovereign immunity did not apply. Affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
74. United States v. Lummi Nation 
No. 15-35661, 876 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. Dec. 1, 2017). In proceedings 
to adjudicate fishing rights reserved by 1855 Treaty of Point Elliott, 
Lower Elwha Band of S’Klallams, Jamestown Band of S’Klallams, 
Port Gamble Band of S’Klallams, and Skokomish Indian Tribe 
sought determination that Lummi Indian Tribe was violating 1974 
District Court opinion in United States v. Washington, Boldt, J., 384 
F. Supp. 312, by fishing in areas outside its adjudicated usual and 
accustomed grounds and stations. Following entry of summary 
judgment order in 1990 in favor of plaintiff tribes determining that 
1974 opinion did not intend to include disputed areas within Lummi 
Tribe’s usual and accustomed grounds and stations, the District 
Court dismissed action. Plaintiff tribes appealed. The appellate 
court, 235 F.3d 443, affirmed in part and reversed in part. On 
remand, the District Court, 2012 WL 4846239, entered summary 
judgment on Klallam Tribes’ request for determination that Lummi 
Tribe’s usual and accustomed grounds did not include eastern 
portion of Strait of Juan de Fuca or waters west of Whidbey Island. 
The appellate court, 763 F.3d 1180, reversed and remanded. On 
remand, the District Court, 2015 WL 4405591, entered summary 
judgment in favor of the Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe. Lummi Tribe 
appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) District Court’s finding 
in United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, that the usual and 
accustomed fishing places of the Lummi Indians at treaty times 
included the marine areas of Northern Puget Sound from the Fraser 
River south to the present environs of Seattle, was ambiguous as to 
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whether the usual and accustomed fishing places of the Lummi 
Indians included the waters west of Whidbey Island, and (2) waters 
west of Whidbey Island were encompassed in usual and accustomed 
fishing places of the Lummi Indians. Reversed and remanded. 
75. Navajo Nation v. Department of the Interior 
 No. 14-16864, 876 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2017). Indian tribe 
brought action against Interior Department, Interior Secretary, 
Bureau of Reclamation, Bureau of Indian Affairs, and water districts 
alleging that United States failed in its trust obligation to assert and 
protect tribe’s water rights and violated National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) and Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
through actions undertaken to manage flow of Colorado River’s 
lower basin. The District Court, 34 F. Supp. 3d 1019, granted federal 
defendants’ motion to dismiss. Tribe appealed. The appellate court 
held that:(1) tribe lacked standing to assert claim that preparation of 
environmental impact statement (EIS) and related documents by 
Secretary of Department of Interior relating to guidelines for 
determining when there was surplus of water from Colorado River 
for use within Arizona, California, and Nevada and storage of such 
surplus water would threaten its interests in obtaining adequate 
water; (2) allegations by tribe about future development of reliance 
interests in unadjudicated or unquantified reserved water rights, and 
that United States would be disinclined to revisit water rights 
adjudications after implementation of guidelines by Department of 
Interior clarifying how it would make “surplus” and “shortage” 
determinations of waters of Colorado River for delivery to Western 
states, did not show that tribe suffered injury needed for Article III 
standing; (3) alleged adverse affect on Indian tribe’s generalized 
interest in availability of water did not show that tribe suffered injury 
needed for Article III standing; (4) breach of trust claim by tribe was 
predicated not on affirmative action, but rather failure to act; and 
(5) waiver of sovereign immunity applied to breach of trust claim 
by tribe. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
76. Baley v. United States 
No. 1–591L, 134 Fed. Cl. 619 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 29, 2017). Farmers 
filed class actions against United States, claiming that Bureau of 
Reclamation effected Fifth Amendment taking and violated their 
water rights under the Klamath River Basin Compact, by 
temporarily terminating water deliveries to farmers for irrigation in 
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order to preserve habitat of fish protected under Endangered Species 
Act (ESA) and to comply with government’s tribal trust obligations 
to several Indian tribes. Following consolidation of actions and class 
certification, parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The Court 
of Federal Claims held that: (1) claims by shareholders in 
corporation that supplied irrigation water were barred; (2) claims by 
successors to signors of water rights applications were not barred; 
(3) claims by successors to signors of repayment contracts were not 
barred; (4) claims by some successors to signors of Warren Act 
contracts were barred; (5) claims by successors to leaseholders of 
land in wildlife refuges were barred; (6) termination of water 
deliveries did not affect taking or violate compact as farmers’ water 
rights were subordinate to tribes’ rights. Defendant’s motion 
granted. 
 
77. Clayvin Herrera v. State of Wyoming 
No. 2016-242, Fourth Judicial District, Sheridan County, State of 
Wyoming. Petition for Certiorari Granted, No. 17–532, (U.S. June 
28, 2018). Issue: Whether Wyoming’s admission to the Union or the 
establishment of the Bighorn National Forest abrogated the Crow 
Tribe of Indians’ 1868 federal treaty right to hunt on the 
“unoccupied lands of the United States,” thereby permitting the 
present-day criminal conviction of a Crow member who engaged in 
subsistence hunting for his family. Clayvin Herrera appeals from the 
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, Striking Evidentiary Hearing 
and Granting State’s Motion in Limine, entered on October 16, 2015 
and the Judgment and Sentence entered by the Fourth Judicial 
Circuit Court on April 29, 2016. The Appellant frames the pertinent 
issues as follows: (1) Did the circuit court err in denying treaty-
based immunity to Herrera by holding itself “bound by” an 
erroneous Tenth Circuit decision, and ruling -- that the 
establishment of the Big Horn National Forest (BHNF) in 1897 by 
presidential proclamation extinguished the Crow Treaty hunting 
rights? (2) Should the Court grant judgment of acquittal to Herrera, 
and dismiss the misdemeanor counts against him because the State 
did not, and cannot meet the controlling federal “conservation 
necessity” standard for prosecution of an otherwise immune treaty-
hunter under state wildlife laws? Herrera is an enrolled member of 
the Crow Tribe and a resident of St. Xavier, Montana, which is 
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located on the Crow Reservation. In January 2014, Herrera and 
several other tribal members decided to hunt for elk on the Crow 
Reservation. They spotted several elk on the Reservation in the 
vicinity of Eskimo Creek. At some point, the elk crossed a fence, 
leaving the Crow Reservation and entering into the Big Horn 
National Forest in the State of Wyoming. Herrera and the others 
crossed the fence into Wyoming and continued to track the elk. They 
shot three bull elk and took the meat back with them to Montana. 
The elk were taken without a license and during a closed season. 
Herrera was cited with two misdemeanors, taking an Antlered Big 
Game Animal Without a License or During a Closed Season, a 
violation of W.S. § 23-3-102(d), and Accessory to Taking Antlered 
Big Game Animal Without a License or During a Closed Season, a 
violation of W.S. § 23-6-205. Herrera filed a Motion to Dismiss 
under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and 
the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868. Herrera did not deny taking the 
elk, but he asserted that he had a right to hunt where and when he 
did under Article 4 of the 1868 Treaty with the Crow (“Crow 
Treaty”). He argued that this treaty gave the Crow Tribe the right to 
hunt off of the reservation on the “unoccupied lands of the United 
States” that fell within territory that had been ceded by the Crow, 
and that this treaty right was still valid and preempted state law. The 
circuit court entered its Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, Striking 
Evidentiary Hearings and Granting the State’s Motion in Limine. 
The trial court held that “[t]his issue of off-reservation treaty hunting 
rights is indistinguishable from the issue and arguments which were 
adjudicated in Crow Tribe of Indians vs. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982 (10th 
Cir. 1995).” The circuit court found itself to be “bound by the Tenth 
Circuit’s holding that Crow Tribe members do not have off-
reservation treaty hunting rights anywhere within the state of 
Wyoming.” The circuit court also rejected Herrera’s argument that 
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 
(1999), had reversed and rejected the Repsis case as well as Ward v. 
Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896), upon which the Repsis decision 
was based. The circuit court agreed with the Repsis court’s decision 
that the off-reservation treaty hunting right was intended to be 
temporary and is no longer valid. The circuit court alternatively held 
that even if the treaty rights still existed, the regulation at issue met 
the “conservation necessity” standard, and therefore the regulation 
would apply to treaty hunters. Herrera filed a Petition for a Writ of 
Review, Writ of Certiorari and Writ of Prohibition with the 
Wyoming Supreme Court. The Wyoming Supreme Court denied the 
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Petition. The jury convicted Herrera and he was given concurrent 
sentences of one (l) year in jail suspended in lieu of unsupervised 
probation, three (3) years of suspended hunting privileges, and 
$8,080.00 in fines and court costs. This appeal followed. Herrera is 
not challenging anything that occurred at his trial. Rather, he is 
appealing the circuit court’s pretrial decisions on the validity of the 
off-reservation treaty hunting right. The circuit court was presented 
with the Repsis case, which had squarely addressed the 
interpretation of the Crow Treaty. The circuit court was free to adopt 
that decision if it found it to be persuasive and appropriate. The 
circuit court did adopt the analysis and conclusions of the Repsis 
case, and this Court finds that it was appropriate to do so. Herrera’s 
primary argument is that the circuit court should not have found 
Repsis to be persuasive, because it was overruled by Mille Lacs. The 
circuit court rejected this argument, and as discussed above, this 
Court also concludes that Mille Lacs did not overrule Repsis. Rather, 
Mille Lacs reaffirmed the principle that the court must look at the 
language in the treaty to determine whether it was intended to be 
perpetual or if it was intended to terminate at the occurrence of a 
“clearly contemplated” event. The Repsis court applied this 
principle and determined that the off-reservation treaty hunting right 
in the Crow Treaty was no longer valid. It was therefore proper for 
the circuit court to adopt the reasoning in the Repsis decision, and 
bar Herrera from asserting the invalidated treaty hunting right as a 
defense to the criminal prosecution. Having reviewed the record, the 
briefs of the parties, and being otherwise fully advised, the Court 
affirms the circuit court’s orders and the Judgment and Sentence. 
Now, therefore, it is hereby ordered that the circuit court’s orders 
and the Judgment and Sentence are affirmed. 
78. Ak-Chin Indian Community v. Central Arizona Water 
Conservation District 
 
No. CV-17-00918-PHX-DGC, 2018 WL 397233 (D. Ariz. Jan. 12, 
2018). Crossclaim Defendants the United States, Department of the 
Interior (“DOI”), Bureau of Reclamation (“BOR”), and four officials 
of the DOI and BOR (collectively, the “United States”) move to 
dismiss Defendant Central Arizona Water Conservation District’s 
(“CAWCD”) crossclaim against them under Rules 12(b)(1) and 
12(b)(6). Plaintiff Ak-Chin Indian Community sued CAWCD to 
establish its right to certain water. CAWCD moved to join the United 
States as a necessary party defendant under Rule 19, and the Court 
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granted the motion. CAWCD then brought a crossclaim against the 
United States regarding CAWCD’s obligation to provide the water to 
Ak-Chin on behalf of the United States. The crossclaim seeks 
injunctive and declaratory relief. CAWCD operates and maintains the 
Central Arizona Project (“CAP”) pursuant to an operating agreement 
with the United States. As part of a 1984 settlement with Ak-Chin, the 
United States committed to deliver not less than 75,000 acre-feet 
(“AF”) per year “from the main project works of the [CAP] to the 
southeast corner of the Ak-Chin Indian Reservation.” Ak-Chin Water 
Rights Settlement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-530, §2(a), 98 Stat. 2698 
(the “1984 Act”). Additionally, “[i]n any year in which sufficient 
surface water is available,” the DOI “shall deliver such additional 
quantity of water as is requested by the Community not to exceed ten 
thousand acre-feet.” Id. § 2(b). The 1984 Act identifies the CAP as the 
source of the mandatory 75,000 AF, but does not identify a source for 
the additional 10,000 AF. The parties refer to this additional 10,000 AF 
as “§ 2(b) water,” and they dispute whether and under what 
circumstances CAWCD is obligated to supply it. Pursuant to a contract 
between the United States and Ak-Chin, Ak-Chin submits an annual 
schedule of its desired water deliveries to the DOI, which reviews the 
schedule for compliance with governing statutes and contracts and 
transmits it to CAWCD to arrange the water deliveries. CAWCD 
alleges that the United States transmitted a 2017 schedule that included 
§ 2(b) water and would have forced CAWCD to supply water in excess 
of its obligations. The United States instructed CAWCD that the § 2(b) 
water was to come from “any unused Indian contract water.” CAWCD 
argues that various statutes allocate a total of 136,645 AF of CAP water 
for use by the Ak-Chin and San Carlos Apache tribes each year. 
Further, CAWCD asserts that forcing it to supply § 2(b) water from 
“unused Indian contract water” violates the 2007 CAP Repayment 
Stipulation from prior litigation between CAWCD and the United 
States. Because § 2(b) water is “Excess Water” under the Stipulation, 
CAWCD argues that it has the “exclusive right in its discretion to sell 
or use [it] for any authorized purpose of the CAP.” In short, the rights 
asserted and the remedies sought in the crossclaim are rooted in 
contract. The crossclaim therefore seeks relief impliedly forbidden by 
another statute—the Tucker Act—and the APA waiver of sovereign 
immunity does not apply. The crossclaim is barred by sovereign 
immunity. It is ordered that the United States’ motion to dismiss 
CAWCD’s crossclaim is granted.  
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79. Yurok Tribe v. Resighini Rancheria 
 
No. 16-cv-02471 RMI, 2018 WL 550233 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2018). 
Appeal filed with the 9th Circuit on February 26, 2018. This is an action 
in which the Yurok Tribe (“the Tribe”) seeks a declaratory judgment 
that the Resighini Rancheria (“the Rancheria”) and Gary Mitch Dowd, 
a member of the Rancheria, do not have any rights to fish in the 
Klamath River Indian fishery within the Yurok Reservation. The 
Complaint sets forth two claims for relief: (1) violation of the Hoopa-
Yurok Settlement Act; and (2) violation of the Yurok Tribe’s exclusive 
federally reserved fishing right. Pending before the court is the 
Rancheria’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
This action is dismissed with prejudice as against the Resighini 
Rancheria based on the Rancheria’s tribal sovereign immunity. The 
court finds that the Yurok Tribe has waived its claims against 
Defendant Dowd in his official capacity, and those claims are 
dismissed. Finally, the court dismisses the action without prejudice as 
against Defendant Dowd in his individual capacity for failure to join an 
indispensable party under Rule 19. 
 
80. National Wildlife Federation, et al. v.                                
State of Oregon, et al. 
No. 17-35462, No. 17-35463, No. 17-35465, No. 17-35466, 
No. 17-35467, No. 17-35502, No. 18-35111, No. 18-35152, 
886 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. Apr. 2, 2018). Environmental conservation 
organizations brought action against National Marine Fisheries 
Service (NMFS), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and U.S. Bureau 
of Reclamation, challenging NMFS’s Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) biological opinion regarding salmonid species in Federal 
Columbia River Power System (FCRPS). State of Oregon 
intervened as plaintiff and states of Washington, Montana, and 
Idaho, as well as Indian tribes and other interested groups intervened 
as defendants. Following several rounds of appeals and remands to 
agencies to modify the biological opinion, the United States District 
Court for the District of Oregon, 184 F. Supp. 3d 861, found that 
NMFS violated ESA, Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in part. Organizations 
and Oregon moved for injunctive relief to address violations. The 
District Court, 2017 WL 1135610, granted in part and denied in part 
motions for injunctive relief. Agencies and intervenor-defendants 
appealed. The Appellate Court held that: (1) conservation 
organizations’ injunction motions were not precluded by rule 
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establishing under what circumstances a motion for relief from 
judgment is permitted; (2) showing an extinction-level threat to a 
listed species is not required before an injunction can issue under the 
ESA; (3) district court did not err in basing its issuance of 
preliminary injunction on the harm from the operation of the FCRPS 
dams as a whole, rather than on the harm from only the spill-related 
components of the alternative proposed in NMFS’s biological 
opinion; (4) district court properly concluded that operation of the 
FCRPS dams would cause irreparable harm to threatened and 
endangered salmonid species absent an injunction; (5) organizations 
adequately showed irreparable harm to their own interests; 
(6) preliminary injunction requiring increased amounts of spill was 
narrowly tailored to avoid the irreparable harm identified; and 
(7) conclusion that operation of dams would cause irreparable harm 
to salmonid species absent an injunction requiring operation of 
juvenile bypass facilities and associated passive integrated 
transponder (PIT) tag detection systems at dams was based on 
sufficient findings in the record. Affirmed in part. 
81. United States v. Washington 
No. C70-9213, Sub-proceeding 17-02, 2018 WL 1933718 (W.D. 
Wash. Apr. 24, 2018). This subproceeding concerning the 
Muckleshoot Tribe’s marine usual and accustomed fishing grounds 
and stations comes before the Court on the Swinomish Indian Tribal 
Community’s, Port Gamble and Jamestown S’Klallam Tribes’, 
Suquamish Tribes’, and Tulalip Tribe’s Motion to Dismiss under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The Muckleshoot Tribe 
opposes the motion, and the Nisqually Indian Tribe has joined in 
that opposition. The Moving Tribes assert that this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear this matter under Paragraph 25(a)(6) of the Order 
Modifying Paragraph 25 of the Permanent Injunction, entered on 
August 24, 1993, because the Muckleshoot Tribe’s marine usual and 
accustomed fishing grounds and stations (“U&A”) has already been 
specifically determined, and because the Muckleshoot asserted a 
contrary position to that advanced now in a prior subproceeding in 
which it succeeded. The Muckleshoot oppose the motion on the 
basis that the marine U&A asserted now has never been determined. 
The Nisqually, while not joining any substantive claims to the U&A, 
concurs with the procedural arguments made by the Muckleshoot 
with respect to its ability to invoke Paragraph 26(a)(6) jurisdiction. 
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For the reasons discussed herein, the Court agrees with the Moving 
Tribes, and hereby dismisses this subproceeding. 
82. Hoopa Valley Tribe v. National Marine Fisheries Service 
No. 16-cv-04294-WHO, 2018 WL 2010980 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 
2018). On March 24, 2017, I issued permanent injunctions in two 
related cases, Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Bureau of Reclamation, No. 16-
cv-4294, and Yurok Tribe v. Bureau of Reclamation, No. 16-cv-
6863. See Hoopa Dkt. No. 111; Yurok Dkt. No. 70. The injunctions 
ordered the United States Bureau of Reclamation (the “Bureau”) to 
require certain types of water flows as part of their operation of the 
Klamath River Project in order to prevent irreparable harm to the 
SONCC Coho salmon, an endangered species. The plaintiffs in 
those two cases are two federally protected Klamath Basin Tribes, 
the Hoopa Valley Tribe and the Yurok Tribe, whose cultural 
heritage and economic wellbeing revolve around the salmon’s 
health, as well as the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s 
Associations, Institute for Fisheries Resources, and Klamath 
Riverkeeper. Certain organizations and persons interested in the 
Klamath River Project intervened in both cases on the side of the 
Bureau and the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS,” and 
together with the Bureau, “federal defendants”), advocating the 
interests of ranchers and farmers in receiving needed water for their 
livelihoods. While all of the parties present important equitable 
concerns, the Court issued the injunctions because the law demands 
that endangered species are entitled to primary protection. Both 
federal defendants and intervenors filed timely notices of appeal in 
the two cases. Water year 2017 resulted in favorable conditions in 
the Klamath River, while water year 2018 has been significantly 
drier. On March 7, 2018, intervenors moved for relief from the 
judgment, or, in the alternative, a stay of enforcement of the 
injunctions, arguing that the application of the injunctions to water 
year 2018 is both unnecessary and inequitable due to new 
information not available at the time that the injunctions were 
issued. Federal defendants do not join in intervenors’ motion, but 
respond separately that they believe that full compliance with the 
injunctions is not possible as a result of the drier hydrological 
conditions, and propose a new plan. Plaintiffs oppose both 
intervenors’ motion and federal defendants’ proposal. Given the 
pendency of the appeal, the Court’s jurisdiction is limited. Pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1, the Court considered the 
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merits of intervenors’ motion and denies it because they do not show 
newly discovered evidence sufficient to justify suspending or 
modifying the injunctions pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2), nor that 
prospective application of the injunctions would be inequitable 
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5). Staying enforcement would not preserve 
the status quo, and the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant their 
requested stay while the appeal is pending. Nor would the Court do 
so in light of the evidence of record. With respect to federal 
defendants’ proposed plan, the Court clarifies federal defendants’ 
obligations under the injunctions – partial compliance with Measure 
4 is necessary in the event that full compliance is not possible.  
83. United States v. Walker River Irrigation District 
No. 15-16478, No. 15-16479, 890 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. May 22, 
2018). Federal government brought action to establish water rights 
in river basin on behalf of the Walker River Paiute Tribe. The 
District Court issued decision, 11 F. Supp. 158, and entered decree 
awarding water rights to various claimants. Federal government 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, 104 F.2d 334, reversed in part. On 
remand, the District Court amended and retained jurisdiction to 
modify decree. A river irrigation district filed a petition to enjoin 
state water resources control board from implementing restrictions 
on its water licenses. Tribe and federal government filed 
counterclaims asserting new water rights. The District Court, 2015 
WL 3439106, granted irrigation district’s motion to dismiss 
counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that 
while continuing jurisdiction existed, counterclaims were new 
action barred by res judicata. Tribe and federal government 
appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) continuing jurisdiction 
existed; (2) counterclaims were not new action; (3) dismissal based 
on res judicata was improper; and (4) Court of Appeals would 
reassign case. Reversed, remanded, and reassigned. We hold that the 
district court had continuing jurisdiction over the counterclaims and 
that it erred in dismissing the claims on res judicata or jurisdictional 
grounds without giving the parties an opportunity to brief the issue. 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand. On remand, we also order the 
reassignment of this case to another district judge.  
84. Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Forsman 
No. 17-35336, 738 Fed. Appx. 406, 2018 WL 3017052 (9th Cir. 
Jun. 18, 2018). The Jamestown S’Klallam and Port Gamble 
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S’Klallam Tribes are required parties to this action to establish 
hunting rights. Like Defendants, these amici tribes’ interpretation of 
their reserved hunting rights conflicts with Skokomish’s primary-
right claim, which entails the power to exclude members from all 
other Stevens Treaty Tribes from hunting in the land at issue. 
Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that deciding 
Skokomish’s claims against the Suquamish Defendants would 
necessarily decide Skokomish’s hunting rights in relation to the 
amici tribes and potentially other absent, non-party Stevens Treaty 
Tribes. Finally, the district court did not err in sua sponte denying 
Skokomish leave to amend its complaint. Skokomish has cursorily 
argued that it can remedy the absence of indispensable parties by 
adding the officers of the other Stevens Treaty Tribes to this action. 
Skokomish has failed, however, to allege that any tribe other than 
Suquamish has promulgated and is enforcing the type of tribal 
hunting regulation at issue. Leave to amend would therefore be 
futile.  
85. United States v. United States Board of Water 
Commissioners 
No. 15-16316, No. 15-16317, No. 15-16319, No. 15-16321, No. 15-
16323, No. 15-16489, 893 F.3d 578 (9th Cir. Jun. 22, 2018). 
Farmers sought review under court’s in rem jurisdiction of Nevada 
State Engineer’s and California State Water Resources Control 
Board’s approval of conservation organization’s and irrigation 
district’s change applications regarding their use of their water 
claims from Walker River. The District Court rejected Nevada’s and 
California’s rulings, refused to grant change applications, and 
remanded. Conservation organization and irrigation district 
appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) district court’s remand 
order was sufficiently final for Court of Appeals to review; 
(2) California Water Board’s adjudication of irrigation district’s 
change applications should have been reviewed under abuse of 
discretion standard; (3) Nevada State Engineer’s finding was 
supported by substantial evidence; (4) farmers failed to demonstrate 
that they had any right to the stored water that would have been 
injured by irrigation district’s proposed change; and (5) irrigation 
district’s proposed change did not violate Decree’s prohibition on 
delivering water outside the basin of the Walker River. Reversed 
and remanded. Opinion, 890 F.3d 1134, superseded.  
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86. The Klamath Tribes v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, et al. 
No. 18-cv-03078-WHO, 2018 WL 3570865 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 25, 
2018). The Klamath Tribes have filed suit for declaratory and 
injunctive relief to protect two endangered species of sucker fish 
from risk of extinction surrounding the operation of the Klamath 
Irrigation Project (“Project”). They move for a preliminary 
injunction to require the United States Bureau of Reclamation 
(“Bureau”) to maintain the water in the Upper Klamath Lake during 
the irrigation season of 2018 at elevation levels suggested in a 
controlling Biological Opinion issued jointly by the United States 
Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) and National Marine Fisheries 
Service (“NMFS”). The Bureau, FWS, and NMFS (collectively, 
“federal defendants”) as well as Klamath Water Users Association, 
Sunnyside Irrigation District, and Ben DuVal (collectively, 
“intervenors”), oppose the preliminary injunction and move to 
dismiss this case for improper venue, or alternatively to transfer 
venue. The federal defendants also move to dismiss one Count as 
nonjusticiable, and contend that it should at least be dismissed 
against NMFS because it lacks jurisdiction over the protected sucker 
fish. Various amici have filed briefs expressing their positions on 
venue and the preliminary injunction. While venue may be proper 
in the Northern District of California, it is more appropriate in the 
United States District Court for the District of Oregon: the Klamath 
Tribes are headquartered there, the sucker fish are there, the Upper 
Klamath Lake is there, and the Bureau and FWS have offices there. 
Only NMFS has an office in the Northern District, and it may not be 
long for this case given problems with Count III. The Court will let 
the transferee court address the pleadings as it will. There is reason 
for all parties to give urgent focus to the health of the sucker fish. 
The federal defendants represent that this is already happening, and 
the Court encourages the engaged scientists for all parties to work 
collaboratively and expeditiously to protect the sucker fish. The 
Klamath Irrigation Project is complex, and the endangered species 
within it are of paramount importance under the Endangered Species 
Act. That said, while this is a close case, the Klamath Tribes have 
not convinced the Court on this record that they are likely to prevail 
on the merits or that the sucker fish will suffer irreparable harm if I 
do not grant the relief the Klamath Tribes seek. There is substantial 
disagreement whether the lake elevation level is causing injury to 
the sucker fish, but there is no doubt that granting a mandatory 
injunction that cuts off water to the Klamath Irrigation District will 
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cause substantial harm to others that depend on it, including wildlife 
refuges, farmers and ranchers. The motion for preliminary 
injunction is denied.  
87. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. United States 
No. 2017-2340, 900 F.3d 1350, 2018 WL 3945585 (Fed. Cir. 
Aug. 17, 2018). The Crow Creek Sioux Tribe (“Tribe”) is a federally 
recognized Indian tribe. Its reservation is located in South Dakota 
along the Missouri River. The Tribe filed suit against the United 
States in the Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”) seeking 
damages and declaratory and injunctive relief for the alleged taking 
of its water rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and for the 
alleged mismanagement of its water rights in violation of 25 U.S.C. 
§ 162a(d)(8). The Claims Court dismissed the case for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction. The Crow Creek Indian Reservation 
(“Reservation”) was established in central South Dakota in 1863. 
The Missouri River overlies the Reservation's western boundary. 
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Winters v. United States, 207 
U.S. 564, 28 S. Ct. 207, 52 L. Ed. 340 (1908), the creation of an 
Indian Reservation carries an implied right to unappropriated water 
“to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.” 
These reserved rights are known as Winters rights. They arise as an 
implied right from the treaty, federal statute, or executive order that 
set aside the reservation, and they vest on the date of the 
reservation's creation. The parties agree for purposes of the motion 
to dismiss that, pursuant to the Winters doctrine, the Tribe possesses 
a perfected right to sufficient water to fulfil the Reservation's 
purposes. In June 2016, the Tribe filed suit in the Claims Court 
seeking at least $200 million in damages. The complaint alleged that 
certain, unspecified acts and omissions by the United States, 
presumably including the continued operation of the dams, have 
taken the Tribe's “Winters reserved water rights” without just 
compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The complaint 
also alleged that the government breached its fiduciary duty to 
“[a]ppropriately manag[e] the natural resources located within the 
boundaries of Indian reservations,” 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d)(8), “by the 
acts and omissions described hereinabove, including failing to 
protect, quantify, assert or record Plaintiff's water rights, and instead 
continuously diverting, retaining, and appropriating that water to 
others and to Defendant's own use.” The complaint did not allege 
that the government's actions deprived the Tribe of sufficient water 
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to fulfill the reservation's purposes or that those actions would cause 
the Tribe to lack sufficient water in the future. The United States 
filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Court of 
Federal Claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Claims 
Court granted the motion, noting that Winters only entitles the Tribe 
to sufficient water to fulfill the Reservation's purposes and 
explaining that nothing in the complaint suggests that the Tribe is 
“experienc[ing] a shortage of water” or that its water supply from 
the Missouri River is or will be “insufficient for [the Tribe's] 
intended pursuits.” The Claims Court rejected the Tribe's argument 
that its Winters reserved water rights can be injured by any “taking 
or diverting [of] waters from the Missouri River,” even if the 
diversion does not cause the Tribe to experience any water shortage. 
The court also noted that, while 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d)(8) “does direct 
the government to manage the natural resources of Indian tribes,” 
the statute “does not direct any specific actions to be taken by the 
government in that management.” The Claims Court therefore 
dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because it 
could not “identify an injury to the Tribe that has yet occurred.” The 
tribe timely appealed. The Claims Court's decision, while it 
sometimes uses the word “damages,” turns on the Tribe's underlying 
failure to allege an injury in fact. Indeed, the Claims Court concludes 
its opinion by stating that “[t]he jurisdictional problem ... arises from 
plaintiff's inability to identify an injury to the Tribe.” We think the 
Claims Court was correct in dismissing the case for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction because the Tribe failed to sufficiently allege 
injury. The Tribe argues that, because its Winters rights vested at the 
founding of the Reservation, any subsequent action affecting the 
waters of the Missouri River constitutes an injury of those rights, 
even if the action does not affect the Tribe's ability to draw sufficient 
water to fulfill the purposes of the Reservation. In so arguing, the 
Tribe appears to misunderstand what its water rights entail. As noted 
above, Winters, the sole source of the water rights asserted in this 
case, only entitles tribes to “that amount of water necessary to fulfill 
the purpose of the reservation, no more.” And because water rights 
are usufructuary in nature—meaning that the property right 
“consists not so much of the fluid itself as the advantage of its 
use”—the Tribe has no right to any particular molecules of water, 
either on the Reservation or up- or downstream, that may have been 
used or diverted by the government. The Tribe's Winters rights, 
which give the Tribe the right to use sufficient water to fulfill the 
purposes of the Reservation, simply cannot be injured by 
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government action that does not affect the Tribe's ability to use 
sufficient water to fulfill the purposes of the Reservation. Because 
the Tribe failed to allege an injury in fact, we affirm the Claims 
Court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Affirmed.  
 
G. Gaming 
 
88. Stockbridge–Munsee Community v. Wisconsin 
 
No. 17–cv–249-jdp, 299 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 2017 WL 4857646 
(W.D. Wis. Oct. 25, 2017). Stockbridge–Munsee Tribe filed this 
lawsuit, claiming that the Ho–Chunk Nation’s casino violated 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) and gaming compact that 
other tribe negotiated with state, and that state and its governor 
violated compact by refusing to enforce its provisions.  
Stockbridge–Munsee Tribe moved for preliminary injunction, and 
other tribe moved for judgment on pleadings. The District Court 
held that:(1) tribe’s claims accrued when state approved of casino 
and other tribe began operating it, and (2) continuing violations 
doctrine did not extend statutory period. Motion for judgment on 
pleadings granted; dismissed. 
 
89. Amador County, California v. United States Department 
of the Interior 
 
No. 16-5082, 707 Fed. Appx. 720 (Mem) (D.D.C. Nov. 27, 2017). 
This petition for review was considered on the record from the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the 
briefs filed by the parties. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. R. 
34(j). The court has accorded the issues full consideration and 
determined that they do not warrant a published opinion. Amador 
County challenges the Department of the Interior’s authorization of 
gaming on land, known as the Buena Vista Rancheria, that is owned 
by the Me Wuk Tribe. Its suit turns on whether the Rancheria is a 
“reservation” within the meaning of the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(4), 2710. In 1987, in Hardwick v. 
United States, No. C-79-1710 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 1987), the County 
and the Hardwick plaintiffs from the Buena Vista Rancheria agreed 
to a stipulated judgment stating that the County would treat the 
Buena Vista Rancheria “as any other federally recognized Indian 
reservation,” and that “all of the laws of the United States that 
pertain to federally recognized Indian Tribes and Indians shall 
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apply” to the Rancheria. Joint Appendix 31. As the district court 
found, the agreement’s plain language “unambiguously sets forth 
the parties’ intent that the County would treat the Buena Vista 
Rancheria as a reservation.” Amador County v. S.M.R. Jewell, 170 
F. Supp. 3d 135, 144 (D.D.C. 2016). And as this court noted in an 
earlier appeal, such a clear manifestation of the “parties’ intent to be 
bound in future actions” precludes the County from arguing here 
that the Rancheria is not an Indian reservation. See Amador County 
v. Salazar, 640 F.3d 373, 384 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Otherson v. 
Dep’t of Justice, 711 F.2d 267, 274 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). The 
district court’s order of March 16, 2016 is affirmed.  
 
90. Sharp Image Gaming, Inc. v. Shingle Springs Band of 
Miwok Indians 
 
No. C070512, 15 Cal. App. 5th 391, 223 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2017), reh’g denied (Oct. 16, 2017), review denied (Dec. 20, 
2017). Casino gaming company brought breach of contract action 
against Indian tribe stemming from a deal to develop a casino on 
tribal land. The Superior Court denied tribe’s motion to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction as well as motion for summary 
judgment, and, following trial, entered judgment on jury verdict for 
the company. Tribe appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) court 
was required to determine threshold question of whether agreements 
were management contracts or collateral agreements to a 
management contract subject to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
(IGRA); (2) agreements were “management agreements” within 
meaning of IGRA; and (3) promissory note was a collateral 
agreement to a management contract within meaning of IGRA such 
that preemption applied. Reversed and remanded with directions. 
 
91. Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Oklahoma 
 
No. 16-6224, 881 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. Feb. 6, 2018). Native American 
nation brought action against state of Oklahoma, seeking to enforce 
arbitration award obtained in connection with dispute under tribal-state 
gaming compact. The District Court, 2016 WL 3461538, entered order 
enforcing award. State appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) de 
novo review provision of binding arbitration clause in tribal-state 
gaming compact was legally invalid, and (2) district court erred in 
failing to sever binding arbitration clause from tribal-state gaming 
compact. Remanded with instructions to vacate arbitration award. 
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92. Texas v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo 
 
No. EP–17–CV–179–RPM, 2018 WL 1474679 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 
2018). The Court considered Defendants Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, the 
Tribal Council, and the Tribal Governor Carlos Hisa’s [hereinafter 
collectively referred to as “Defendants”] “Motion to Dismiss First 
Amended Complaint” (“Motion”). This case is the latest iteration of a 
long-running dispute between Plaintiff and Defendants regarding 
enforcement of Texas gaming law on the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo 
[hereinafter “Pueblo” or “the Tribe”] reservation. In 1987, the United 
States enacted the Restoration Act (“the Act”), which “restored trust 
responsibility for the Pueblo to the federal government” from the State 
of Texas. The Act delineates the nature of the federal trust relationship 
and contains provisions regarding, inter alia, federal recognition of the 
Tribe, the rights and privileges of the Tribe (including eligibility for 
federal services and assistance), the relationship between federal, state, 
and tribal authority, and permanent physical improvements to the 
reservation. Most importantly for purposes of this case, the Act governs 
“Gaming Activities” conducted on the reservation [hereinafter “Pueblo 
gaming”]. Section 107 of the Act contains two provisions relevant to 
deciding the Motion. Section 107(a), in pertinent part, provides that: 
All gaming activities which are prohibited by the laws of the State of 
Texas are hereby prohibited on the reservation and on lands of the tribe. 
Any violation of the prohibition provided in this subsection shall be 
subject to the same civil and criminal penalties that are provided by the 
laws of the State of Texas. Section 107(c) provides that “the courts of 
the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any offense in 
violation of subsection (a) [i.e., the section prohibiting all gaming 
activities prohibited by the State of Texas] ....” The effect of 
subsections (a) and (c) of the Act is to federalize Texas gaming law, 
which currently operates “as surrogate federal law on the Tribe’s 
reservation in Texas.” Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. State of Tex., 36 F.3d 
1325, 1334 (5th Cir. 1994). Essentially, any activity prohibited 
pursuant to Texas law is prohibited pursuant to federal law. The Court 
concludes that the Texas attorney general, who is statutorily authorized 
to sue based on the Texas common nuisance statute, maintains the 
capacity to bring suit in this case. Accordingly, Defendants Ysleta del 
Sur Pueblo, the Tribal Council, and the Tribal Governor Carlos Hisa’s 
“Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint” is denied.  
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93. Pauma v. National Labor Relations Board 
No. 16-70397, No. 16-70756, 888 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 
2018). Tribal employer that operated casino on Indian reservation 
filed petition for review of order of the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB), No. 21-CA-125450, 363 NLRB No. 60, 205 
L.R.R.M. 1591, 2015 WL 7873631, which affirmed as modified 
administrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision, 2015 WL 3526140, that 
employer committed unfair labor practices in violation of the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by trying to stop union 
literature distribution in guest areas at casino’s front entrance and in 
non-working areas near its employees’ time clock. NLRB filed 
petition for enforcement of its order, and union intervened in 
opposition to employer. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) union 
could not raise collateral estoppel defense affirmatively waived by 
NLRB; (2) NLRB’s determination that tribal employer was 
“employer” within meaning of the NLRA was entitled to Chevron 
deference; (3) federal Indian law did not preclude NLRB’s 
determination that tribal employer was “employer” within meaning 
of the NLRA; (4) employer sufficiently exhausted its claim that it 
did not violate the NLRA; (5) substantial evidence supported 
NLRB’s determination that tribal employer committed unfair labor 
practice by trying to stop employees’ union literature distribution to 
customers outside casino’s front entrance; and (6) substantial 
evidence supported NLRB’s determination that tribal employer 
committed unfair labor practice by disciplining employee for 
distributing union literature near casino’s time clock. NLRB’s 
petition granted and employer’s petition denied. 
 
94. Fort Sill Apache Tribe v. National Indian Gaming 
Commission 
 
No. 14-958, 317 F. Supp. 3d 504, 2018 WL 2389724 (D.D.C. 
May 25, 2018). Indian tribe brought action against National Indian 
Gaming Commission (NIGC), its acting chairman, and United 
States, alleging that NIGC’s decision not to reconsider and to affirm 
its prior decision, which determined that tribe was not eligible to 
operate casino, was arbitrary and capricious and that United States 
breached settlement agreement, under which tribe agreed to 
relinquish its lands on reservation and move to area within tribe’s 
ancestral homeland. NIGC, acting chairman, and United States 
moved to dismiss and to reconsider prior order that allowed tribe to 
amend its complaint. In the late 1990s, the Tribe sought to open a 
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gaming facility on land within the boundaries of the KCA 
Reservation. The Comanche Nation, a separate tribal entity which 
also held lands on the KCA Reservation, opposed that plan and sued 
the United States to stop it. See Comanche Nation, Okla. v. United 
States (Comanche Nation), Case No. CIV–05–328–F (W.D. Ok. 
Mar. 9, 2007). The Fort Sill Apache Indian Tribe intervened in the 
lawsuit. Pursuant to the Comanche Nation Settlement Agreement, 
the Fort Sill Apache Indian Tribe agreed to relinquish its lands on 
the KCA Reservation and move to a thirty-acre location in Akela 
Flats, New Mexico, an area within the Tribe’s ancestral homeland. 
Plaintiff now seeks to establish gaming in the New Mexico lands. 
The District Court held that: (1) District Court that issued settlement 
agreement retained jurisdiction over the agreement, and thus, 
District Court lacked jurisdiction over tribe’s breach of agreement 
claim, and (2) NIGC’s decision not to reconsider and to affirm its 
prior decision was final agency action, and thus was subject to 
judicial review. Motion to dismiss granted in part and denied in part; 
motion for reconsideration granted. Having reaffirmed on 
reconsideration that the 2017 Decision constitutes final agency 
action subject to challenge in court, the Court will order the 
Defendants to produce the administrative record for the 2017 
Decision, including any privilege log, within fourteen days of the 
date of this order. The Tribe’s motion to compel is denied as 
premature.  
 
95. California v. Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians 
of California, 
 
No. 16-15096, 725 Fed. Appx. 591 (Mem) (9th Cir. Jun. 5, 2018). 
Defendant-Appellants, individual members of the Picayune 
Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians of California Tribe (“the 
Distributees”), appeal the district court’s entry of judgment and 
permanent injunction, which enjoined the Tribe and its agents from 
certain conduct related to ensuring the health, safety, and welfare of 
the public with respect to the Tribe’s operation of its Chukchansi 
Gold Resort and Casino. The Distributees allege that the district 
court erroneously recognized a faction of tribal members as the 
rightful tribal leadership and failed to recognize and defer to tribal 
court rulings regarding the makeup of the Tribal Council and its 
election. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
over the appeal of the district court’s judgment and permanent 
injunction. Contrary to Appellee’s assertion, the Distributees have 
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standing to pursue this appeal because the district court enjoined “all 
groups claiming to constitute the tribal government,” which 
arguably forms the basis of the Distributees’ claim. Nonetheless, the 
appeal fails on the merits. First, the injuries alleged by the 
Distributees, recognition of the Interim and New Tribal Councils 
and failure to recognize tribal court rulings, are not part of the 
district court’s decision. The district court did not determine which 
disputant tribal faction represented the rightful tribal council or 
leadership. Rather, the district court summarized the intra-tribal 
dispute among the factions, the actions taken by the BIA and the 
Interior Board of Indian Appeals with respect to the 2010 Interim 
Tribal Council, and the October 2015 Tribal Council Election. 
Further, the tribal court rulings referenced by the Distributees were 
irrelevant to the issues before the district court: the Tribe’s 
compliance with the provisions of the Class III gaming Compact 
between the Tribe and the State of California requiring the Tribe to 
ensure the public’s health, safety, and welfare in operating its 
Casino. Because the district court did not recognize one faction over 
another and did not err by failing to recognize tribal court rulings 
that were irrelevant to the issues before it, reversal of the district 
court’s judgment or permanent injunction would not redress or have 
a practical effect on the injuries alleged by the Distributees. On the 
merits, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the 
injunction. The State of California sufficiently established 
irreparable harm in the danger that the continued conflict over the 
tribal casino operations posed to public safety. There were no 
adequate remedies at law. The balance of hardships favored the 
State. The public interest was served by the entry of a permanent 
injunction. The district court acted entirely properly.  
 
96. Navajo Nation et. al., v. Dalley  
 
No. 16-2205, 896 F.3d 1196, 2018 WL 3543643 (10th Cir. Jul. 24, 
2018). The Appellants, the Navajo Nation and its wholly-owned 
government enterprise the Northern Edge Navajo Casino (together, 
the “Tribe” or “Nation”), entered into a state-tribal gaming compact 
with New Mexico under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
(“IGRA”), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721. The Tribe agreed not only to 
waive its sovereign immunity for personal-injury lawsuits brought 
by visitors to its on-reservation gaming facilities, but also to permit 
state courts to take jurisdiction over such claims. Harold and 
Michelle McNeal (the “McNeals”) are plaintiffs in just such a state-
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court action against the Tribe. Mr. McNeal allegedly slipped on a 
wet floor in the Northern Edge Navajo Casino. This slip-and-fall 
incident constituted the basis for the McNeals’ tort claims against 
the Nation for negligence, res ipsa loquitur, and loss of consortium. 
Judge Bradford Dalley is a New Mexico state judge who presides 
over the ongoing state-court proceedings. The Tribe moved to 
dismiss the McNeals’ complaint, arguing that the state court lacked 
jurisdiction because neither IGRA nor Navajo law permits the 
shifting of jurisdiction to a state court over such personal-injury 
claims. The state court rejected that motion. In response, the Tribe 
sought declaratory relief in federal court on the basis of the same 
arguments. The district court granted summary judgment for the 
McNeals and Judge Dalley, holding that IGRA permitted tribes and 
states to agree to shift jurisdiction to the state courts and that Navajo 
law did not prohibit such an allocation of jurisdiction. The Tribe 
timely appealed. Prior to oral argument, the Court ordered the 
parties to submit supplemental briefs as to whether the district court 
had jurisdiction. Along with the jurisdictional issue, the parties also 
dispute (1) whether IGRA permits an Indian tribe to allocate 
jurisdiction over a tort claim arising on Indian land to a state court, 
and (2) assuming that IGRA does allow for such an allocation, 
whether the Navajo Nation Council (“NNC”) was empowered to 
shift jurisdiction to the state court under Navajo Law. After first 
concluding that the Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal, the 
Court determined that IGRA, under its plain terms, does not 
authorize an allocation of jurisdiction over tort claims of the kind at 
issue here. Accordingly, the Court reverses the judgment of the 
district court and remand with instructions to grant the declaratory 
relief sought by the Nation.  
 
97. State Of California, et al., v. Iipay Nation Of Santa 
Ysabel, et al. 
 
No. 17-55150, 898 F.3d 960, 2018 WL 3650825 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 
2018). The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in 
favor of the State of California and the United States in their action 
seeking injunctive relief prohibiting Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel 
from continuing to operate Desert Rose Casino. Desert Rose Casino 
is exclusively a server-based bingo game that allows patrons to play 
computerized bingo over the internet. Iipay Nation is a federally 
recognized Indian tribe with tribal lands located in San Diego 
County, California. The panel held that Iipay Nation’s operation of 
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Desert Rose Casino violated the Unlawful Internet Gambling 
Enforcement Act (“UIGEA”). The panel held that the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act protected gaming activity conducted on 
Indian lands, but the patrons’ act of placing a bet or wager on a game 
of Desert Rose Casino while located in California, violated the 
UIGEA, and was not protected by the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act. The panel further held that even if all of the “gaming activity” 
associated with Desert Rose Casino occurred on Indian lands, the 
patrons’ act of placing bets or wagers over the internet while located 
in a jurisdiction where those bets or wagers were illegal made Iipay 
Nation’s decision to accept financial payments associated with those 
bets or wagers a violation of the UIGEA. This case presents an issue 
of first impression: Does the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 
U.S.C. § 2701, et seq., permit an Indian tribe to offer online gaming 
to patrons located off Indian lands in jurisdictions where gambling 
is illegal? Because we conclude that the Unlawful Internet 
Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5361, et seq., bars the 
activity at issue in this case, we affirm the district court’s order 
granting summary judgment to the State of California and the United 
States. As discussed above, DRB (like other forms of bingo, 
generally) is a Class II game. Thus, if DRB takes place on Indian 
lands, it is under Iipay’s jurisdiction, provided Iipay complies with 
certain regulatory requirements that are not at issue here. The 
UIGEA was passed to regulate online gambling. See 31 U.S.C. 
§ 5361. Unlike IGRA or other gambling regulations, the UIGEA 
does not make gambling legal or illegal directly. Instead, the UIGEA 
makes it illegal for a “person engaged in the business of betting or 
wagering” knowingly to accept certain financial payments from an 
individual who is engaged in “unlawful Internet gambling.” 31 
U.S.C. § 5363. Unlawful internet gambling occurs when an 
individual places or receives a “bet or wager by any means which  
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involves the use, at least in part, of the Internet where such bet or 
wager is unlawful under any applicable Federal or State law in the 
State or Tribal lands in which the bet or wager is initiated, received, 
or otherwise made.” 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(A) (emphasis added). A 
“bet or wager” includes “staking or risking” something of value, 
purchasing a lottery ticket, or transmitting “any instructions or 
information pertaining to the establishment or movement of funds 
by the bettor or customer in, to, or from an account with the business 
of betting or wagering.” 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1). Thus, the UIGEA does 
not prohibit otherwise legal gambling. But the UIGEA does create a 
system in which a “bet or wager” must be legal both where it is 
“initiated” and where it is “received.”  
 
H. Jurisdiction, Federal 
 
98. Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe v. McFarland 
 
No. 2:17–00293–WBS, 579 B.R. 853 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 19, 2017). 
Chapter 11 trustee brought adversarial proceeding against tribe, 
seeking to avoid and recover the value of certain allegedly 
fraudulent transfers. The bankruptcy court denied tribe’s motion to 
dismiss. The Tribe appealed. The District Court held that: 
(1) Bankruptcy Code provision abrogating the sovereignty of any 
governmental unit, abrogated tribe’s sovereign immunity with 
regard to trustee’s adversarial proceeding against tribe under 
provision allowing trustee to avoid any transfer of an interest of the 
debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is 
voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an allowable 
unsecured claim; (2) due to explicit abrogation of sovereign 
immunity in Bankruptcy Code provision abrogating the sovereignty 
of any governmental unit, in order to bring a claim against tribe 
under provision allowing trustee to avoid any transfer of an interest 
of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor 
that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an 
allowable unsecured claim, trustee needed only identify an 
unsecured creditor who, but for sovereign immunity, could have 
brought claim against tribe; (3) such interpretation in no way altered 
state law or created a new cause of action, and thus, trustee could 
bring such claim against tribe; (4) trustee’s service of summons and 
complaint for adversarial proceeding against tribe, by mail, was 
effective; and (5) trustee demonstrated good cause for delay in 
service of first amended complaint against tribe, and thus, the 
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bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in extending the time 
for service. Affirmed. 
 
99. Toya v. Toledo 
No. CIV 17-0258 JCH/KBM, 2017 WL 3995554 (D.N.M. Sep. 19, 
2017). This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Milton 
Toya’s First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus for Relief 
from a Tribal Court Conviction Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1303 filed 
June 9, 2017. Petitioner asserts that he was denied the right to 
counsel and the right to request a trial by jury during the course of 
his tribal-court prosecution. Respondents, on the other hand, 
contend that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his tribal remedies, 
leaving this Court without jurisdiction to resolve the Petition. The 
Honorable Judith C. Herrera referred this matter to me to “conduct 
hearings, if warranted, including evidentiary hearings, and to 
perform any legal analysis required to recommend to the Court an 
ultimate disposition of the case.” Having reviewed the submissions 
of the parties and the relevant law, the Court finds that Petitioner has 
exhausted his tribal remedies or that resort to them would be futile. 
The Court furthermore concludes that there is merit to Petitioner’s 
contentions, and therefore recommends that the Petition be granted. 
Petitioner was charged with four crimes: aggravated driving under 
the influence, liquor violation, driving on a revoked or suspended 
license, and open container. Petitioner asked to change his plea to 
not guilty and proceed to a jury trial. Petitioner also asked for an 
attorney. Judge Toledo advised Petitioner that he should have asked 
for an attorney and a trial before he pled guilty, and he denied 
Petitioner’s request to change his plea. Judge Toledo told Petitioner 
that if he was unhappy with the decision, he could appeal to the 
Governor’s office. However, it is made clear that Petitioner has no 
recourse in appealing to the Tribal Council or in requesting post-
judgment relief from his criminal proceedings when examining the 
Pueblo of Jemez Rules of Criminal Procedure.  
100. Jones v. Parmley 
No. 16-3603-cv, 714 Fed. Appx. 42, 2017 WL 4994468 (2nd Cir. 
Nov. 2, 2017). Members of Native American tribe filed suit against 
state troopers and other law enforcement officials arising out of 
defendants’ conduct in dispersing tribe’s political protest. Following 
settlement, 15 members of tribe who refused to settle proceeded to 
trial pro se. Following jury trial, the District Court entered judgment 
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for defendants, and tribe members appealed. The appellate court 
held that: (1) district court’s trial management did not violate rights 
of tribe members to fair trial; (2) record contained no evidence of 
judicial bias that warranted district court’s recusal; (3) personal 
involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations 
was prerequisite to award of damages under § 1983; (4) magistrate 
judge did not abuse her discretion in granting motions of tribe 
members’ counsel to withdraw following tribe members’ rejection 
of settlement. Affirmed. 
101. Murphy v. Royal 
No. 07-7068, No. 15-7041, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. Nov. 9, 2017). 
After Oklahoma state prisoner’s conviction for first-degree murder 
and death sentence were affirmed on appeal, 47 P.3d 876, he filed 
petition for writ of habeas corpus. The District Court for the Eastern 
District of Oklahoma, D.C. No. 6:03-CV-00443, White, J., 497 F. 
Supp. 2d 1257, denied prisoner’s petition, and, after prisoner filed 
second habeas petition, the District Court, D.C. No. 6:12-CV-00191, 
White, J., 2015 WL 2094548, denied prisoner’s second petition. 
Prisoner appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) prisoner’s claim 
was governed by clearly established federal law; (2) Oklahoma state 
appellate court rendered merits decision on prisoner’s claim that 
state court lacked jurisdiction because crime occurred on Indian 
land; (3) Oklahoma state appellate court’s decision was contrary to 
clearly established federal law; and (4) Congress did not disestablish 
Indian reservation, and thus Oklahoma state court lacked 
jurisdiction to prosecute defendant for murder that occurred on 
reservation. Reversed and remanded. 
102. Darnell v. Merchant 
No. 17-03063-EFM-TJJ, 2017 WL 5889754 (D. Kan. Nov. 29, 
2017). Petitioner Bobbie Darnell, a member of the Kickapoo Tribe 
in Kansas (the “Tribe”), filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1303 seeking relief from her tribal court 
convictions and sentence. Petitioner requests that the Court issue a 
writ of habeas corpus commanding her immediate release from jail 
in Brown County, Kansas, overturning her convictions in Kickapoo 
criminal cases numbers CRM016-11 and CRM016-23, and staying 
all further tribal court action against her. As explained below, the 
Court denies the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus because 
Petitioner has not exhausted her tribal remedies. After the district 
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court filed the sentencing order, Petitioner never filed a notice of 
appeal to the Kickapoo Supreme Court. But Petitioner contends that 
she does not have to exhaust her tribal remedies because she satisfies 
the exceptions to exhaustion set forth in Burrell. Specifically, 
Petitioner argues that the assertion of tribal jurisdiction was 
motivated by a desire to harass or was conducted in bad faith and 
that the assertion of tribal jurisdiction would be futile. She has not 
shown that any of the five exceptions to the exhaustion requirement 
apply in this case.  
103. State v. Todd 
No. 20170240, 904 N.W. 2d 40 (Mem) (N.D. Dec. 7, 2017). 
Timothy Lee Todd appeals from a criminal judgment entered after 
the district court found him guilty of being in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
Todd argues the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
because he is an enrolled member of a federally-recognized tribe and 
he was conducting tribe-related business. Because Todd committed 
the offense beyond the exterior boundaries of a reservation, we 
conclude the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over this 
matter under N.D. Const. art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 27–05–06. See 
State v. Delorme, 2013 ND 123, ¶ 12, 834 N.W. 2d 300 (quoting 
Roe v. Doe, 2002 ND 136, ¶ 8, 649 N.W. 2d 566) (stating that 
“outside of Indian country, the state has general criminal jurisdiction 
over all persons, including Indians”). Further, the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in rejecting Todd’s discovery claim, and its 
judgment is supported by substantial evidence. We summarily 
affirm under N.D.R. App. P. 35.1(a)(3), (4), and (7).  
104. State v. Comenout 
No. 48990–2–II, 1 Wash. App. 2d 1058 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 
2017). In a consolidated case, Robert Comenout Jr., Lee Comenout 
Sr., Marlene Comenout, and Robert Comenout Sr. (collectively the 
Comenouts) appeal their convictions following their Alford pleas to 
charges relating to the possession and sale of cigarettes in the 
operation of the Indian Country Store in Puyallup. The Comenouts 
allege that they are enrolled Indians doing business in Indian 
Country, and therefore that they are not subject to State criminal 
jurisdiction. The Indian Country Store is located on trust allotment 
property, but it is not within an Indian reservation. We hold that 
(1) the State has criminal jurisdiction over the Comenouts for 
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activity occurring on trust allotment property that is not located 
within an Indian reservation, (2) RCW 82.24.250, one of the statutes 
associated with their convictions, does not violate equal protection, 
(3) we decline to consider the Comenouts’ claim that their 
respective informations were insufficient because they presented no 
meaningful argument on that claim, and (4) we decline to review the 
Comenouts’ other claims that do not involve jurisdiction because 
they waived their right to appeal those claims when they pleaded 
guilty. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions of Robert Comenout 
Jr., Lee Comenout Sr., Marlene Comenout, and Robert Comenout 
Sr. 
105. State v. Zack 
No. 34926-8-III, 2 Wash. App. 2d 667 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 
2018). Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court of assault of 
law enforcement officer, arising out of assault of jail officer while 
transporting defendant to hospital on deeded (fee) land within 
boundaries of reservation. Defendant appealed. As matter of first 
impression, the Court of Appeals held that State had jurisdiction to 
prosecute defendant, who was not enrolled member of tribe, for 
crime that occurred on fee land within boundaries of reservation. 
Affirmed.  
 
106. Swinomish Indian Tribal Community v. BNSF Railway 
Company 
 
No. C15-0543RSL, 2018 WL 1336256 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 15, 
2018). This matter comes before the Court on “BNSF Railway 
Company’s Motion for Clarification and, if Necessary, 
Reconsideration.” The Swinomish Indian Tribal Community filed 
this lawsuit in April 2015 alleging that BNSF Railway Company 
breached provisions of a Right-of-Way Easement Agreement 
(“Easement Agreement”) that governed BNSF’s access to tribal 
lands. The Tribe asserted breach of contract and trespass claims and 
sought damages, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. In its 
answer, BNSF admitted that “the Right-of-Way is on the north end 
of the Reservation” and “crosses a bridge over the Swinomish 
Channel and a bridge across Padilla Bay, both of which are within 
the Reservation.” BNSF also raised preemption as an affirmative 
defense, arguing that the Tribe’s claims are barred by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”), 49 U.S.C. 
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§ 10501 et seq. The parties filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment regarding the preemption defense. In support of its 
motion, the Tribe set forth facts relevant to the enforceability of the 
Easement Agreement, the Court’s jurisdiction, and the nature of its 
claims. These facts were not disputed in the summary judgment 
memoranda. Although BNSF noted that a contested issue in the 
prior litigation was whether the rail line was within the boundaries 
of the Reservation, it admitted the fact for purposes of this litigation 
and offered no evidence that would suggest a genuine dispute. At 
oral argument, however, counsel announced that BNSF was, in fact, 
contesting whether the Tribe had any rights in the land underlying 
the railway. Again, no evidence was identified or provided in 
support of the supposed disputed issue of fact. In ruling on the cross-
motions for summary judgment, the Court initially misconstrued 
plaintiff’s breach of contract and trespass claims as arising under 
state law. The Tribe filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that 
it was “suing to protect its interests in land that, pursuant to treaty, 
is held in trust for the Tribe by the United States government” and 
that its claims were therefore grounded in federal common law, not 
state law. The Tribe clearly linked the resolution of the preemption 
issue to its treaty rights in the land underlying BNSF’s tracks, 
arguing that the treaty gave rise to a federally-protected interest and 
fundamentally changed the preemption analysis. Again, BNSF did 
not produce any evidence that the right-of-way fell outside the 
Reservation boundaries. Based on the record before it, the Court 
found that it had erred in its preemption analysis. A federal right 
arising from a treaty is, under the Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution, Art. VI cl. 2, on equal legal footing with federal 
statutes: Preemption was simply not an issue. Thus, the Court 
implicitly adopted the admitted and factually undisputed allegation 
that BNSF’s tracks are on tribal land. BNSF, having now lost the 
preemption battle, intends to contest a key fact underlying that 
analysis, even though it was admitted in its answer and regarding 
which it has not provided a shred of evidence. BNSF admits that its 
goal is to overturn the Court’s preemption decision by showing that 
the Tribe has no treaty rights to the land under the tracks, that the 
Tribe’s right is therefore merely a contract right arising under state 
law, and that the contract and trespass claims are preempted. This 
very issue has been resolved based on a record developed by the 
parties with full knowledge that the genesis of the Tribe’s 
contractual right—whether it arose from a Treaty right or under state 
law—was a critical issue. BNSF chose not to submit evidence on 
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that issue, instead asserting a right to litigate this fact on its own 
schedule. It will not be permitted to do so. For all of the foregoing 
reasons, BNSF’s request for clarification is granted. As part of the 
preemption analysis, the Court relied on the record evidence 
showing that the Tribe has a treaty right to the land under BNSF’s 
tracks. That counsel can imagine a factual dispute regarding 
ownership—or the fact that BNSF’s predecessor raised the issue in 
a prior litigation—does not mean that there is a genuine issue of 
disputed fact in this litigation. The Tribe’s allegation of ownership 
was admitted, and BNSF declined to provide any evidence to 
support its periodic assertions that there may be some doubt 
regarding the issue. Its request for reconsideration is denied.  
 
107. United States v. 99, 337 Pieces of Counterfeit Native 
American Jewelry 
No. 16-1304 KG-KBM, 2018 WL 1568725 (D.N.M. Mar. 27, 
2018). This matter comes before the Court upon Claimant Romie 
Salem’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, filed March 
6, 2017. Mr. Salem requests that the Court dismiss the United States’ 
claim against his property, asserting he is an innocent bystander 
whose property the United States wrongfully seized. Mr. Salem 
further asserts that his property is now subject to forfeiture simply 
because it was stored in the same facility where other property 
subject to forfeiture was stored and that his property, therefore, is 
implicated in a criminal investigation not related to his property. The 
United States argues the Court should deny the Motion to Dismiss 
because the Verified Complaint for Forfeiture In Rem states a claim 
for relief. On February 1, 2018, the Court held a hearing on the 
Motion to Dismiss. The Court took the matter under advisement but 
allowed both parties to file supplemental reply briefs. The United 
States brings this civil action to forfeit and condemn property, 
alleging violations of: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 542 (“Entry of goods by 
means of false statements”), and forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
981(a)(1)(C); (2) 18 U.S.C. § 545 (“Smuggling goods in the United 
States”), and forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 545; (3) 19 U.S.C. § 
1304 (“Marking of imported articles and containers”), and forfeiture 
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(2)(E); and (4) 18 U.S.C. § 1956 
(“Laundering of monetary instruments”) and § 1957 (“Engaging in 
monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful 
activity”), and forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A).  
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Defendants in rem include (a) 99,337 Pieces of Counterfeit Native 
American Jewelry; (b) 72,620 Pieces of Counterfeit Native 
American Jewelry; (c) 21,249 Pieces of Counterfeit Native 
American Jewelry; and (d) $288,738.94 in Funds from Bank of 
America Account No.-3826 (collectively, Defendant Property). The 
allegations stem from an investigation by the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service and the Indian Arts and Crafts Board into the sale 
of alleged counterfeit Native American jewelry and violations of the 
Indian Arts and Crafts Act (IACA) by Sterling Islands, Inc. 
(Sterling), located at 5815 Menaul Boulevard, NE, Albuquerque, 
New Mexico. The Complaint alleges Sterling and other associated 
businesses worked in concert both inside and outside the District of 
New Mexico to design, manufacture, import, and fraudulently sell 
counterfeit Native American Jewelry in violation of the IACA. As a 
result of the investigation, federal search warrants were obtained and 
executed on Sterling’s business located at 5815 Menaul Boulevard 
NE, Albuquerque, New Mexico, where agents seized 53 boxes of 
alleged counterfeit Native American jewelry, including 99,337 
pieces of jewelry. In addition, agents seized $288,738.94. Agents 
also executed search warrants at Al Zuni Global Jewelry, located at 
1603 West Highway 66, Gallup, New Mexico, where they seized 
72,620 pieces of alleged counterfeit Native American jewelry and at 
1924 Count Fleet Street SE, Albuquerque, New Mexico, where 
agents seized 21,249 pieces of alleged counterfeit Native American 
jewelry. Mr. Salem argues the Complaint fails to state a claim 
against his property because (1) it does not include his name or that 
of his company, “Turquoise Network;” (2) there are no allegations 
against him of any wrongdoing; and (3) there is no justification for 
the seizure of his property. Mr. Salem also argues there is 
“absolutely no way for [him] to know or reasonably expect that he 
or his property were involved at all.” Having reviewed the entirety 
of the Complaint the Court determines that the Complaint states a 
claim against Defendant Property. It is therefore, ordered that 
Claimant Romie Salem’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a 
Claim is denied. 
 
108. John v. Garcia 
No. C 16-02368 WHA, 2018 WL 1569760 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 
2018). Respondents move for the third time to dismiss this petition 
for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act. 
The parties herein belong to the Elem Indian Colony of Pomo 
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Indians (the “Tribe”). A general council comprising all qualified 
voting members governs the Tribe and delegates various powers to 
a biennially-elected executive committee. Following a disputed 
election in November 2014, two factions—petitioners and 
respondents—each purported to be the Tribe’s duly-elected 
executive committee. Respondents managed to establish themselves 
as such and remain in power as the current executive committee, 
though petitioners continued to contest the results of the 2014 
election. On March 28, 2016, respondents issued an “Order of 
Disenrollment” to petitioners and other members of the Tribe. The 
disenrollment order accused petitioners of “violating the laws of 
Elem” and included a list of offenses. It stated, “If you are found 
guilty by the General Council of these offenses against the Tribe, 
you may be punished by ... DISENROLLMENT—loss of 
membership.” Recipients of the disenrollment order could submit a 
written answer within 35 days admitting or denying each accusation. 
Shortly after issuance of the disenrollment order, on April 30, 2016, 
petitioners filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging 
denial of due process and equal protection in violation of the Indian 
Civil Rights Act. Respondents had issued a “Disenrollment Notice 
of Default,” which claimed that petitioners’ time to answer the 
disenrollment order had passed. Petitioners and other recipients of 
the order were thus deemed to be in default and to have admitted the 
allegations against them. The Court is inclined to dismiss this 
petition. The volatility of relations between the two sides, however, 
is such that the potential need for relief in the near future remains a 
real possibility. This action, moreover, has been plagued by 
evolving and shifting facts and narratives, and testimony elicited 
during the hearing suggests some effects of respondents’ now-
repudiated actions—such as the denial of medical services to 
petitioners based on their purported “disenrollment”—continue to 
reverberate. Respondents’ renewed motion to dismiss repeats their 
position that petitioners have not been and will not be disenrolled or 
banished in the foreseeable future. Based on the premise that no 
petitioner has been disenrolled or banished, or will be disenrolled or 
banished in the foreseeable future, respondents contend this petition 
must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because it 
remains (1) unripe, (2) barred by tribal sovereign immunity, and (3) 
“a purely intra-Tribal dispute that should not be heard by this 
Court.” Their main thesis seems to be that petitioners cannot 
establish subject-matter jurisdiction under the ICRA because they 
failed to establish the requisite custody or detention for seeking such 
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relief. This order must agree. Since petitioners failed to establish the 
requisite custody or detention for seeking relief via a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus under Section 1303, this petition must be 
dismissed. Petitioners have not requested further leave to amend, 
and such leave would not be warranted in any event in light of the 
multiple opportunities already granted for petitioners to cure the 
deficiencies in their petition, including by taking discovery. Because 
this order concludes petitioners have not shown a “severe restraint” 
sufficient to invoke Section 1303, it does not reach the parties’ 
additional arguments, including arguments regarding exhaustion of 
administrative remedies or sovereign immunity. Respondents’ 
motion to dismiss is Granted. This petition is dismissed.  
109. Olson v. North Dakota Department of Transportation 
No. 20170351, 909 N.W. 2d 676, 2018 WL 1722354 (N.D. Apr. 10, 
2018). Harold Olson appeals a district court order affirming the 
North Dakota Department of Transportation’s (“Department”) 
revocation of his driving privileges for two years, following an 
arrest for driving under the influence. A deputy with the Mountrail 
County Sheriff’s Department testified he received a call from a 
Three Affiliated Tribes, also known as the Mandan, Hidatsa and 
Arikara Nation (“MHA”), officer on May 13, 2017 requesting 
assistance with a non-Indian he stopped and detained on tribal land. 
The district court affirmed the Department’s decision finding the 
deputy was acting under a request for assistance, which extended the 
deputy’s authority to arrest onto tribal land. The parties do not 
dispute the following facts: (1) Olson was discovered in his vehicle 
by a MHA officer on tribal land within the Fort Berthold 
Reservation, (2) the MHA officer requested assistance from the 
Mountrail County Sheriff’s Department, (3) the deputy completed 
an investigation and arrested Olson for driving under the influence 
on tribal land within the Fort Berthold Reservation, (4) Olson is an 
enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Chippewa Tribe, and 
(5) the MHA officer and the deputy did not know Olson was an 
enrolled member at the time of the arrest. Olson argues the deputy 
lacked the authority to arrest him on tribal land and that a valid arrest 
is a prerequisite to revocation of his driving privileges. Absent a 
valid arrest, Olson argues the revocation order is not in accordance 
with the law. The Department contends the MHA officer’s request 
for assistance from Mountrail County extended criminal jurisdiction 
to the State. The appellate court found that the deputy lacked 
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authority to arrest Olson, a non-member Indian, on MHA tribal land 
and reversed the district court’s order affirming the Department’s 
revocation of Olson’s driving privileges and reinstate Olson’s 
driving privileges.  
110. Tortalita v. Geisen 
No. 1:17-CV-684-RB-KRS, 2018 WL 3195145 (D.N.M. Apr. 24, 
2018). This matter comes before the Court upon Petitioner’s Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus for Relief from a Tribal Court Conviction 
Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (“Petition”), filed June 29, 2017. On 
August 31, 2017, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), this 
Petition was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Kevin R. 
Sweazea to conduct any necessary hearings and to recommend an 
ultimate disposition. Having reviewed the record and the parties’ 
briefing, the Magistrate recommends that the Court grant 
Petitioner’s Petition and vacate Petitioner’s underlying sentence and 
conviction. On September 16, 2016, Petitioner was arrested for 
Aggravated DWI; Reckless Driving; Resisting Arrest; Terroristic 
Threats; Probation Violation; Eluding; Open Container; Reckless 
Endangerment; Disorderly Conduct; and Invalid/Revoked Driver’s 
License. He was brought before the Tribal Court on September 20, 
2016, at which time he entered pleas of guilty. The Court adjudged 
Petitioner guilty, sentenced him to 544 days in jail, and assessed 
various fines and fees. On June 29, 2017, Petitioner filed the instant 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, alleging violations of the Indian 
Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”) 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303. 
Specifically, Petitioner argues that he was (1) denied the right to 
assistance of counsel, in violation of 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6); 
(2) denied the right to a trial by jury, in violation of 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1302(a)(10); and (3) subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, 
in violation of 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a)(7)(A), (c). As the Tribal 
Respondents highlight in their brief, the terms “vacate” and 
“reverse” have, at times, been used almost interchangeably in ICRA 
actions. However, the terms implicate very different results. In light 
of the sanctity of tribal sovereignty, and the need to safeguard not 
just the rights of the individual, but also the rights of the tribe, it is 
imperative that the Court stay within its own lane when crafting 
appropriate relief in this case. For the reasons set forth above, it is 
hereby recommended that the Court grant Petitioner’s Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus and vacate Petitioner’s underlying sentence 
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and conviction. It is further recommended that Petitioner be released 
from custody. 
111. Oviatt v. Reynolds 
No. 17-4124, 733 Fed. Appx. 929, 2018 WL 2094505 (10th Cir. 
May 7, 2018). Arrestees, who were lay advocates in tribe, brought 
action against tribal officials, alleging that officials had violated 
Fourth Amendment and Indian Civil Rights Act by incarcerating 
and searching them. The District Court granted officials’ motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Arrestees appealed. 
The Court of Appeals held that: (1) Court of Appeals would exercise 
its discretion to deny appointment of United States Attorney as 
counsel for arrestees; (2) arrestees were not detained within 
meaning of Indian Civil Rights Act when they brought action 
against tribal officials; and (3) arrestees’ Fourth Amendment claims 
were frivolous. We consider the plaintiffs “detained” only if they 
were subject at the time to “a severe actual or potential restraint on 
liberty.” Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 919 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of 
Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 880 (2d Cir. 1996). The plaintiffs have 
alleged past arrests and incarceration. But they do not allege that 
they were under arrest or incarcerated when they sought habeas 
relief. Instead, the plaintiffs argue that they were “banished,” relying 
on the Second Circuit’s opinion in Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of 
Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874 (2d Cir. 1996). We have not decided 
whether banishment satisfies the statutory requirement of detention. 
See Walton v. Tesuque Pueblo, 443 F.3d 1274, 1279 n.2 (10th Cir. 
2006) (declining to decide whether banishment of a non-Indian from 
tribal lands constitutes detention under 25 U.S.C. § 1303). But even 
in the Second Circuit, a tribal member is considered “detained” only 
when permanently banished from the tribe. Shenandoah v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Interior, 159 F.3d 708, 714 (2d Cir. 1998). On appeal, the 
plaintiffs use the word “banishment.” But in district court, the 
plaintiffs did not allege banishment. Nor have they presented 
evidence of a permanent prohibition from entering the Ute Tribe’s 
land. As a result, even if we were to follow Poodry, the plaintiffs’ 
new allegation of “banishment” would not satisfy the detention 
requirement.  
 
 
 134 
 
112. American Indian Health & Services Corporation v. Kent 
No. C081338, 24 Cal. App. 5th 772, 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d 583 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Jun. 19, 2018). Federally qualified health centers (FQHC) and 
rural health clinics (RHC) petitioned for writ of mandate seeking 
order requiring Department of Health Care Services to reimburse 
services provided to Medi-Cal patients. Prior to July 1, 2009, the 
Department processed and paid claims for these services. In 2009, 
in a cost-cutting measure due to budget problems, the Legislature 
enacted Welfare and Institutions Code section 14131.101 to exclude 
coverage for these services (and others) “to the extent permitted by 
federal law.” (§ 14131.10, subd. (d).) After the Department stopped 
paying claims for these services, various FQHC’s and RHC’s 
challenged the validity of section 14131.10, claiming it conflicted 
with federal Medicaid law. In California Assn. of Rural Health 
Clinics v. Douglas (9th Cir. 2013) 738 F.3d 1007 (CARHC), the 
Ninth Circuit held section 14131.10 was invalid to the extent it 
eliminated coverage for these services when provided by FQHC’s 
and RHC’s because the federal Medicaid Act imposed on 
participating states the obligation to cover these services by these 
providers. The Superior Court, No. 34-2014-80001828, granted 
petition in part and entered judgment in favor of the clinics. 
Department appealed. The Court of Appeal J., held that: (1) petition 
was not barred by sovereign immunity; (2) Department had 
adequate notice that coverage was mandatory; and (3) the Court of 
Appeal would decline to consider argument that separation of 
powers precluded entry of judgment. Affirmed.  
113. Ho-Chunk, Inc. v. Sessions 
No. 17-5140, 894 F.3d 365 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 3, 2018). Tribal 
corporations brought action against United States Attorney General 
seeking declaratory judgment that they were not subject to 
Contraband Cigarettes Trafficking Act’s (CCTA) recordkeeping 
requirements. The District Court, 253 F. Supp. 3d 303, entered 
summary judgment in government’s favor, and corporations 
appealed. In 2016, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives sent letters to Rock River, HCI 
Distribution, and Woodlands. The letters notified the companies that 
the Bureau intended to inspect and copy their records of tobacco 
transactions and asked them to name a mutually-acceptable 
inspection date within fifteen business days from receipt of the 
letters. The companies and their parent responded with a complaint 
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seeking a declaratory judgment that they are not subject to federal 
recordkeeping laws dealing with the distribution of cigarettes. The 
district court entered summary judgment against them. Ho-Chunk, 
Inc. v. Sessions, 253 F. Supp. 3d 303, 304 (D.D.C. 2017). Their 
appeal presents a question of statutory interpretation – do the federal 
recordkeeping laws cover these corporations? Yes. The Court of 
Appeals held that: (1) CCTA’s recordkeeping requirements applied 
to tribal corporations, and (2) tribal corporations were “persons” 
subject to CCTA’s recordkeeping requirements. Affirmed.  
114. Cayuga Nation v. Campbell 
No. CA 17–01956, 163 A.D.3d 1500, 2018 WL 3567391 (N.Y. App. 
Div. Jul. 25, 2018). This litigation involves a long-standing dispute 
over which of two competing factions should have control of the 
Cayuga Nation (Nation), a sovereign Indian Nation and a member 
of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, sometimes called the Iroquois 
Confederacy. Plaintiff, whose members constitute one of the two 
factions vying for control of the Nation (hereafter, plaintiff’s 
members), commenced this action seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief as well as money damages. In the complaint, 
plaintiff’s members alleged that defendants, who are members of the 
other competing faction, were improperly in control of and 
trespassing on certain property of the Nation on which the Nation’s 
offices and security center, a cannery, a gas station and convenience 
store, and an ice cream store were located. Plaintiff moved for 
various interim relief, including a preliminary injunction directing 
defendants to vacate the subject property. Thereafter, defendants 
moved to dismiss the complaint on, inter alia, the ground that 
Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because this 
matter required a determination whether plaintiff or defendants 
constituted the proper governing body of the Nation. In support of 
their motion, defendants contended that such a determination was 
beyond the authority of the courts of New York inasmuch as it 
usurped the sovereign right of the people of the Nation to determine 
their own leadership. In appeal No. 1, defendants appeal from an 
order that, among other things, granted plaintiff’s motion, issued a 
preliminary injunction, denied defendants’ motion, and determined 
that no undertaking pursuant to CPLR 6213(b) was required. We 
affirm. Here, the BIA determined that it will conduct government-
to-government relations with plaintiff. Based on that determination, 
the BIA awarded an ISDA contract to plaintiff for the purpose, 
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among others, of running the Nation’s office. In this action, plaintiff 
seeks several forms of relief, including possession of and the ability 
to run the Nation’s office. Thus, although we may not make a 
determination that will interfere with the Nation’s governance and 
right to self-determination, we must defer to the federal executive 
branch’s determination that the Nation has resolved that issue, 
especially where, as here, that determination concerns the very 
property that is the subject of this action. 
115. Northern Natural Gas Company v. 80 Acres of Land in 
Thurston County 
No. 8:17-CV-328, 2018 WL 3586527 (D. Neb. Jul. 26, 2018). This 
dispute involves the renewal of a right-of-way across tribal and 
allotted lands located within reservation boundaries of the Omaha 
Tribe of Nebraska. The plaintiff, Northern Natural Gas, filed this 
suit seeking to condemn individually owned interests in two parcels 
of allotted land: Allotment No. 742-2 and Allotment No. 742-4. The 
defendants in this case each have an individual interest in Allotment 
No. 742-2, Allotment No. 742-4, or both. Northern filed a partial 
motion for summary judgment asking the Court to confirm its right 
to condemn the individual interests in those Allotments. At least one 
defendant, Nolan J. Solomon, disputes Northern’s power to 
condemn the property. For the reasons discussed below, the Court 
will grant Northern’s motion for summary judgment. When the BIA 
renewed Northern’s right-of-way across the Omaha Tribe’s trust 
land, see 25 U.S.C. § 324, it also authorized that right-of-way to 
cross newly acquired trust interests deeded to the Tribe between 
February 8, 2018 and February 9, 2046. That means Solomon’s 
February 23, 2018 conveyance to the Tribe is precisely the type of 
land acquisition the “New ROW” sought to include and govern. And 
because Solomon’s conveyance is governed by the “New ROW,” 
contrary to Solomon’s contention, the Tribe has consented to 
Northern’s right-of-way across Allotment No. 742-2 and Allotment 
No. 742-4. To that end, Solomon cannot use the Omaha Tribe’s 
newly acquired interest in Allotment No. 742-2 and Allotment No. 
742-4 to prevent the renewal of a right-of-way the Tribe has already 
consented to. Accordingly, Northern may condemn the remaining 
individually owned interests in Allotment No. 742-2 and Allotment 
No. 742-4. See Pub. Serv. Co. of New Mexico v. Barboan. 857 F.3d 
1101, 1105 n.5 (10th Cir. 2017) (implying that allotted interests in 
mixed land may be subjected to condemnation if the “tribal interests 
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[are left] undisturbed”); WBI Energy Transmission, Inc., 2017 WL 
532281, at *4 (allowing the condemnation action to proceed against 
the individual interests but not the tribal interests in tribal trust land). 
The Court will grant Northern’s partial motion for summary 
judgment. 
116. Wilhite v. Awe Kualawaache Care Center 
No. CV 18-80, 2018 WL 3586539 (D. Mont. Jul. 26, 2018). Tammy 
Wilhite was employed as a registered nurse at the Awe Kualawaache 
Care Center. The Care Center is an entity owned by the Crow Tribe 
of Indians. One day, a patient at the Care Center informed Wilhite 
that he had been molested during transport. Wilhite reported the 
conversation to her supervisor. When nothing was done, White 
reported the incident to law enforcement. Wilhite was subsequently 
harassed by her supervisor and terminated from employment by the 
Care Center. Wilhite filed suit in federal district court, alleging 
solely that she was entitled to damages under the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., 
(RICO). The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Wilhite’s claim 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1). The RICO Act does not touch exclusive rights 
of self-governance in purely intramural matters. Organized crime 
that controls or affects businesses engaged in interstate commerce 
is, by definition, not a purely intramural matter. Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau v. Great Plains Lending, LLC, 846 F.3d 1049, 
1052-1053 (9th Cir. 2017). holding Consumer Financial Protection 
Act of 2010 applied to tribe controlled lenders because they engaged 
in interstate commerce). Regarding the third Coeur d’Alene 
exception, the Defendants themselves state the RICO Act’s 
“legislative history makes absolutely no mention of Indian tribes or 
any intent on Congress’ part to have this statute apply to Indian 
tribes.” Contrary to the Defendants’ assertions, the third exception 
requires affirmative proof Congress did not intend to include tribes 
within a generally applicable statute. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene 
Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1985). the Defendants 
have not shown any of the Coeur d’Alene exceptions apply, the 
motion is denied.  
117. State v. George 
No. 45196, 422 P.3d 1142, 2018 WL 3598926 (Idaho Jul. 27, 2018). 
This is a jurisdictional dispute. Tribal police arrested Shaula Marie 
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George (“George”) for possession of methamphetamine on the 
Coeur d’Alene Reservation. Upon discovery that George was not a 
member of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, the case was referred to the 
Kootenai County district court. Thereafter, George filed a motion to 
dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction. The district court granted 
George’s motion, finding that despite the fact that George was not 
eligible to become a member of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, George 
was an Indian; thus, the district court did not have jurisdiction. We 
affirm. Regarding the State’s concern that the Tribe would not 
prosecute George because it only prosecuted enrolled Tribe 
members, the district court recognized that as a state court it either 
had jurisdiction or it did not, and that jurisdiction was not based on 
whether other agencies had jurisdiction or exercised discretion in 
determining whether to prosecute. On May 16, 2017, the district 
court entered an order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. 
The State timely appealed. We affirm the district court’s dismissal.  
 
I. Religious Freedom 
 
118. Hopi Tribe v. Arizona Snowbowl Resort Limited 
Partnership 
 
No. 16-0521, 418 P.3d 1032, 2018 WL 771809 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
Feb. 8, 2018). This case arises from the sale and use of reclaimed 
wastewater to make artificial snow for ski runs on the San Francisco 
Peaks (the Peaks) in northern Arizona. The Hopi Tribe (the Tribe), 
which opposes the use of reclaimed wastewater on the Peaks, 
appeals the dismissal of its complaint for lack of standing and the 
award of attorneys’ fees to the City of Flagstaff (the City) and 
Arizona Snowbowl Resort Limited Partnership (Snowbowl). At 
issue is whether the Tribe sufficiently alleged standing to maintain 
a common law public nuisance claim. For a private party to bring a 
claim of public nuisance, it must allege both an interference with a 
right common to the public and a special injury different in kind 
from that of the public. The parties do not dispute that the Tribe 
sufficiently alleged that the use of reclaimed wastewater interferes 
with the public’s right to use and enjoy the Peaks. Because we find 
the Tribe sufficiently alleged the use of reclaimed wastewater causes 
its members a special injury, different in kind than that suffered by 
the general public, by interfering with places of special cultural and 
religious significance to the Tribe, we reverse the trial court’s 
dismissal, vacate the orders denying the Tribe’s motion to amend 
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the complaint and awarding Snowbowl and the City attorneys’ fees, 
and remand for further consideration.  
 
119. Damon Young, Plaintiff, v. Deputy Warden Smith, et. al.  
 
No. 6:17-cv-00131, 2018 WL 3447179 (S.D. Georgia Jul. 17, 
2018). Plaintiff, an inmate at Georgia State Prison in Reidsville, 
Georgia, filed the above-captioned action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 et seq., contesting certain 
conditions of his confinement. Plaintiff also filed and was granted a 
Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. In March 2017, 
Defendants Allen, Bobbit, and Hutchinson retaliated against 
Plaintiff for filing grievances and confiscated Plaintiff’s Native 
American religious books and catalogs as well as other items. 
Defendant Allen told Plaintiff that he could not have any Native 
American religious items while in Tier II, only the Bible or Koran. 
Defendants Bobbit and Hutchinson also precluded Plaintiff from 
utilizing his sacred religious items, which were stored in the 
property room, in his weekly prayer ceremonies. Plaintiff avers 
these Defendants’ retaliation and other actions violated his freedom 
of religion and equal protection rights, among others. Plaintiff also 
contends Defendant Allen violated these same rights when he 
denied Plaintiff from receiving kinnikinnick and a “Buffalo Skull” 
blanket, which Plaintiff states came in a preapproved mail package. 
For the reasons and in the manner set forth, I find Plaintiff plausibly 
states colorable: RLUIPA injunctive relief claims; First Amendment 
free exercise, establishment clause, and retaliation claims; 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process claims; 
Sections 1983 and 1985 conspiracy claims; and Eighth Amendment 
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims.  The Motion 
to Dismiss should be denied.  
 
120. Cobb v. Morris 
 
No. 2:14-CV-22, 2018 WL 842406 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2018). 
Plaintiff maintains that the TDCJ prison’s grooming policy, which 
prohibits long hair and/or a kouplock, imposes a substantial burden 
on his ability to practice his NA faith. Plaintiff testified at his Spears 
hearing that it is a tenet of his faith to grow his hair and to cut it only 
in times of mourning. However, the grooming policy requires that 
male offenders must keep their hair trimmed up the back of their 
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neck and head, and also trimmed around the ears. If an offender 
refuses to comply with the grooming standards, he is subject to 
disciplinary charges that can result in the loss of privileges, and 
possibly, adversely affect time-earning classification and good time 
credits. Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against Defendant Morris 
is virtually identical to the First Amendment claims raised against 
the same defendant in Davis. This Court in Davis concluded that 
Defendant Morris was entitled to summary judgment because the 
plaintiffs had not established that their First Amendment rights to 
exercise their religion had been violated. Davis, 2014 WL 798033, 
at *18-19. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of First 
Amendment claims. Davis, 826 F.3d at 266. Based on the foregoing, 
the undersigned respectfully recommends that Defendants’ 
supplemental motion for summary judgment, which incorporates 
their original motion for summary judgment, be denied in part and 
granted in part. The summary judgment evidence establishes that 
Plaintiff is sincere in the practice of his NA faith and that the TDCJ 
grooming policy challenged by Plaintiff imposed substantial 
burdens on Plaintiff’s religious exercise. Because the summary 
judgment evidence establishes a fact issue as to whether the TDCJ’s 
grooming policy is the least restrictive means of maintaining the 
TDCJ’s compelling security and costs interests, the undersigned 
respectfully recommends that Defendants’ supplemental motion for 
summary judgment be denied with respect to Plaintiff’s RLUIPA 
grooming policy claim. The undersigned further respectfully 
recommends that Defendants’ supplemental summary judgment 
motion be granted to the extent that Plaintiff’s First Amendment 
claims be dismissed with prejudice as foreclosed by the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision in Davis. Plaintiff should be allowed to proceed 
to trial on his RLUIPA grooming policy claim against Defendant 
Davis. 
 
J. Sovereign Immunity 
 
121. Rosales v. Dutschke 
 
No. 2:15–cv–01145, 279 F.Supp.3d 1084, 2017 WL 3730500 (E.D. 
Cal. Aug. 30, 2017).  Appeal Filed 9th Cir., Sep. 28, 2017. Indian 
lineal descendants of members of half-blood Indian tribe called 
Jamul Indian Village filed suit against officials of Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA), tribal employees, and gaming corporations, claiming 
violation of Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation 
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Act (NAGPRA), compact between California and tribe, and state 
law, by alleged illegal disinterment and removal of human remains 
of descendants’ families from cemetery during construction of 
casino, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and $4 million 
in damages. Plaintiffs moved to substitute personal representative as 
party for deceased plaintiffs and moved for leave to amend 
complaint, and defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. The district court held that: (1) tribal employees 
were protected from suit by sovereign immunity, and (2) suit was 
barred by descendants’ inability to join tribe as party. Plaintiffs’ 
motions denied; defendants’ motions granted. 
 
122. Douglas Indian Association v. Central Council of Tlingit 
and Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska 
No. S-16235, 403 P.3d 1172 (Alaska Sep. 8, 2017). First Indian tribe 
brought action against second Indian tribe and two of its tribal 
officials after first tribe withdrew from consortium formed by 
second tribe to administer tribal transportation funds from federal 
government, but second tribe failed to remit first tribe’s funds as 
required by agreement. The Superior Court, No. 1JU-15-00625, 
granted second tribe’s motion to dismiss based on sovereign 
immunity. First tribe appealed. The Supreme Court held that: 
(1) tribal sovereign immunity is jurisdictional bar properly raised in 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by denying jurisdictional discovery 
to first tribe; (3) Ex parte Young doctrine does not allow suit to 
proceed against tribal official based on contract claim merely 
because plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief; and (4) trial 
court did not have jurisdiction over first tribe’s claims that officials 
were not protected by sovereign immunity because their actions 
were ultra vires. Affirmed. 
123. Montella v. Chugachmiut 
No. 3:16–CV–00251, 283 F.Supp.3d 774, 2017 WL 4238859 (D. 
Alaska Sep. 25, 2017). Former employee of organization operated 
by tribal consortium brought action against organization, alleging 
discrimination in violation of Title VII and breach of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Alaska law. 
Organization moved for summary judgment. The District Court held 
that: (1) organization was not an employer within the meaning of 
Title VII; (2) organization did not waive tribal sovereign immunity; 
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and (3) fact issues precluded summary judgment for organization on 
employee’s claim of breach of implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing under Alaska law. Motion granted in part and denied in 
part. 
124. Wilkes v. PCI Gaming Authority 
No. 1151312, __ So. 3d __, 2017 WL 4385738 (Ala. Sep. 25, 2017). 
Motorist and passenger brought action against truck driver and 
driver’s employer, a casino and hotel owned by Indian tribe, raising 
negligence and wantonness claims and seeking compensation for 
injuries sustained in head-on collision with driver. The Elmore 
Circuit Court, CV-15-900057, entered summary judgment in favor 
of employer on basis of tribal sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs 
appealed. The Supreme Court held that doctrine of tribal sovereign 
immunity did not apply to shield Indian tribe from tort claims 
brought by non-tribal plaintiffs. Reversed and remanded. 
125. Rape v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians 
No. 1111250, 250 So.3d 547, 2017 WL 4325017 (Ala. Sep. 29, 
2017). Non-member patron brought action against Indian tribe that 
operated casino and various business entities owned by the tribe, 
alleging breach of contract and various tort claims arising out of 
disputed winnings from an electric bingo gaming machine. 
Defendants moved to dismiss, alleging the claims were barred by 
sovereign immunity and that tribe’s court had exclusive jurisdiction 
of any claim. The Circuit Court, No. CV–11–901485, granted the 
motion. Patron appealed. The Supreme Court held that: (1) it would 
decline to decide whether casino was properly located on land 
considered Indian country; and (2) it would decline to decide 
whether dispute was a matter of internal or tribal relations or, 
alternatively, was a dispute specially consigned to the regulatory 
authority of a tribe by Congress. Affirmed. 
126. Amerind Risk Management Corporation v. Blackfeet 
Housing 
No. 16 CV 1093, 2017 WL 4712211 (D.N.M Oct. 17, 2017).  
Plaintiff Amerind Risk Management Corporation (Plaintiff) seeks 
declaratory and injunctive relief from litigation brought by 
Defendant Blackfeet Housing (Defendant) in the Blackfeet Tribal 
Courts. The Court previously denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss 
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for lack of jurisdiction after concluding that the Court has subject 
matter jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and 
personal jurisdiction over Defendant. The Court also found that 
Plaintiff has exhausted tribal remedies, so that its challenge to the 
jurisdiction of the Blackfeet Tribal Courts may go forward in this 
Court. Both parties have now moved for summary judgment. 
Although the issues before this Court are jurisdictional, at the root 
of the conflict between the parties is a dispute over insurance 
coverage. Plaintiff is a federally chartered tribal corporation formed 
under Section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. 
§ 5124 (formerly § 477). The charter tribes are the Red Lake Band 
of Chippewa Indians, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes 
of the Flathead Reservation, and the Pueblo of Santa Ana. Plaintiff 
was formed to provide risk-sharing self-insurance for tribal 
governments and entities in response to a lack of affordable 
insurance options on tribal lands. Plaintiff has over 400 tribal 
member entities that contribute capital to a risk pool for each line of 
coverage, from which Plaintiff pays all covered claims. Members’ 
participation in the risk-sharing group is governed by contractual 
agreement. Defendant is a member entity that entered into a 
Participation Agreement (PA) in March 2012 to join Plaintiff’s 
Tribal Operations Protection Plan (TOPP) risk pool. The PA 
provides that participants in TOPP “agree to jointly share in the 
costs of protecting against financial loss and in the monetary claims 
that may arise from financial loss.” In return, the PA guarantees that 
TOPP will indemnify members “in accordance with any coverage 
documents issued to the Participant and this agreement, but only 
from the assets of TOPP.” As a participant in TOPP governed by the 
March 2012 PA, Defendant obtained four insurance policies from 
Plaintiff. Defendant contacted Plaintiff in April 2013 regarding 
issues with some of its covered properties and subsequently made 
formal claims.. Plaintiff denied the claims in March 2014. 
Defendant, rather than invoking the dispute resolution procedures 
contained in the PA, filed suit against Plaintiff in the Blackfeet 
Tribal Court alleging breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, 
breach of the duty of good faith, and violations of Blackfeet tribal 
law. Plaintiff made a special appearance in the Blackfeet Tribal 
Court and moved to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction, asserting 
sovereign immunity and relying on the choice of forum provision in 
the PA. But the Blackfeet Tribal Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to 
dismiss after concluding that Plaintiff did not have tribal sovereign 
immunity and that the Blackfeet Tribal Court had jurisdiction to 
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decide Defendant’s claim. Plaintiff appealed the jurisdictional issue 
to the Blackfeet Court of Appeals, which heard oral argument, but 
had not yet decided the case when Plaintiff filed this suit for 
declaratory and injunctive relief from the tribal litigation. The 
Blackfeet Court of Appeals issued its decision holding that Plaintiff 
did have tribal sovereign immunity as a Section 17 tribal 
corporation, but that Plaintiff had waived that immunity by 
including an arbitration clause in the PA. The Blackfeet Court of 
Appeals acknowledged Plaintiff’s argument that any waiver of 
immunity was limited to the courts specified in the PA for 
enforcement of the arbitration provision, and stated that it would 
normally agree. But without giving any reason for broadening the 
limited waiver, the Blackfeet Court of Appeals appears to have 
concluded that it had jurisdiction. The Blackfeet Court of Appeals 
ordered the parties to “proceed to mediation as contemplated by the 
Participation Agreement and thereafter to arbitration if needed.” The 
issue of the Blackfeet Tribal Court’s jurisdiction is now before this 
Court. It is ordered that: (1) Plaintiff’s motion for summary 
judgment is granted. A separate order of declaratory judgment and 
permanent injunction will be entered. (2) Defendant’s cross-motion 
for summary judgment is denied. 
127. Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation 
No. 20160362, 416 P.3d 401, 2017 WL 5166885 (Utah Nov. 7, 
2017). Businessman brought action against Indian tribe, tribal 
officials, various companies owned by the tribal officials, oil and 
gas companies, and other private companies, alleging, inter alia, 
tortious interference with economic relations, extortion, violation of 
Utah Antitrust Act, and civil conspiracy. The Eighth District granted 
defendants’ motions to dismiss. Businessman appealed. The 
Supreme Court held that: (1) tribe did not waive sovereign 
immunity; (2) tribal officials, in their official capacities, were not 
entitled to sovereign immunity on claims to enjoin actions that 
exceeded tribe’s jurisdiction; (3) tribal officials were not protected 
by sovereign immunity when sued for damages in their individual 
capacities; (4) tribe was not a necessary party to businessman’s 
action against tribal officials; (5) tribal exhaustion doctrine 
prevented state courts from reviewing businessman’s claims against 
tribal officials; (6) businessman was not entitled to grant of untimely 
motion to file supplemental pleadings; (7) businessman failed to 
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state claims against companies owned by tribal officials; 
(8) businessman failed to state claims against oil and gas companies; 
(9) there is no civil cause of action in Utah for extortion; and 
(10) state constitutional provision prohibiting “the exchange of 
black lists” was not self-executing. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, 
and remanded. 
128. Wilmington Savings Fund Society v. Fryberg 
No. C17-1196, 2017 WL 6344185 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 12, 2017). 
Plaintiff Wilmington Savings Fund Society brings this foreclosure 
action against defendant Corey Fryberg. Corey Fryberg is a member 
of the Tulalip Tribes, a federally recognized Indian tribe, and the 
property at issue is trust land within the Tulalip Indian Reservation. 
The Tulalip Tribes is also a named defendant for having a possible 
interest in the property. Plaintiff’s initial complaint was filed on 
August 8, 2017. On August 17, 2017, the Court sua sponte issued an 
Order to Show Cause for plaintiff’s failure to provide the citizenship 
of the parties to establish diversity jurisdiction. On August 25, 2017, 
plaintiff filed an amended complaint, and on September 28, 2017, 
the Court vacated the Order to Show Cause. Now, defendant Tulalip 
Tribes moves to dismiss the case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Here, the Tulalip Tribes 
argues that dismissal is appropriate because diversity jurisdiction is 
lacking, the Tulalip Tribes is immune from suit, and plaintiff failed 
to exhaust tribal remedies. Each of defendant’s arguments 
independently supports dismissal: there is no complete diversity 
between the parties; the Tulalip Tribes is immune from suit; and 
plaintiff failed to exhaust tribal remedies. For all of the foregoing 
reasons, defendant’s motion is granted. The case is dismissed.  
129. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources v. Timber 
and Wood Products Located in Sawyer County 
No. 2017AP181, 906 N.W. 2d 707 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2017). 
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) brought action against 
Indian tribe and timber and wood products located on tribe’s land, 
seeking to recover termination severance tax that tribe allegedly 
owed under Forest Croplands Law after tribe’s forest croplands 
contract with the State expired. The Circuit Court granted tribe’s 
motion to dismiss. DNR appealed. The appellate court held that: 
(1) tribe did not clearly and unequivocally waive its sovereign 
immunity with respect to DNR’s claims, seeking to recover 
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termination severance tax, by executing transfer of land ownership 
forms stating it agreed to comply with Forest Croplands Law, and 
(2) tribe’s sovereign immunity prevented DNR from pursuing in 
rem claim against timber and wood products located on tribe’s land 
in order to satisfy termination severance tax. Affirmed. 
130. Buchwald Capital Advisors v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of 
Chippewa Indians 
No. 16-cv-13643, 584 B.R. 706 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2018). 
Litigation trustee brought strong-arm proceeding to avoid allegedly 
fraudulent transfers, and Indian tribe named as defendant moved to 
dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. The United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 516 B.R. 
462, denied the motion, and Indian tribe appealed. The District 
Court, 532 B.R. 680, reversed and remanded. On remand, the 
Bankruptcy Court, 559 B.R. 842, granted motion to dismiss, and 
litigation trustee appealed. The District Court, Borman, J., held that: 
(1) allegedly unauthorized acts of tribal officials could not result in 
waiver of Indian tribe’s immunity from suit on state law fraudulent 
transfer claims asserted, in strong-arm capacity, by litigation trustee 
of trust established under debtor’s confirmed Chapter 11 plan; 
(2) any waiver of tribe’s immunity by its acts in filing proofs of 
claim and participating in bankruptcy case would be limited to 
adjudication of matters raised by tribe’s proofs of claim; (3) trustee 
could not rely on equitable alter ego or veil-piercing doctrine in 
order to make required showing of express, unequivocal, 
unmistakable and unambiguous waiver of Indian tribe’s sovereign 
immunity. Affirmed. 
131. Charles v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation 
No. 2:17-00321, 2018 WL 611469 (D. Utah Feb. 21, 2018). Plaintiff 
Grant Charles seeks in this action to enjoin defendants Ute Indian 
Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation (the “Ute Court”) based 
upon a suit filed in the Ute Court, Hackford v. Allred et al., Ute Case 
No. 16-259. Defendants filed three motions to dismiss. Richita 
Hackford, who is named as a defendant because her suit in Ute Court 
is the underlying case, filed a “Motion to Deny Complaint,” which 
is treated as a motion to dismiss. The remaining defendants (the 
“Tribal Defendants”) filed an initial motion to dismiss based on lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction and insufficient service of process. 
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After Ms. Hackford’s claims in the Ute Court were dismissed by an 
order of the Ute Court dated June 5, 2017, the Tribal Defendants 
filed another motion to dismiss, further arguing that no case or 
controversy provides Article III standing in this action. A hearing 
on the motions was held on January 4, 2018.  Based on the motions, 
the argument of the parties at the hearing, and for good cause 
appearing, the court finds as follows: (1) The Tribal Defendants’ 
latter motion to dismiss is granted. In that motion to dismiss for lack 
of jurisdiction, the Tribal Defendants correctly analogized the 
present case to Board of Education for Gallup-McKinley County 
Schools v. Henderson, 696 Fed Appx. 355 (10th Cir. 2017). Because 
Ms. Hackford’s case in Ute Court has been dismissed following an 
initial screening by the Ute Court, no case or controversy exists on 
which to decide the action. Mr. Charles’s complaint must be 
dismissed on this basis. (2) As a further partial basis for dismissal, 
the tribe, the tribe’s business committee, and the Ute Court are 
protected by tribal sovereign immunity. Plaintiff’s primary 
argument for jurisdiction is based upon application of Ex Parte 
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) to tribal officers. The court has 
jurisdiction over the Chief Judge of the Ute Court on that basis, but 
because Ex Parte Young is limited to suits against individuals, the 
court does not have jurisdiction over the other Tribal Defendants. 
(3) Defendants argue that the court does not have jurisdiction to 
review the Ute Court’s exercise of authority over Mr. Charles. 
However, a federal court may determine under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
whether a tribal court has exceeded the lawful limits of its 
jurisdiction as a federal question. (4) The tribe and business 
committee argued that service of process on them was insufficient. 
That issue is moot. Judge Reynolds (subsequently replaced as a 
named defendant by Judge Stiffarm) did not move to dismiss on that 
basis, and the off-reservation service upon Judge Reynolds was 
sufficient to provide personal jurisdiction over him. (5) The United 
States is not an indispensable party to this action, and no relief is 
granted on that basis. (6) Ms. Hackford is dismissed as a defendant 
because her underlying suit in Ute Court was dismissed. Her motion 
to dismiss this action is therefore rendered moot. Therefore, it is 
hereby ordered that the Tribal Defendants’ motion to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is granted.  
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132. Munoz v. Barona Band of Mission Indians 
No. 17-cv-2092, 2018 WL 1245257 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2018). 
Plaintiff Christobal Munoz brought this action against Defendant 
Barona Band of Mission Indians (the “Tribe”) alleging violations of 
the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”). The Tribe has moved to 
dismiss the Complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Plaintiff 
is a former employee of the Defendant Tribe. Plaintiff was 
employed as a heavy equipment operator with the Barona Resort & 
Casino, which the Tribe owns and operates. He alleges that he 
suffered an injury in October 21, 2015 while working. He received 
workers compensation and medical treatment while his claim was 
investigated; his claim was subsequently denied around March 
2016. Defendant allegedly terminated Plaintiff in September 2016 
“for being on medical leave.” In February 2017, Plaintiff filed 
claims in the Tribal Court, alleging personal injury, workers 
compensation retaliation, and wrongful termination by the Tribe. 
The Tribal Court dismissed each of these claims on April 21, 2017. 
The Tribal Court ruled that Plaintiff’s personal injury claim was not 
serious, had not occurred while he was working at the Casino, and 
was barred by a six-month statute of limitations. The Tribal Court 
allegedly ruled on this claim without allowing him to submit 
medical evidence. The Tribal Court ruled that Plaintiff’s workers 
compensation claim was barred by a thirty-day statute of limitations 
and his wrongful termination claim was barred by a five-day statute 
of limitations. Plaintiff then filed claims in Tribal Court alleging due 
process violations based on the Tribal Court’s ruling on medical 
evidence at the demurrer stage and the Tribe’s statutes of 
limitations. The Tribe asserted that it had not waived sovereign 
immunity for his due process claims and there was no forum for his 
claims. Thereafter, Plaintiff reasserted his claims in Tribal Court 
regarding due process violations and claimed that the Indian Civil 
Rights Act (“ICRA”) had waived the Tribe’s sovereign immunity. 
The Tribe and Tribal Court disavowed this. Plaintiff filed his 
Complaint in this Court on October 12, 2017. He asserts violations 
of his due process rights under ICRA based on the same conduct he 
challenged in Tribal Court. Defendant moves to dismiss the 
Complaint on the ground that the Court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction over this case in view of the Tribe’s sovereign 
immunity, which it argues has not been abrogated either by 
Congress or the Tribe. Although the Tribe also asserts a Rule 
12(b)(6) challenge to Plaintiff’s claims regarding the Tribe’s statutes 
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of limitations, the Court declines to decide that issue because the 
Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over the Complaint. The 
Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss and hereby dismisses 
the Complaint with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
based on tribal sovereign immunity.  
133. In re: Money Centers of America, Inc., et al., v. 
Thunderbird Entertainment Center, Inc. 
No. 17-319, 2018 WL 1535464 (D. Del. Mar. 29, 2018). Trustee 
appeals the Bankruptcy Court’s Order, In re Money Centers of 
America, Inc., 565 B.R. 87 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017) (“Dismissal 
Order”), which dismissed Trustee’s complaint against Thunderbird 
Entertainment Center, Inc. (“Thunderbird”), a wholly owned entity 
of the Absentee Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma, seeking to avoid and 
recover certain transfers to Thunderbird.  Debtors provided debit 
card and credit card processing for patrons of Thunderbird’s casino. 
Patrons presented their credit or debit cards to Thunderbird, who 
would then run those cards through equipment provided by Debtors. 
If the transaction was approved, Thunderbird advanced funds to the 
patrons, and Debtors would obtain an amount equal to the advanced 
amount from the patrons’ credit or debit card issuers and forward 
those funds to Thunderbird, less a fee. Debtors filed voluntary 
petitions for relief under Chapter 11 in March 2014. On March 21, 
2016, the complaint against Thunderbird was filed, seeking to avoid 
and recover $230,633.80 in allegedly preferential transfers or 
fraudulent conveyances paid by Debtors to Thunderbird in the 90 
days prior to Debtors’ bankruptcy filing. Thunderbird filed a motion 
to dismiss the complaint on May 5, 2016, arguing that it had not 
waived its tribal sovereign immunity and that the Bankruptcy Court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding. 
The Bankruptcy Court agreed and entered the Dismissal Order on 
February 28, 2017. On March 13, 2017, a timely appeal was filed. It 
is undisputed that Thunderbird is wholly owned by the Absentee 
Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma and is a tribal corporation and tribal 
entity with sufficient relationship with the Absentee Shawnee Tribe 
to enjoy the tribe’s sovereign immunity. The sole issue on appeal is 
whether the Bankruptcy Court correctly held that Congress did not 
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in the Bankruptcy Code. Trustee 
opposed dismissal, asserting that Congress abrogated Thunderbird’s 
sovereign immunity in 11 U.S.C. § 106. While Congress may waive 
tribal sovereign immunity by statute, the Supreme Court has held 
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that “such a congressional decision must be clear.” Bay Mills, 
134 S. Ct. at 2031. Congressional waivers further “cannot be 
implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” Santa Clara, 436 
U.S. at 58; Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2031-32 (“That rule of 
construction reflects an enduring principle of Indian law: Although 
Congress has plenary authority over tribes, courts will not lightly 
assume that Congress in fact intends to undermine Indian self-
government.”) Section 106 waives sovereign immunity for 
“governmental units” which are defined at § 101(27) as “a State, a 
Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign 
state; or other foreign or domestic government.” 11 U.S.C. § 106. 
Trustee argued that the reference to “other ... domestic 
government[s]” can only mean Indian tribes, thus the congressional 
waiver is clear and unequivocal. Recognizing a split of authority on 
this issue, the Bankruptcy Court rejected Trustee’s argument and 
adopted the rationale of Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Papas 
(In re Greektown Holdings, LLC), 532 B.R. 680 (E.D. Mich. 2015) 
and Whitaker v. Dakota Finance Corp. (In re Whitaker), 474 B.R. 
687 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2012). See Money Centers, 565 B.R. at 101-03. 
These decisions, holding that Congress has not clearly and 
unequivocally expressed an intent to abrogate sovereign immunity 
of Indian tribes under §§ 106(a) and 101(27), were “well reasoned, 
and carefully construe the text of the Bankruptcy Code.” Id. at 103. 
On appeal, the Trustee argues that the Dismissal Order should be 
reversed because, in Krystal Energy, the only court of appeals to 
consider this issue determined that tribes are “domestic 
governments.” The Ninth Circuit held that “[i]t is clear from the face 
of §§ 106(a) and 101(27) that Congress did intend to abrogate the 
sovereign immunity of all ‘foreign and domestic governments.” See 
Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(emphasis in original). “Indian tribes are certainly governments,” 
which the Supreme Court has described as “‘domestic dependent 
nations that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their 
members and territories.’” Id. (citations omitted). “[T]he category 
‘Indian tribes’ is simply a specific member of the group of domestic 
governments.” Id. at 1058. Trustee urges the Court to adopt this 
interpretation. Trustee argues that Thunderbird has offered no other 
possible definition for “other ... domestic governments],” which can 
only mean Indian tribes “because there is nothing else to which it 
could possibly refer.” Trustee further argues that Congress need not 
invoke any “magic words” (i.e., Indian tribes); rather, the intent to 
abrogate must simply be “clearly discernable from the statutory text 
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in light of traditional interpretive tools.” (Id. at 10). Conversely, 
Thunderbird argues that the Bankruptcy Court properly joined 
Whitaker in rejecting Krystal Energy’s reliance on “domestic 
dependent nations” language in prior cases, finding a waiver by 
implication, which is prohibited by Supreme Court precedent. 
Thunderbird contends that Congress included the catch-all “other ... 
domestic government[s]” to avoid any argument over terminology 
used by many types of local domestic governments not expressly 
identified – e.g., towns, townships, villages, boroughs, counties, and 
parishes. Thunderbird argues it would make little sense to include a 
catch-all provision solely to address Indian tribes, when the term 
“Indian tribe” would have been much clearer and consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s long-standing requirement that Congress be 
explicit in enacting waivers of tribal sovereign immunity. 
Thunderbird argues that the overwhelming weight of recent 
authority is in agreement and cites a recent decision on this issue 
from a bankruptcy court in the Third Circuit with nearly identical 
facts. (See D.I. 16 at 9 (citing Subranni v. Navajo Times Publishing 
Co., Inc.), 568 B.R. 616 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2016)). Subranni also 
involved a claim against a tribe to avoid preferential payments. The 
tribe moved to dismiss, arguing that §§ 106(a) and 101(27) were not 
sufficiently clear or unequivocal to constitute a waiver. The court 
adhered to the basic canons of statutory interpretation by following 
the plain language of § 106. “The plain language of [§] 106(a) is 
clear and unambiguous. It does not abrogate sovereign immunity for 
Indian tribes. If Congress had intended to abrogate sovereign 
immunity to Indian tribes under [§] 106, it could easily and 
expressly have done so, but it did not.” Id. at 625. The Court agrees 
with the reasoning set forth in Whitaker, Greektown and Subranni. 
In Whitaker, the Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel adopted 
the bright line rule set forth in In re National Cattle Congress, 247 
B.R. 259, 267 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa. 2000). Absent a specific mention 
of “Indian tribes” in the Bankruptcy Code, any finding of abrogation 
under § 106(a) necessarily relies on inference or implication, both 
of which are prohibited by the Supreme Court: Courts have found 
abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity in cases where Congress 
has included “Indian tribes” in definitions of parties who may be 
sued under specific statutes ... Where the language of a jurisdictional 
grant is unambiguous as to its application to Indian tribes, no more 
is needed to satisfy the Santa Clara requirement than that Congress 
unequivocally state its intent ... Where the language of a federal 
statute does not include “Indian tribes” in definitions of parties 
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subject to suit or does not specifically assert jurisdiction over 
“Indian tribes,” courts find the statute insufficient to express an 
unequivocal congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity. 
The Court finds no error in the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion that 
Congress did not unequivocally express an intent to abrogate 
sovereign immunity of Indian tribes in §§ 106(a) and 101(27). 
Section 101(27)’s reference to “other ... domestic government[s]” 
falls short of the clarity required for abrogation of tribal sovereign 
immunity. The Dismissal Order is affirmed.  
134. Cain v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc. 
No. CV-12-181, 2018 WL 2272792, (D. Mont. May 17, 2018). The 
Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in this matter on July 10, 2017. 
United States ex rel. Cain v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc., 862 F.3d 
939 (9th Cir. 2017). The Ninth Circuit instructed this Court to 
determine on remand whether Defendant Salish Kootenai College, 
Inc. (the College) functions as an arm of the Confederated Salish 
and Kootenai Tribes (the Tribe) “and therefore shares the Tribe’s 
sovereign status” for purpose of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 
§§ 3729–3733. Cain, 862 F.3d at 943. The Ninth Circuit directed 
this Court to determine the College’s status by analyzing the 
relationship between the College and the Tribe using the factors 
described in White v. University of California, 765 F.3d 1010 (9th 
Cir. 2014). Id. At 945. The parties have conducted discovery on the 
relationship between the College and the Tribe. The College has 
filed a Renewed Motion to Dismiss. The College argues that 
Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed because the College functions 
as an arm of the Tribe. The Tribe has filed an amicus curiae brief. 
The Tribe agrees with the College. Plaintiffs oppose the College’s 
motion. Plaintiffs argue that the College is not an arm of the Tribe. 
The Court conducted a hearing on the College’s Renewed Motion 
to Dismiss. Plaintiffs ground their federal claims against the College 
in the False Claims Act. The False Claim Act permits suits against 
“any person” who defrauds the government by “knowingly 
present[ing] ... a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.” 
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). The False Claims Act excludes 
sovereign entities, including federally recognized tribes, from the 
term person. Cain, 862 F.3d at 941. Entities that function as an arm 
of a tribe are also excluded from the term person for purposes of the 
False Claims Act. Id. White instructs courts to employ a multi-factor 
analysis to determine whether an entity enjoys sovereign immunity 
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as an arm of the tribe. White, 765 F.3d at 1025. The factors include: 
(1) the method of creation of the entity; (2) the purpose of the entity; 
(3) the structure, ownership and management of the entity, including 
the amount of control the tribe has over the entity; (4) the 
sovereign’s intent with respect to the sharing of its sovereign 
immunity with the entity; and (5) the financial relationship between 
the sovereign and the entity. Id. Application of these factors to the 
undisputed facts establishes that the College functions as an arm of 
the Tribe. All five White factors support a conclusion that the 
College functions as an arm of the Tribe. The College shares in the 
Tribe’s sovereign immunity given its status as an arm of the Tribe. 
The College is not subject to suit under the False Claims Act. 
Accordingly, the College’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss is granted.  
135. Caddo Nation of Oklahoma v. Wichita and              
Affiliated Tribes 
No. 16-0559, 2018 WL 3354882 (W.D. Okla. Jul. 9, 2018). Plaintiff 
Caddo Nation of Oklahoma filed this suit seeking to prevent the 
construction of the Wichita Tribal History Center (the “History 
Center”) by defendant Wichita and Affiliated Tribes (“Wichita 
Tribe”). The Caddo Nation sought a declaration that defendants had 
violated the National Historical Preservation Act (“NHPA”) and the 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and also sought 
injunctive relief barring construction of the Center. Plaintiff sought 
a temporary restraining order halting the construction efforts, which 
the court granted. The court later vacated the TRO and denied 
plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff filed an 
interlocutory appeal from that decision but did not seek an 
injunction to stay the decision during the appeal. While the appeal 
was pending, the Wichita Tribe resumed construction of the History 
Center and the center was eventually completed. Due to that fact, 
the Court of Appeals concluded the relief sought by plaintiff was 
moot and dismissed the appeal. The case was remanded for further 
proceedings here. Caddo Nation of Oklahoma v. Wichita and 
Affiliated Tribes, 877 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2017). Where the 
recipient tribe assumes the pertinent regulatory responsibilities, it 
must “specify that the certifying officer (i) consents to assume the 
status of a responsible Federal official under [NEPA or NHPA] ... 
and (ii) is authorized and consents on behalf of the recipient of 
assistance ... to accept the jurisdiction of the Federal courts for the 
purpose of enforcement of his responsibilities as such an official.” 
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Id. at § 5304(g)(3)(D). It is undisputed that the Wichita Tribe 
assumed the responsibilities at issue and that defendant Parton, on 
behalf of the Wichita and Affiliated Tribes, requested the release of 
funds and consented to federal court jurisdiction with respect to the 
History Center project. Having invoked the congressionally 
authorized procedure for assumption of NEPA/NHPA regulatory 
determinations, the Wichita Tribe is bound by the legal 
consequences, including being subject to suit in federal court, that 
go with it. Sovereign immunity therefore does not prevent the 
court’s consideration of the APA claims based on NEPA and 
NHPA. The court concludes otherwise as to the other claims 
asserted by plaintiff. The state law claims for unjust enrichment and 
equitable estoppel, as well as any claims based on the state of legal 
title to the property in question, are outside the scope of the 
immunity waiver applicable to the NEPA and NHPA claims, and 
plaintiffs have not pointed to any other Congressional abrogation of 
immunity as to such claims. Absent such action by Congress, suits 
based on such claims are barred by sovereign immunity absent a 
“clear waiver by the tribe.” Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band 
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991). There 
is no suggestion here of such a waiver as to the state law claims. 
Further, plaintiff’s submissions provide no basis for concluding that 
the actions of the individual defendants were other than within the 
scope of their activities and authority as officers of the Wichita 
Tribe, and sovereign immunity therefore bars the claims against 
them as well. The result is that sovereign immunity bars all of 
plaintiff’s claims other than the NEPA/NHPA claims under the APA 
referenced above, and the court therefore lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction over them.  
136. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. 
 Nos. 2018-1638, 2018-1639, 2018-1640, 2018-1641, 2018-1642, 
2018-1643, 896 F.3d 1322, 2018 WL 3484448 (Fed. Cir. Jul. 20, 
2018). Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., petitioned for inter partes 
review (“IPR”) of various patents owned by Allergan, Inc., relating 
to its dry eye treatment Restasis. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 
and Akorn, Inc. (together with Mylan, “Appellees”) joined. While 
IPR was pending, Allergan transferred title of the patents to the Saint 
Regis Mohawk Tribe, which asserted sovereign immunity. The 
Board denied the Tribe’s motion to terminate on the basis of 
sovereign immunity and Allergan’s motion to withdraw from the 
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proceedings. Allergan and the Tribe appeal, arguing the Board 
improperly denied these motions. We affirm. Significant features of 
the system confirm that inter partes review is an agency 
reconsideration rather than an adjudication of a private dispute and 
does not implicate sovereign immunity. Inter partes review brings 
to bear the same agency expertise as exists in initial examination. 
There is no requirement that a third-party petitioner have any 
interest in the outcome of the proceeding, much less Article III 
standing. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(a). Upon receiving a petition, the 
Director has complete discretion regarding whether to institute 
review. § 314; Oil States, 138 S .Ct. at 1371. The inter partes review 
procedures limit discovery, typically preclude live testimony in oral 
hearings, and do not mirror the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Ultratec, Inc. v. CaptionCall, LLC, 872 F.3d 1267, 1270 n.2 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017). If the third-party settles, the proceeding does not end, 
and the USPTO may continue on to a final written decision. 
§ 317(a). The USPTO may intervene to defend its decisions on 
appeal, whether or not the third party petitioner remains in the case. 
§ 143; Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144. Inter partes review does not 
involve exercise of personal jurisdiction over the patent holder or 
adjudication of infringement. The only possible adverse outcome is 
the cancelation of erroneously granted claims. Notably, the Supreme 
Court has held that “adversarial proceedings” that do not involve the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction do not necessarily raise sovereign 
immunity concerns. See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 
541 U.S. 440, 448, 124 S. Ct. 1905, 158 L. Ed. 2d 764 (2004) 
(bankruptcy). These features distinguish inter partes review from the 
proceeding in FMC and bolster the view that it is, like ex parte and 
inter partes reexamination, an executive proceeding that enlists 
third-party assistance. Sovereign immunity does not apply. 
137. Williams v. Big Picture Loans, LLC 
No. 3:17-cv-461, 2018 WL 3615966 (E.D. Va. Jul. 27, 2018). This 
matter is before the Court on Defendants Big Picture Loans and 
Ascension Technologies’ Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction. Big Picture Loans, LLC (“Big Picture”) and 
Ascension Technologies, Inc. (“Ascension”) argue that the Court 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over all claims asserted against 
them because they qualify as arms of the Lac Vieux Desert Band of 
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians (“the Tribe”) and are thereby 
entitled to tribal sovereign immunity. For the reasons set forth 
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below, the motion was denied. The Tribe’s Business Ordinance 
created comprehensive procedures for the creation, operation, and 
dissolution of various tribal entities, including limited liability 
companies (“LLCs”). Relevant to this dispute, the Ordinance stated 
that a tribally-owned LLC with the Tribe as its sole member would 
“be considered a wholly owned and operated instrumentality of the 
Tribe and ... have all the privileges and immunities of the Tribe, 
including but not limited to the Tribe’s sovereign immunity from 
suit, except as explicitly waived by the [LVD] Council.” The 
Ordinance further indicated that those LLCs would be subject to the 
LVD Court’s jurisdiction, but that such provision would not waive 
any claim to sovereign immunity in state or federal court. However, 
a closer look reveals that neither Big Picture nor Ascension fulfills 
those goals very well, if at all. The inadequacies of Hazen’s general 
statements about the Tribe’s use of Big Picture’s revenues are 
detailed above. Because the extent to which the Tribe has actually 
used Big Picture’s funds for the services noted by Hazen is unclear, 
the Court cannot tell whether granting immunity here “directly 
protects the ... Tribe’s treasury, which is one of the historic purposes 
of sovereign immunity in general.” Allen, 464 F.3d at 1047. 
Moreover, even assuming that Big Picture’s lending operation and 
Ascension’s support have contributed to the Tribe’s economic self-
development to some extent, those entities’ actions have primarily 
enriched non-tribal entities like Eventide and, possibly, individuals 
like Martorello. The Bellicose purchase, and the resulting Note and 
Loan Agreement, have undoubtedly yielded some benefits for the 
Tribe. Yet, by limiting the Tribe’s monthly distribution to a very 
small percentage of Big Picture’s revenue, the Note forces the Tribe 
to receive those benefits at substantial cost, a reality that is 
illustrated by the sharp disparity in distributions received by the 
Tribe and Eventide since TED began repaying the loan. 
Consequently, as Plaintiffs note, granting immunity here might have 
the unintended consequence of preventing the Tribe from obtaining 
favorable terms in future business transactions, as non-tribal entities 
would not be inclined to offer repayment above a certain rate. 
Therefore, although Big Picture and Ascension serve the core 
purposes of tribal immunity to some extent, these circumstances 
cause this factor to weigh against immunity for both entities. For the 
reasons discussed, Big Picture and Ascension have the burden to 
prove arm-of-the-tribe immunity by a preponderance of the 
evidence. That means the weighing of factors must permit a finding 
of immunity. On this record, that balance actually falls the other 
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way, and weighing everything on the balance, the Court finds that 
neither entity qualifies as an arm of the Tribe. Therefore, Big Picture 
and Ascension are not immune from suit here. 
K. Sovereignty, Tribal Inherent 
138. Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks 
No. 2:16-CV-366, 2017 WL 3699347 (D. Idaho Aug. 25, 2017). 
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by the Hawks. The 
Tribe brought this action to domesticate and enforce a default 
judgment obtained against the Hawks in Tribal Court. The Tribe is 
also pursuing this same relief in Idaho State courts. The Hawks own 
real property along the St. Joe River with the Coeur d’Alene 
Reservation. They also own a boat garage and pilings within the St. 
Joe River. The Tribe claims that the boat garage and pilings are 
illegal encroachments and filed an objection in June of 2015 in the 
Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River Basin Adjudication (CSRBA). That 
litigation, a state water rights adjudication, is proceeding in the 
District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho. 
Almost a year after filing that objection, the Tribe filed suit against 
the Hawks in Tribal Court for violation of the Tribal Code, claiming 
that the Hawks failed to obtain a Tribal permit before constructing 
the boat garage and pilings. The Tribal Court issued a default 
judgment in the form of a civil penalty of $3,900. It is that judgment 
that the Tribe seeks to enforce in this Court. The Hawks responded 
by filing a motion to dismiss, arguing that this Court does not have 
jurisdiction to grant the Tribe the relief they seek. In the briefing on 
this motion, the Tribe concedes it is not relying on diversity 
jurisdiction, but argues instead that the Court has jurisdiction under 
the federal question provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In support, the 
Tribe cites National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of 
Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 105 S. Ct. 2447 (1985). That case would 
provide sound support for this Court’s jurisdiction over a lawsuit 
filed by the Hawks claiming that the Tribal Court had no jurisdiction 
to enter the judgment for $3,900—that would place the Court 
squarely within National Farmers, and the dispute over whether the 
Tribal Court had jurisdiction over a non-member of the Tribe would 
be a federal question that would satisfy the jurisdictional demands 
of § 1331. But here, the Hawks have not challenged the Tribal 
Court’s jurisdiction to make the award, and the Tribe has not sought 
a declaratory judgment that its courts had jurisdiction over the 
Hawks. Instead, the Tribe is simply asking a federal court to 
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domesticate and enforce a Tribal Court Judgment. While such a 
claim has a basis in Idaho law and can be enforced in Idaho courts 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1401 et. seq., the Tribe cites no federal 
statute or law that is in dispute and that could be used to create a 
federal question. The posture of this case shifts it away from 
National Farmers, and places it squarely within Miccosukee Tribe 
v. Kraus-Anderson Const. Co., 607 F.3d 1268, 1275 (11th Cir. 
2010). There, a Tribe filed suit to enforce a Tribal Court Judgment, 
and the non-Tribal member defendant filed a motion to dismiss. The 
court granted the motion, distinguishing National Farmers. With no 
basis for federal jurisdiction, the Court is compelled to grant the 
motion to dismiss.  
139. Quinault Indian Nation v. Pearson for Estate of 
Comenout 
No. 15-35263, No. 15-35267, 868 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 
2017). Indian tribe brought action alleging that tribal members 
violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO) by engaging in scheme to defraud it of cigarette taxes. After 
one member’s death, his estate asserted counterclaims seeking 
declaratory judgment that member had not violated cigarette sales 
and tax code, order compelling grant of building and business 
permits, and mandamus relief, lost profits, and damages due to 
alleged antitrust and price-fixing scheme perpetrated by tribe. The 
District Court, No. 3:10-cv-05345, 2015 WL 1311438, granted 
tribe’s motion to dismiss counterclaims and to voluntarily dismiss 
entire action. Estate appealed. The appellate court held that: 
(1) tribe’s filing of suit did not constitute waiver of its sovereign 
immunity, and (2) district court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying estate leave to amend its answer and counterclaims. 
Affirmed. 
140. FMC Corporation v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes 
No. 4:14-CV-489, 2017 WL 4322393 (D. Idaho Sep. 28, 2017). 
Appeal filed, 9th Cir., Oct. 24, 2017. In several pending motions, 
the Tribes and FMC ask the Court to determine whether the Tribes 
may enforce a Judgment imposed by the Tribal Appellate Court. 
That Judgment imposes an annual permit fee of $1.5 million. For 
over 50 years, FMC operated a phosphorus production plant on 
1,450 acres of property FMC owned in fee in Pocatello, Idaho, lying 
mostly within the Shoshone-Bannock Fort Hall Reservation. FMC’s 
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operations produced 22 million tons of waste products stored on the 
Reservation in 23 ponds. This waste is radioactive, carcinogenic, 
and poisonous. It will persist for decades, generations even, and is 
so toxic that there is no safe method to move it off-site. The waste’s 
extreme hazards led the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to 
declare the site a CERCLA Superfund clean-up site and to charge 
FMC with violating the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA). The EPA designed and implemented a program to contain 
the waste. To avoid litigation over the RCRA charges, FMC 
negotiated with the EPA over a Consent Decree. As a condition of 
agreeing to that Consent Decree, the EPA insisted that FMC obtain 
Tribal permits for work FMC would do under the Consent Decree 
on the Reservation. The Tribes, however, were demanding $100 
million for those permits, although they would drop the fee to $1.5 
million a year if FMC consented to Tribal jurisdiction. To get the 
lower permit fee, and to satisfy the EPA’s condition that they obtain 
Tribal permits, FMC consented to Tribal jurisdiction. FMC 
challenged those permit fees in Tribal Courts by producing evidence 
that the stored waste had caused no harm and the EPA’s containment 
program foreclosed any need to impose substantial fees. The Tribes 
produced evidence that the waste was severely toxic, would remain 
so for generations, and could not be moved off-site. After hearing 
this evidence, the Tribal Appellate Court issued a Judgment against 
FMC requiring them to pay an annual fee of $1.5 million. The 
parties brought this action to resolve the issue whether the Tribes 
could enforce that Judgment. The Court finds that the Tribes have 
jurisdiction over FMC. The source of the jurisdiction is based on 
FMC’s consent, discussed above, and the catastrophic threat FMC’s 
waste poses to Tribal governance, cultural traditions, and health and 
welfare. Having identified the source of the Tribes’ jurisdiction over 
FMC, the Court turns next to the scope of that jurisdiction. To the 
extent that Tribal jurisdiction is based on FMC’s consensual 
relationship with the Tribe to pay $1.5 million annually to store 
hazardous waste within the Reservation, the Tribes have jurisdiction 
to impose the $1.5 million annual fee for as long as the waste is 
stored there. The Tribal Appellate Court relied on this ground of 
jurisdiction to impose its Judgment, and the Court finds that the 
Judgment must be enforced on that ground. Using an agreed-upon 
figure is fine when the basis of jurisdiction is a consensual 
relationship, but when jurisdiction is based instead on a catastrophic 
threat, the amount of the Judgment must bear some relationship to 
the Tribes’ need to protect against the threat. Because there is no 
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such relationship in this record, the Court cannot enforce the 
Judgment on the basis of the catastrophic threat basis for Tribal 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Court will enforce the Judgment 
because, as discussed above, it was properly entered under the 
consensual relationship basis for Tribal jurisdiction. Now therefore 
it is hereby ordered that the Tribes’ motion to enforce the Judgment 
under Montana’s first exception is granted. It is further ordered, that 
the motion to enforce the Judgment under Montana’s second 
exception is granted in part and denied in part. It is granted to the 
extent it seeks a ruling that the Tribes had jurisdiction over FMC 
under Montana’s second exception to impose an annual permit fee 
to store hazardous waste within the Reservation but is denied to the 
extent it seeks to enforce the Judgment of an annual permit fee of 
$1.5 million, for the reasons discussed above.  
141. Mitchell v. Tulalip Tribes of Washington 
No. C17-1279, 2017 WL 5010129 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 2, 2017). This 
matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 
Plaintiffs are three married couples, each of whom own a house on 
the Tulalip Indian Reservation in Snohomish County, Washington 
(“Homeowners”). Defendant Tulalip Tribes of Washington (“The 
Tribes”), is a federally recognized American Indian Tribe. 
Homeowners are not members of The Tribes. Homeowners seek 
declaratory and injunctive relief against The Tribes in regard to 
tribal ordinances that they allege are unlawfully encumbering their 
property. Although Homeowners’ property is located on the Tulalip 
Reservation, they own title in fee simple. In 1999, The Tribes 
recorded a Memorandum of Ordinance that states The Tribes have 
land use regulatory authority over all properties located within the 
Reservation’s boundaries. This regulatory ordinance appears as a 
special exception to coverage on Homeowners’ title. In addition, the 
Tulalip Tribal Code contains a real estate excise tax provision that 
requires payment of 1% of the sale price of any transfer of real 
property within the boundaries of the Tulalip Reservation. This 
excise tax is also listed as a special exception on Homeowners’ title. 
Homeowners allege that the regulatory ordinance and real excise tax 
place a cloud on their title and render it unmarketable. Homeowners 
ask the Court to: (1) declare The Tribes are without right to regulate 
or levy tax on Homeowners’ property; (2) permanently enjoin The 
Tribes from excising a tax against Homeowners’ property; and (3) 
quiet title to Homeowners’ title free and clear of any encumbrances 
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arising from the regulatory ordinance or real estate excise tax. The 
Tribes argue that Homeowners’ claims should be dismissed for three 
reasons. First, The Tribes assert the Court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction because Homeowners are barred from bringing the 
lawsuit under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. Second, it 
argues that Homeowners’ claims are barred by res judicata because 
the Snohomish County Superior Court previously dismissed the 
identical claims with prejudice. Third, The Tribes assert that 
Homeowners’ claims do not represent an Article III case or 
controversy because they are not ripe. The Court finds that 
Homeowners’ claims are unripe and therefore does not address the 
issues of tribal sovereign immunity and res judicata. The Court will 
not issue a declaratory judgment because Homeowners’ complaint 
does not demonstrate “that there is a substantial controversy, 
between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient 
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory 
judgment.” United States v. Braren, 338 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 
2003) (internal quotations omitted). The Tribe’s motion to dismiss 
is granted. Homeowners’ claims are dismissed without prejudice.  
142. Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Johnson 
No. 44478, 162 Idaho 754, 405 P.3d 13 (Idaho Nov. 3, 2017). 
Kenneth and Donna Johnson appealed a district court judgment 
recognizing a tribal judgment from the Coeur d’Alene Tribal Court 
(Tribal Court). The Johnsons owned land within the Coeur d’Alene 
Reservation (Reservation) on the banks of the St. Joe River and had 
a dock and pilings on the river. The Coeur d’Alene Tribe (Tribe) 
initiated an action in Tribal Court to enforce a tribal statute which 
required a permit for docks on the St. Joe River within the 
Reservation. The Johnsons did not appear and a default judgment 
was entered against them. The judgment imposed a civil penalty of 
$17,400 and declared that the Tribe was entitled to remove the dock 
and pilings. On January 2016, the Tribe filed a petition to have the 
Tribal Court judgment recognized in Idaho pursuant to the 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. I.C. sections 10-1301, et 
seq. The district court held the Tribal Judgment was valid and 
enforceable, entitled to full faith and credit. However, the Idaho 
Supreme Court determined the district court was incorrect in 
holding the Tribal Judgment was entitled to full faith and credit, and 
the civil penalty was not entitled to recognition in Idaho courts. 
However, the Idaho Supreme Court held the Tribal Court had 
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jurisdiction over the Johnsons and the subject matter of this case; the 
Johnsons did not meet their burden of establishing the Tribal Court 
did not have jurisdiction, and the Johnsons were afforded due 
process in Tribal Court. In this case the judgment comprised two 
parts: (1) the civil penalty of $17,400; and (2) the declaration that 
the Tribe had the right to remove the offending encroachment. The 
civil penalty was not enforceable under principles of comity. 
However, the penal law rule does not prevent courts from 
recognizing declaratory judgments of foreign courts. Therefore, the 
Idaho Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment to the 
extent that it recognized the Tribal Court’s judgment imposing the 
civil penalty of $17,400. The Court affirmed the judgment 
recognizing the Tribal Court judgment regarding the Tribe’s right to 
remove the dock and pilings. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. 
143. McKesson Corporation v. Hembree 
No. 17-CV-323, 2018 WL 340042 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 9, 2018). This 
proceeding concerns a lawsuit by the Cherokee Nation against a 
number of opioid distributors and pharmacies. However, the 
question before the Court is not the merits of the Cherokee Nation’s 
lawsuit but rather the boundaries of Tribal Court jurisdiction. The 
Attorney General of the Cherokee Nation has filed suit not in state 
court but in the Tribal District Court of the Cherokee Nation. Do the 
Tribal Courts of the Cherokee Nation have jurisdiction over this 
particular action? The Court finds they do not. The Court finds that 
Tribal Court jurisdiction over Count I of the Tribal Court Petition is 
foreclosed as an unauthorized attempt to privately enforce the 
Controlled Substances Act. Further, in light of the Plaintiffs’ 
nonmember status, the lack of authorization for tribal enforcement 
in the CSA or elsewhere, and clearly established authority that the 
CSA does not authorize a private right of action, the Court finds that 
the lack of Tribal Court jurisdiction over Count I is “so patently 
obvious as to defy exhaustion.” Thlopthlocco Tribal Town, 762 F.3d 
at 1239. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not required to exhaust their 
arguments in Tribal Court with respect to the CNUDPA claims. To 
require otherwise “would serve no purpose other than delay.” Id. at 
1238. The Tribal Court Petition asserts common-law claims of 
nuisance, negligence, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy 
against all defendants. Plaintiffs contend, first, that tribal 
jurisdiction is automatically foreclosed because none of the conduct 
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at issue occurred within Indian country. It is undisputed that the 
Distributors’ and Pharmacies’ facilities are not located on land 
owned by or held in trust for the Cherokee Nation. However, 
because Montana governs jurisdiction over nonmembers even 
within Indian country, the Court will determine first whether there 
is a colorable claim of jurisdiction under either the first or second 
Montana exception. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown that 
the lack of Tribal Court jurisdiction is sufficiently clear, such that 
further proceedings in the Tribal Court Action would serve no 
purpose other than delay. First, the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction is 
presumptively invalid under Montana because the Distributors and 
Pharmacies are nonmembers of the Cherokee Nation. Second, it is 
clear that the conduct alleged in the Tribal Court Action falls well 
outside the Cherokee Nation’s inherent sovereign authority to 
regulate conduct under the first Montana exception. Third, the Court 
does not find a colorable argument that the Tribal Court Action fits 
within the narrow second Montana exception. The clear lack of 
jurisdiction is sufficient to excuse Plaintiffs from the exhaustion 
requirement. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are 
substantially likely to show that the Tribal Court lacks jurisdiction 
in the Tribal Court Action and that exhaustion should not be 
required. 
144. Kodiak Oil & Gas (USA) Inc. v. Burr 
No. 4:14–cv–085, No. 4:14–cv–087, 303 F.Supp.3d 964, 2018 WL 
1440602 (D.N.D. Mar. 22, 2018). Before the Court are three 
separate motions for preliminary injunctive relief filed by Kodiak 
Oil & Gas (USA), Inc., now known as Whiting Resources 
Corporation, HRC Operating, LLC, and EOG Resources, Inc. Also 
before the Court are several motions to dismiss the complaints of 
Kodiak Oil, HRC Operating, and EOG Resources (“Plaintiffs”). On 
July 29, 2014, Kodiak Oil & Gas (USA), Inc., now known as 
Whiting Resources Corporation (“Kodiak Oil”), filed a complaint 
against Defendants Jolene Burr, Ted Lone Fight, Georgianna Danks, 
Edward S. Danks, and Judge Diane Johnson, in her capacity as the 
Chief Judge of the Fort Berthold District Court, seeking a 
declaration that the Fort Berthold Tribal Court (“Tribal Court”) 
lacks jurisdiction over a suit filed by Defendants Jolene Burr, Ted 
Lone Fight, as well as Georgianna Danks and Edward S. Danks in 
Tribal Court against Kodiak Oil and others. In the underlying Tribal 
Court action, the Tribal Court Plaintiffs seek to recover royalties 
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pursuant to an Oil & Gas Mining Lease for Kodiak and others’ 
improper flaring of natural gas associated with oil wells. On May 4, 
2015, the Magistrate Judge ordered the federal court action brought 
by Kodiak Oil stayed upon agreement of the parties, “pending 
further action by the tribal court.” EOG Resources, Inc. (“EOG 
Resources”) also filed a complaint in this Court. As a named 
defendant in the same tribal court action brought against Kodiak Oil, 
EOG Resources similarly seeks a declaration the Tribal Court lacks 
jurisdiction over the suit filed by the Tribal Court Plaintiffs in Tribal 
Court. On May 1, 2015, EOG Resources requested a stay of the 
federal court action due to its pending motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction in the tribal court matter. Consequently, this Court 
ordered the federal action stayed “pending a ruling from the Three 
Affiliated Tribes District Court and a possible appeal from the tribal 
court decision.” While both federal court actions were stayed, the 
matter proceeded in the Tribal Court, with Kodiak Oil and others 
filing motions to dismiss the tribal court action for lack of 
jurisdiction. On May 12, 2016, the Tribal Court issued a 
“Memorandum Opinion” in which the Tribal Court denied the 
motions to dismiss, concluding the Tribal Court has jurisdiction over 
the “straight-forward contract action.” On appeal, the MHA Nation 
Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the 
Fort Berthold District Court. The MHA Nation Supreme Court 
ultimately determined Kodiak Oil, EOG Resources, HRC Operating 
and other defendants are subject to MHA Nation’s “legislative, 
executive and judicial jurisdiction” because they operate businesses 
and conduct business activities within the Fort Berthold 
Reservation. The MHA Nation Supreme Court first decided 
“Montana’s rule and exceptions do not apply here, where the 
challenged non-Indian Petitioner’s activities were all taken on 
Indian allotments held in trust.” Essentially, the MHA Nation 
Supreme Court construed Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 
101 S. Ct. 1245, 67 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1981) narrowly to apply to lands 
within a reservation not owned by the Tribe or its members. 
However, the MHA Nation Supreme Court continued, and 
determined if Montana applies, the Tribal Court has jurisdiction 
over the matter based upon the ‘consensual relationship’ exception 
to the Montana rule, evinced “by the oil and gas leases executed by 
and between oil and gas companies and the individual Indian 
allottees.” The MHA Nation Supreme Court also concluded the 
federal regulatory scheme of oil and gas leases for allotted lands 
does not preclude the Fort Berthold District Court from exercising 
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its jurisdiction over the matter. Nonetheless, the MHA National 
Supreme Court ultimately determined “judicial review is premature 
at this juncture because [the Tribal Court Plaintiffs] have not 
exhausted their administrative remedies.” The Court GRANTS 
Kodiak Oil, EOG Resources, and HRC Operating’s motions for 
preliminary injunction and ORDERS Defendants Jolene Burr, Ted 
Lone Fight, Georgianna Danks and Edward S. Danks enjoined from 
further prosecuting the underlying action in Tribal Court and 
Defendants Judge Mary Seaworth, in her capacity as Acting Chief 
Judge of the Fort Berthold District Court, and Yvette Falcon, in her 
capacity as the Court Clerk/Consultant of the Three Affiliated 
Tribes District Court of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, 
enjoined from exercising jurisdiction over the underlying Tribal 
Court action until a final determination of the Plaintiffs’ claims in 
federal court. Further, the Court DENIES the Tribal Court 
Defendants’ motions to dismiss.  
145. Free v. Dellinger 
No. 18-cv-181, 2018 WL 3580769 (N.D. Okla. Jul 25, 2018). Now 
before the Court are the following motions: Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction and Brief in Support and Defendant 
Dellinger’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for Failure to 
Exhaust Tribal Remedies. This case arises out of an ongoing dispute 
about gaming activities on land over which the Muscogee Creek 
Nation (MCN) claims to have exclusive jurisdiction. The land in 
question is located in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma and is known as the 
Bruner Parcel, and the MCN claims that Bruner Parcel is within the 
historical boundaries of the MCN Reservation. Bruner is a citizen of 
the MCN, but he was apparently a member of the Kialegee Tribal 
Town as well. On August 16, 2017, the MCN filed a civil action in 
the District Court of the MCN seeking a declaratory judgment and 
injunctive relief preventing defendants Bruner, The Kialegee Tribal 
Town, Jeremiah Hobia, Red Creek Holdings, LLC, and Luis 
Figueredo from taking any action in furtherance of gaming activity 
on the Bruner Parcel. The Kialegee Tribal Town was allegedly 
claiming that it had shared jurisdiction over the Bruner Parcel and it 
had issued a gaming license to Bruner. The MCN argues that it has 
sole jurisdiction over the Bruner Parcel, and it is seeking to prevent 
illegal gaming activity on its lands. The Court finds that this case 
should be dismissed, because plaintiff did not exhaust her tribal 
court remedies before filing suit in federal court to challenge the 
 166 
 
jurisdiction of the MCN courts. Plaintiff has not met her burden to 
show that any of the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are 
present, and it would be preferable to allow the tribal court to 
consider plaintiff’s arguments concerning the existence of tribal 
jurisdiction in the first instance. The tribal court action was also in 
its early stages and the Court finds that there is not a sufficient 
factual record to consider whether plaintiff is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the MCN courts.  
146. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v.                                             
Yamassee Tribal Nation, et al. 
No. 1:17-cv-00759, 2018 WL 3629940 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 30, 2018). 
On March 29, 2018, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Plaintiff” or 
“Chase”) filed a motion for entry of default judgment, seeking 
declaratory and permanent injunctive relief against Peter P. 
Khamsanvong, Yamassee Tribal Nation, and Supreme Court of the 
Yamassee Native American Association of Nations (“Yamassee 
Supreme Court”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Defendants have not 
opposed the motion. Upon review of the declarations, pleadings, and 
exhibits to the present motion, the Court recommends granting the 
motion for default judgment and awarding declaratory relief. On 
June 2, 2017, Plaintiff commenced this declaratory judgment action. 
Plaintiff alleges that on or about August 13, 2013, Defendant 
Khamsanvong obtained a residential loan in the amount of 
$108,989.00 (the “Loan”), secured by a deed of trust, encumbering 
the real property known as 1906 West Aurora Avenue, Porterville, 
California 93257 (the “Property”). Carrington started non-judicial 
foreclosure proceedings on the property, and, on September 30, 
2016, caused a notice of default to be recorded against title to the 
property. On December 13, 2016, the Yamassee Supreme Court 
issued an “Order to Show Cause/Default Judgment/Writ of 
Restituion [sic] In The Event Defendants Fail To Respond Within 
21 Days Of Receipt Of This Order,” naming Chase and Jamie 
Dimon, Chase’s Chief Executive Officer, as defendants. The 
purported order to show cause alleges that Defendant Khamsanvong 
is “an enrolled tribal member of the Yamassee tribal nation” and that 
the Property, which was owned by Defendant Khamsanvong, is in 
“Indian country,” and seeks remedies against the named defendants 
including “an accounting, restitution or payment of proceeds from 
an alleged ‘securitization’ of the mortgage note and damages in the 
amount of $25 million dollars.” On January 13, 2017, Plaintiff, 
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through a special appearance, responded to the Order Show Cause 
objecting to the Yamassee Tribal Nation and the Yamassee Supreme 
Court’s purported jurisdiction over Plaintiff and Mr. Dimon. 
Plaintiff never received a response to its objection. Plaintiff seeks a 
judicial declaration that the Yamassee Tribal Nation or the 
Yamassee Supreme Court lacks any personal or subject matter 
jurisdiction over Plaintiff or its executives, employees and agents, 
including Mr. Dimon, and cannot award damages or any legal or 
equitable relief, in any manner or any amount, to Defendant 
Khamsanvong. Here, a review of the most recent List, 83 Fed. Reg. 
4235-02, reveals no Indian tribe by the name of “Yamassee.” 
Furthermore, several courts have found that the Yamassee are “not 
recognized as a separate sovereign nation” as they “do not have a 
treaty with the United States, are not recognized by the Bureau of 
Indians, and are not listed as a recognized Indian tribe in IRS 
Revenue Procedure 2002-64.” The Yamassee Tribal Nation, 
therefore, is not a federally recognized Indian tribe entitled to the 
immunities and privileges available to other federally recognized 
Indian tribes, including adjudicative authority pursuant to the 
exercise of inherent sovereign authority. Thus, the Yamassee Tribal 
Nation has no adjudicative jurisdiction and any judgment issued by 
the Yamassee Supreme Court is necessarily null and void.  
 
147. Rabang, et al., v. Kelly, Jr., et al. 
 
No. C17-0088, 2018 WL 3630295 (W.D. Wash. Jul. 31, 2018). This 
matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ response to the Court’s 
order to show cause and Defendants’ responses. Having thoroughly 
considered the parties’ briefing and the relevant record, the Court 
finds oral argument unnecessary and hereby dismisses Plaintiffs’ 
complaint without prejudice and without leave to amend for the 
reasons explained herein. This case arises out of the disenrollment 
of hundreds of members of the Nooksack Indian Tribe and 
subsequent Department of the Interior (“DOI”) and Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (“BIA”) decisions regarding the federal government’s 
recognition of the Nooksack Tribal Council. Plaintiffs in this matter 
are “purportedly disenrolled” members of the Nooksack Indian 
Tribe. Defendants are current and former members of the Nooksack 
Indian Tribal Council and other figures within the tribal 
government. Plaintiffs bring suit against Defendants for alleged 
violations of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (“RICO”). Plaintiffs allege that 
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Defendants abused their positions within the tribal government to 
carry out a scheme to defraud them of money, property, and benefits 
“by depriving [them] of their tribal membership.” The Court 
previously stated that “if the DOI and BIA recognize tribal 
leadership after new elections, this Court will no longer have 
jurisdiction and the issues will be resolved internally.” These 
circumstances have come to pass. The DOI recognized the 
Nooksack Tribal Council as the Tribe’s governing body, following 
the agency’s validation of the December 2017 special election. The 
Court’s original basis for exercising jurisdiction under an exception 
to the tribal exhaustion rule no longer exists. The Court concludes 
that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims. In 
general, Indian tribes possess inherent and exclusive power over 
matters of internal tribal governance. See Nero v. Cherokee Nation, 
892 F.2d 1457, 1463 (10th Cir. 1989); Goodface v. Grassrope, 708 
F.2d 335, 339 (8th Cir. 1983). The determination of tribal 
membership has long been recognized as a matter of internal tribal 
governance to be determined by tribal authorities. The Court 
dismisses Plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice and without leave 
to amend.  
 
148. Stephen Mccoy v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc. 
No. 17-88, 2018 WL 3824147 (D. Mont. Aug. 10, 2018). Before the 
Court is Salish Kootenai College, Inc’s (the “College”) Motion to 
Dismiss. Plaintiff Stephen McCoy (“McCoy”) opposes the Motion. 
Amici Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes and the American 
Indian Higher Education Consortium have joined in support of the 
Motion. McCoy filed his Complaint asserting two claims: a sex-
based discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and a sex-based discrimination 
claim under the Montana Human Rights Act, Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 49–2–101 et seq. McCoy asserts this Court has jurisdiction 
because Title VII presents a federal question. The College moved 
the Court to enter a scheduling order for jurisdictional discovery 
because the Court lacks jurisdiction if the College is an arm of the 
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (the “Tribes”). The Court 
granted the unopposed motion, and the parties have now engaged in 
jurisdictional discovery. During the pendency of this case, the Ninth 
Circuit issued an opinion similar to this matter on July 10, 2017, in 
United States ex rel. Cain v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc., 862 F.3d 
939 (9th Cir. 2017). The Ninth Circuit instructed the district court to 
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determine on remand whether Defendant Salish Kootenai College, 
Inc. functions as an arm of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai 
Tribes “and therefore shares the Tribe’s sovereign status” for 
purpose of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733. Cain, 862 
F.3d at 943. The Ninth Circuit directed the district court to determine 
the College’s status by analyzing the relationship between the 
College and the Tribe using the factors described in White v. 
University of California, 765 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2014). 
Subsequently, on May 17, 2018, United States District Court Judge 
Morris entered a Memorandum and Order granting the College’s 
Motion to Dismiss in accordance with the White factors. Fawn Cain, 
Tanya Archer, and Sandi Ovitt v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc. et 
al., Case No. CV-12-181-B-BMM, Doc. 108 (May 17, 2018). The 
Court finds that all five White factors support that the College 
functions as an arm of the Tribe. Consequently, the College shares 
in the Tribe’s sovereign immunity given its status as an arm of the 
Tribe. The College is not subject to suit under the Title VII and the 
College shares in the Tribe’s sovereign immunity. Therefore, the 
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted 
against the College and tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction over 
the state law claim. Accordingly, it is ordered the College’s Motion 
to Dismiss is granted. McCoy’s claims against the College are 
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  
149. Drabik v. Thomas 
No. AC 38997, __ A.3d __, 2018 WL 3829155 (Conn. Ct. App. 
Aug. 14, 2018). The plaintiff, John Drabik, appeals from the 
judgment of the trial court dismissing his petition for a bill of 
discovery against the defendants, Elaine Thomas, a deputy tribal 
historic preservation officer for The Mohegan Tribe of Indians of 
Connecticut (tribe), James Quinn, the tribal historic preservation 
officer for the tribe, and the Tribal Council, the governing body of 
the tribe, on the ground of tribal sovereign immunity. Specifically, 
the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly (1) decided that 
the petition should be dismissed on the ground that tribal sovereign 
immunity applies to petitions for a bill of discovery, and 
(2) determined that the defendants are entitled to tribal sovereign 
immunity. The plaintiff owns property in East Lyme that is not part 
of or adjacent to the reservation of the tribe. AT & T evaluated the 
plaintiff's property as a potential location for a new cellular 
communications tower. As part of the application process to the 
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Connecticut Siting Council, the agency responsible for utility 
facilities' locations, AT & T submitted an electronic message with 
the proposed site to the Federal Communications Commission, 
which notified the tribe of the proposal. The tribe’s response, written 
by Thomas, indicated that a site walk conducted on June 10, 2015, 
identified “substantial stone groupings” on the property adjacent to 
the plaintiff's property. According to the response, the proposed 
tower would “impact the view shed” of these “cultural stone 
features” and could “possibly cause impact to the overall integrity 
of the landscape.” The response concluded that, in the opinion of the 
Mohegan Tribal Historic Preservation Office, the proposed tower 
would cause an adverse effect to “properties of traditional religious 
and cultural significance to the [tribe].” After receiving this response 
from the tribe, AT & T stopped considering the plaintiff's property 
as a potential site for the tower. On multiple occasions, the plaintiff 
made requests for clarification from Thomas and Quinn about the 
stone groupings, seeking more information about their location, 
substance, and historical and cultural significance, but no 
representative of the tribe responded to any of his repeated requests. 
The plaintiff filed a petition for a bill of discovery, alleging that he 
may have a cause of action of intentional interference with a 
business relationship against the defendants. The defendants filed a 
motion to dismiss, citing the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. 
The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the bill of 
discovery. The plaintiff then filed the present appeal, claiming that 
the court improperly found that sovereign immunity applied to bar 
a bill of discovery. The plaintiff acknowledges that “the [tribe] and 
its officers enjoy tribal sovereign immunity that protects them from 
most lawsuits in Connecticut Superior Court,” but he insists, 
nonetheless, that tribal sovereign immunity does not bar a bill of 
discovery, as a bill of discovery seeks equitable relief and is distinct 
from the filing of a lawsuit. There are no allegations in the bill of 
discovery that Thomas or Quinn conducted the site walk, identified 
the stone groupings, failed to respond to the plaintiff's requests while 
acting outside of their official capacity, or otherwise exceeded the 
authority given to them by the tribe. As such, the facts as alleged do 
not support the plaintiff's claim that Thomas and Quinn were named 
as defendants in their individual capacities or otherwise exceeded 
the scope of their authority. Thus, the court correctly concluded that 
the defendants were protected by sovereign immunity and, 
therefore, properly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The 
judgment is affirmed. 
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L. Tax 
 
150. Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Gerlach 
 
No. 14–4171, 269 F. Supp. 3d 910 (D.S.D. Sep. 15, 2017). Appeal 
Filed 8th Cir., Feb. 6, 2018. Indian tribe brought action, alleging that 
state was not entitled to collect use tax on non-gaming purchases by 
individuals that were not tribe members at casino that was subject 
of compact pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 
and related operations, as well as nearby convenience store. Tribe 
and state both moved for summary judgment. The District Court 
held that: (1) IGRA preempted state from imposing use tax on 
purchases made at casino and related operations that facilitated 
gaming activities; (2) IGRA did not preempt state’s imposition of 
use tax on purchases at convenience store by nonmembers; 
(3) state’s imposition of use tax on nonmembers for purchases at 
store was not preempted under White Mountain Apache Tribe v. 
Bracker, 100 S. Ct. 2578; (4) state’s imposition of use tax on 
purchases at store by nonmembers was not discriminatory; 
(5) burden upon tribe to collect and enforce use tax on nonmember 
purchases at store was not preempted by federal law, nor did it 
infringe upon tribal sovereignty; and (6) State was not entitled to 
condition issuance of liquor license to casino and related operations 
upon remittance of use tax for nonmember purchases at store. 
Motions granted in part and denied in part. 
 
151. People ex rel. Becerra v. Rose 
No. C080546, 16 Cal. App. 5th 317 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 28, 2017). 
The People brought action against cigarette seller operating on 
Indian land allotments, alleged violations of the tobacco directory 
law, California Cigarette Fire Safety and Firefighter Protection Act, 
state excise tax laws, and unfair competition law, and seeking 
injunctive relief and civil penalties. The Superior Court, No. 
176689, entered judgment for the People and imposed total civil 
penalty of $765,000 as well as injunctive relief. Seller appealed. The 
appellate court held that: (1) California had jurisdiction over 
cigarette sales on Indian land allotments, and (2) uncontested 
findings of fact supported conclusion all 51,000 sales for which 
penalties were imposed occurred after seller was notified sales were 
illegal. Affirmed. 
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152. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Biegalski 
No. 16-62775, 2017 WL 4570790, 2017 WL 4570790 (S.D. Fla. 
Oct. 12, 2017). The Seminole Tribe of Florida has filed suit, seeking 
injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that Florida’s 
imposition of a utility tax on the Tribe’s use of electricity on its 
reservations or other property is improper. This is the second time 
the Tribe has sought relief from Florida’s utility tax. Accordingly, 
Defendant Leon Biegalski has filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that 
the Tribe’s second suit is foreclosed by claim preclusion. The Tribe, 
of course, vigorously opposes the application of claim preclusion to 
this suit. After careful analysis, the Court agrees with Biegalski and 
finds the Tribe’s instant case should be dismissed. Because the 
Court finds the specific allegations presented in this case barred by 
claim preclusion, it grants Biegalski’s motion to dismiss. The 
Tribe’s complaint is therefore dismissed with prejudice.  
153. Perkins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
Docket No. 28215–14, 62018 WL 1146343, 129 Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. 
(RIA) 150.6 (T.C. Mar. 1, 2018). Married taxpayers petitioned for 
redetermination of income-tax deficiency arising from disallowance 
of exemption for income earned from selling gravel mined from land 
of Seneca Nation of Indians, of which wife was enrolled member. 
IRS moved for summary judgment. The Tax Court, held that: 
(1) General Allotment Act of 1887 did not exempt married 
taxpayers’ income from gravel sales; (2) Canandaigua Treaty 
between federal government and Seneca Nation did not create 
income-tax exemption for individual member of Seneca Nation, at 
least insofar as income was not derived from land allotted to such 
member; (3) taxpayers were liable for additions to tax for failure to 
timely file returns; (4) IRS failed to meet its burden of production 
with respect to taxpayers’ liability for accuracy-related penalties; 
and (5) in opinion by Lauber and Pugh, JJ., federal government’s 
Treaty with the Seneca conferred rights on Seneca Nation of 
Indians, not its constituent members, and it covered only taxes 
imposed by State of New York. Motion granted in part and denied 
in part.  
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154. Barrett v. California Department of Tax and Fee 
Administration 
No. B276619, 2018 WL 2252657 (Cal. Ct. App. May 17, 2018). 
Selnek operates the Torres–Martinez Travel Center (Travel Center), 
which is located on tribal land. The Travel Center sells fuel, 
alcoholic beverages, food, and general merchandise to the public. In 
May and June 2014, Barrett purchased fuel and an alcoholic 
beverage from the Travel Center, his receipts either reflected that no 
sales tax had been collected, or did not indicate whether or not a 
state sales tax had been collected. Barrett informed the Board of 
Selnek’s tax delinquency, but the Board responded “that because of 
the difficulty of enforcing sales/use taxes against tribal corporations, 
... [the Board] has ... declined to even attempt to apply and enforce 
sales/use tax statutes against Selnek.” Barrett asserts that the failure 
to collect sales and use taxes from the tribe and Selnek violates 
mandatory duties imposed by statute on respondents. Barrett 
therefore seeks a writ of mandate compelling respondents to 
calculate and collect delinquent taxes and penalties owed by the 
tribe, Selnek, and “other similarly situated retailers.” In the present 
petition for writ of mandate, appellant James Barrett alleges that 
several state agencies and administrators (collectively, respondents) 
unlawfully failed to collect state sales and use taxes owed by an 
Indian tribe and corporation. The trial court sustained respondents’ 
demurrer with leave to amend and, when Barrett failed to file an 
amended petition, dismissed the petition. Barrett appealed from the 
resulting judgment of dismissal. We affirm. As we discuss, a writ of 
mandate may issue to compel performance of a ministerial duty, but 
may not command the exercise of discretionary powers in a 
particular manner. Because Barrett has not alleged either the failure 
to perform a ministerial duty or the unreasonable or arbitrary 
exercise of discretionary power, his petition failed to state a claim 
for relief in mandate. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085.) Accordingly, the 
trial court properly sustained respondents’ demurrer and entered 
judgment for respondents.  
155. United States v. Jim 
No. 16-17109, 891 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. Jun. 4, 2018). Government 
brought action against Indian tribe member seeking to reduce 
income tax assessments on gaming revenue distributions to 
judgment. Tribe intervened as a defendant. The District Court, 
No. 1:14–cv–22441, 2016 WL 7539132, granted in part 
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government’s motion for summary judgment on affirmative defense 
that distributions were exempt from taxation under Tribal General 
Welfare Exclusion Act, following bench trial, 2016 WL 6995455, 
issued findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered judgment 
against defendants, and denied tribe’s motion to alter or amend 
judgment. Defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) 
Indian general welfare benefits exemption did not apply to 
distributions; (2) distributions did not derive from tribal land, and, 
thus, were not exempt from federal taxation on such basis; 
(3) District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying tribe’s 
motion to amend judgment entered against it. Affirmed. In this 
appeal, the member and the tribe contend that the District Court 
erred in concluding that the exemption for Indian general welfare 
benefits did not apply to the distributions. The tribe alone asserts 
that the District Court erroneously upheld tax penalties against the 
member and incorrectly attributed to the member the distributions 
of her husband and daughters. Lastly, the tribe argues that the 
District Court erred by entering judgment against it as an intervenor. 
We affirm the ruling of the District Court in each of these matters. 
The distribution payments cannot qualify as Indian general welfare 
benefits under GWEA because Congress specifically subjected such 
distributions to federal taxation in IGRA. The member has waived 
any arguments as to penalties or the amount assessed against her, 
and the tribe lacks a legal interest in those issues. The District Court 
did not err in entering judgment against the tribe because the tribe 
intervened as of right and the Government sought to establish its 
obligation to withhold taxes on the distributions.  
156. White v. Schneiderman 
No. 59, 31 N.Y.3d 543, 2018 WL 2724989 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 
04028 (N.Y. Cir. Jun. 7, 2018). Tribal retailer and its owner brought 
action against state Attorney General and state tax commissioner, 
seeking declaration that requirement that they pre-pay amount of tax 
to be assessed on sale of cigarettes to non–Indians violated Indian 
Law and treaties between Seneca Nation and United States, and 
sought preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of Tax Law. 
The Supreme Court granted defendants’ cross motion to dismiss, 
and plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 
140 A.D.3d 1636, 33 N.Y.S. 3d 614, affirmed as modified, 
reinstating complaint for declaratory relief but concluding plaintiffs 
were not entitled to such relief. Plaintiffs were granted leave to 
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appeal. The Court of Appeals, Garcia, J., held that prepayment 
scheme did not constitute a tax, and thus did not violate federal law, 
and since prepayment scheme was not a tax, it did not violate 
Buffalo Creek Treaty of 1842, or state statute derived therefrom. 
Affirmed.  
157. Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Sattgast 
No. 4:17-CV-04055-KES, 325 F.Supp.3d 995, 2018 WL 3432047, 
D.S.D. Jul. 16, 2018). Plaintiff, Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe, filed 
this action against defendants Richard L. Sattgast, Andy Gerlach, 
and Dennis Daugaard seeking a judicial declaration that, under 
federal law, the State of South Dakota does not have the authority to 
impose the State’s excise tax in connection to services performed by 
non-Indian contractors in the Tribe’s on-reservation construction 
project. Plaintiff and defendants move for summary judgment. The 
Department of Revenue denied requests by the Tribe and its 
construction manager for an exemption for the casino construction 
project. As a result, Henry Carlson has paid contractor’s excise tax 
under protest consistent with SDCL § 10-27-2. Henry Carlson’s 
protest letters requested that the state issue refunds to the Tribe as 
the entity who paid the cost of taxes. The Tribe seeks to have a 
judicial declaration that the State does not “have the authority to 
impose the State’s contractor’s excise tax” and seeks a refund of the 
“contractor’s excise tax paid, or to be paid, under protest.” 
Currently, the Tribe estimates that the contractor’s excise tax on the 
project will be approximately $480,000. Here, similar to Ramah and 
Bracker, Congress created a comprehensive and pervasive 
regulatory scheme with the explicit intent of providing tribal 
governments with revenue and the ability to be self-sufficient. IGRA 
not only regulates gaming operations, but it also requires the Tribe 
to adopt a tribal resolution for the construction and maintenance of 
the gaming facility that is subject to approval by the Chairman of 
NIGC. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(2)(E). And unlike Yee, the Tribe did not 
engage in tax manipulation and the Tribe is a party to the transaction 
subject to the tax. The State’s excise tax undermines the objective 
of IGRA because the tax is passed from the contractor to the Tribe 
which interferes with the Tribe’s ability to make a profit from 
gaming activities. Thus, Congress intended for IGRA to completely 
regulate Indian gaming and there is no room for the State’s 
imposition of an excise tax. In conclusion, the court finds that both 
barriers to the State’s exercise of authority are present here. The 
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excise tax is pre-empted by federal law by IGRA. Also, the State’s 
interests in imposing the excise tax do not outweigh the tribal and 
federal interests in promoting self-sufficiency because there is not a 
nexus between any services the State provides to the Tribe or the 
contractor and the imposition of the excise tax. Either barrier, on its 
own, is sufficient to find that state authority inapplicable. Bracker, 
448 U.S. at 143, 100 S. Ct. 2578. Thus, the court finds that the 
State’s excise tax is inapplicable. Because the court finds in favor of 
the Tribe under both prongs of the Bracker analysis, it does not reach 
the other theory raised by the Tribe – namely whether the Indian 
Trader Statutes pre-empt the State’s ability to impose the 
contractor’s excise tax.  
158. United States v. King Mountain Tobacco Company, Inc. 
Nos. 14-36055, 16-35607, 899 F.3d 954, 2018 WL 3826230 (9th 
Cir. Aug. 13, 2018). In this case of first impression, we consider 
whether King Mountain Tobacco Company, Inc. (“King 
Mountain”), a tribal manufacturer of tobacco products located on 
land held in trust by the United States, is subject to the federal excise 
tax on manufactured tobacco products. The district court awarded 
the United States almost $58 million for unpaid federal excise taxes, 
associated penalties, and interest. In 2006 the late Delbert Wheeler, 
Sr., a lifelong-enrolled member of the Yakama Nation in 
Washington State, purchased “80 acres of trust property ... from the 
Yakama Nation Land Enterprise, the agency of the Yakama Nation 
which is charged with overseeing the maintenance of real property 
held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the Yakama 
Nation and its members.” Wheeler then opened King Mountain 
Tobacco Company, which manufactures cigarettes and roll-your-
own tobacco in a plant located on this trust land. King Mountain 
received a federal tobacco manufacturer’s permit in February 2007. 
Today, King Mountain manufactures all of its tobacco products, and 
grows some of its own tobacco, on trust lands within the boundaries 
of the Yakama Nation. Some of those trust lands—including those 
on which King Mountain is located—are allotted to Wheeler, while 
others are allotted to other Yakama members. King Mountain 
initially obtained all of the tobacco for its products from an entity in 
North Carolina. But according to King Mountain, “[t]obacco has 
historically grown on the Yakama Nation Reservation.” Over time, 
King Mountain increased the proportion of tobacco grown on trust 
land and incorporated into its manufactured products. By the end of 
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2013, King Mountain’s products were composed “of at least 55 
percent tobacco grown exclusively on allotted land held in trust by 
the United States for the beneficial use of ... Wheeler.” King 
Mountain also manufactures a small amount of “‘traditional use 
tobacco’ that is intended for Indian ... ceremonial use” and consists 
entirely of trust land-grown tobacco. The federal government 
imposes excise taxes on manufactured tobacco products, including 
cigars, cigarettes, and roll-your-own tobacco. Administered by the 
Treasury Department’s Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau 
(“TTB”), these excise taxes are assessed on the privilege of 
manufacturing tobacco products and determined at the time the 
tobacco products are removed from a factory or bonded warehouse. 
Although King Mountain initially paid federal excise taxes on its 
tobacco products, it began to fall behind in 2009. The Treasury gave 
King Mountain statutory notice, under I.R.C. § 5703(d), of the 
delinquent taxes and afforded the company an opportunity to show 
cause why the taxes should not be assessed. King Mountain did not 
challenge the statutory notice. Accordingly, the Treasury delegate 
timely made assessments against King Mountain for unpaid excise 
taxes, failure-to-pay penalties, failure-to-deposit penalties, and 
interest for periods in October, November, and December 2009. In 
February 2010, the Treasury issued King Mountain a Notice and 
Demand for Payment pursuant to I.R.C. § 6303. King Mountain paid 
the assessed taxes in installments over a five-month period in 2010, 
but it failed to pay the associated penalties and interest. Eventually, 
King Mountain ceased paying federal excise taxes altogether. This 
case has shuttled between the district court and our court on both 
procedural and substantive grounds. In 2012, the United States 
brought suit against King Mountain to collect the delinquent taxes. 
The district court granted the Government’s motion to dismiss as to 
King Mountain and Wheeler on the basis that the claims were barred 
by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a). The district court 
then granted summary judgment in favor of the United States on the 
merits, reasoning that neither the General Allotment Act nor the 
Treaty with the Yakamas precluded the imposition of federal excise 
taxes. On appeal, we held that the Yakama Nation’s suit was barred 
by the Anti-Injunction Act. We thus vacated the judgment and 
remanded with instructions to dismiss the suit for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. Back in the district court, the court granted 
summary judgment to the Government on King Mountain’s liability 
for payment of the excise tax. Observing that the merits issues were 
“essentially identical” to those presented in the earlier Yakama case, 
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the court expressly incorporated its conclusions of law from the 
summary judgment order. The district court reserved ruling on the 
amount of liabilities owed by King Mountain, however, in order to 
enable King Mountain to obtain additional discovery. After further 
discovery, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the government on the amount of King Mountain’s liabilities—
$57,914,811.27. However, when the district court entered final 
judgment in favor of the government, it accidentally omitted this 
amount from its order. The government quickly moved to alter or 
amend the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
59(e) to reflect that King Mountain owed “to the United States 
federal tobacco excise tax liabilities totaling $57,914,811.27 as of 
June 11, 2013, plus interest and other statutory additions accruing 
after that date until paid in full.” King Mountain filed a timely notice 
of appeal, which is now before us. We affirm our longstanding rule 
that Indians—like all citizens—are subject to federal taxation unless 
expressly exempted by a treaty or congressional statute. In this case, 
neither the General Allotment Act nor the Treaty with the Yakamas 
expressly exempts King Mountain from the federal excise tax on 
manufactured tobacco products. King Mountain is therefore liable 
for payment of the tax and associated penalties and interest. 
Affirmed. 
 
M. Trust Breach and Claims 
 
159. Alabama-Quassarte Tribal Town v. United States 
 
No. 17-7003, 899 F.3d 1121, 2018 WL 3829245 (10th Cir. Aug. 13, 
2018). Indian tribe brought action against United States, Secretary 
and Associate Deputy Secretary of Interior Department, Treasury 
Secretary, and another tribe seeking declaratory judgment that 
property acquired pursuant to Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act 
(OIWA) was purchased for its benefit, and order compelling 
government to assign property to it and provide it with accounting 
of related trust funds and assets. The District Court, No. 6:06-CV-
00558 granted government's motion for partial judgment on 
pleadings, 2008 WL 11389448, granted other tribe's motion to 
dismiss, 2016 WL 93848, and entered summary judgment in 
government's favor, 2016 WL 7495806. Tribe appealed. The 
appellate court held that: (1) other tribe was necessary party; 
(2) other tribe did not waive its tribal immunity; and (3) Interior 
Board of Indian Appeals' (IBIA) determination that other tribe was 
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legal beneficiary of funds was supported by substantial evidence and 
was not arbitrary or capricious. Affirmed. 
 
N. Miscellaneous 
 
160. Navajo Nation Human Rights Comm’n v.                        
San Juan County 
 
No. 2:16-00154, 281 F.Supp.3d 1136, 2017 WL 3972481 (D. Utah 
Sep. 7, 2017). Tribal human rights commission and registered voters 
who were members of Navajo Nation and residents of county filed 
suit against county, county clerk, and county commissioners, in their 
official capacities, claiming that county’s voting procedures violated 
Equal Protection Clause and Voting Rights Act (VRA), and seeking 
injunctive and declaratory relief. Parties cross-moved for summary 
judgment. The District Court held that: (1) declaratory claims 
regarding prior voting procedures were moot; (2) amendment of 
complaint was warranted to add VRA declaratory claims regarding 
county’s new voting procedures; (3) equal protection claims 
regarding new voting procedures were not sufficiently alleged; 
(4) claims for injunctive relief were not moot; (5) summary 
judgment was precluded for VRA claims challenging denial of early 
in-person voting for Indian voters; (6) summary judgment was 
precluded for VRA claims challenging adequacy of language 
assistance to Indian voters and methods of publicizing voting 
procedures; and (7) summary judgment was precluded on VRA 
claims against county commissioner. Motions denied.  
 
161. Brakebill v. Jaeger 
No. 1:16-cv-008, 2018 WL 1612190 (D.N.D. Apr. 3, 2018). In 
August 2016, this Court carefully considered the Dataphase factors 
and concluded the public interest in protecting the right to vote for 
thousands of Native Americans who lacked a qualifying ID and 
cannot obtain one, outweighed the purported interests and 
arguments of the State. As a result, the North Dakota Secretary of 
State was enjoined from enforcing N.D.C.C. § 16.1-05-07 without 
any adequate “fail-safe” provisions that had been provided to all 
voters in North Dakota prior to 2013. In the past, North Dakota 
allowed all citizens who were unable to provide acceptable ID’s to 
cast their vote under two types of “fail-safe” provisions which were 
repealed in 2013. In response to the preliminary injunction issued 
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August 1, 2016, the North Dakota Legislative Assembly amended 
and enacted a new election law (House Bill 1369). Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for a Second Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED in 
limited part. Specifically, the North Dakota Secretary of State is 
enjoined from enforcing only certain subsections of N.D.C.C. 
§ 16.1-01-04: (1) The Secretary of State is enjoined from enforcing 
Section 16.1-01-04.1(2)(b) which mandates the need for a “current 
residential street address.” The Court is unaware of any other state 
that imposes such a requirement to vote. Neither the North Dakota 
Constitution nor the National Registration Voting Act imposes such 
a strict requirement. Instead, the Secretary of State shall allow a 
qualified voter to receive a ballot if they provide a valid form of ID 
as recognized in Section 16.1-01-04.1(3)(a) or another form of 
identification that includes either a “current residential street 
address” or a current mailing address (P.O. Box or other address) in 
North Dakota. (2) The Secretary of State is enjoined from enforcing 
N.D.C.C. § 16.1-01-04.1(3)(a)(2) which mandates only certain valid 
forms of identification. Instead, the Secretary of State shall also 
allow and accept as a valid form of identification an official form of 
identification issued by a tribal government; the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA), any other tribal agency or entity, or any other 
document, letter, writing, enrollment card, or other form of tribal 
identification issued by a tribal authority so long as those other 
forms of identification, (documents, letters, writings) set forth the 
tribal members name, date of birth, and current residential street 
address or mailing address.  
162. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa 
Indians v. McKesson Corporation 
No. 18-cv-286, 2018 WL 2390120 (W.D. Wisc. May 25, 2018). 
Plaintiff the Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa 
Indians filed this case in state court against defendants, 
manufacturers and distributors of opioid medications, alleging 
violations of Wisconsin statutory and common law as a result of a 
conspiracy to cause national opioid addiction. Defendant McKesson 
Corporation removed the case to this court under the federal officer 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). It appears that this court is just a pit 
stop: McKesson hopes to have the case transferred to the Northern 
District of Ohio for multidistrict litigation. See In re Nat’l 
Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (J.P.M.L. filed Sept. 25, 
2017). The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) issued 
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a conditional transfer order, but the transfer is stayed pending 
briefing on Lac Courte Oreilles’s motion to vacate the conditional 
transfer order. See MDL No. 2804, Dkt. 1317 (Apr. 27, 2018). 
Meanwhile, in this court, Lac Courte Oreilles has filed a motion to 
remand the case to the Circuit Court for Sawyer County. McKesson 
has moved to stay consideration of the remand motion pending the 
MDL transfer. The court will grant McKesson’s motion to stay 
litigation. 
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